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<p>Edited by</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi</p><p>Toyin Falola</p><p>The Palgrave Handbook</p><p>of Contemporary Kenya</p><p>The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Kenya</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi • Toyin Falola</p><p>Editors</p><p>The Palgrave</p><p>Handbook of</p><p>Contemporary Kenya</p><p>ISBN 978-3-031-15853-7 ISBN 978-3-031-15854-4 (eBook)</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4</p><p>© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,</p><p>whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting,</p><p>reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical</p><p>way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer</p><p>software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.</p><p>The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this</p><p>publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt</p><p>from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.</p><p>The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information</p><p>in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher</p><p>nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material</p><p>contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains</p><p>neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.</p><p>Cover pattern: Anton Petrus; Getty Images</p><p>This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG.</p><p>The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland</p><p>Editors</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o</p><p>Rhodes College</p><p>Memphis, TN, USA</p><p>Toyin Falola</p><p>Department of History</p><p>University of Texas at Austin</p><p>Austin, TX, USA</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi</p><p>Technical University of Kenya</p><p>Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4</p><p>v</p><p>Preface</p><p>In recent years, the Republic of Kenya has distinguished itself as one of the</p><p>fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite lacking the opportu-</p><p>nities of booming populations of other sub-Saharan African countries such as</p><p>the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Nigeria, Kenya</p><p>has nevertheless found itself a spot among the top economies in Africa. Aside</p><p>from these, Kenya is a front-runner in the continent’s financial technology sec-</p><p>tor, especially in the mobile money sub-sector. Despite Kenya’s established</p><p>status as one of the foremost economies and political giants in Africa, little has</p><p>been written about the potential and opportunities in the country outside of</p><p>the country’s indigenous literature. This book attempts to showcase the coun-</p><p>try’s importance beyond its national borders.</p><p>The volume comes out at a very opportune moment in the history of Kenya.</p><p>In 2023 the country will be celebrating sixtyyears since independence in 1963</p><p>and yet the country has not developed a comprehensive text on all sectors of</p><p>development. Many books on the market have not been comprehensive in</p><p>representing marginalized parts of Kenya such as northern Kenya, as well as</p><p>economic pursuits such as pastoralism and fishing. In the past, texts have been</p><p>comprehensive in the analysis of themes such as gender, environment, and cor-</p><p>ruption, among others. The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Kenya is an</p><p>advantaged and well-grounded work that goes beyond a chronology of events,</p><p>providing a comprehensive analysis and interpretation of data which is contex-</p><p>tualized in terms of place and role in the history of Kenya.</p><p>In the thirty-four chapters that comprise the Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, the authors explore different aspects of its society’s national history,</p><p>culture, economics, politics, and environment. Part I of the book comprising</p><p>Chaps. 2 through 9 explores independence and the political economy of devel-</p><p>opment. Part II of the book covering Chaps. 10–23 focuses on issues of envi-</p><p>ronment, globalization, gender, and society. It assesses different aspects of</p><p>post-colonial Kenya’s socio-cultural, political, and economic histories, includ-</p><p>ing the country’s indigenous knowledge, sports, environmental policies, eth-</p><p>nicity, and security sector. The involvement of special groups such as women,</p><p>vi PREFACE</p><p>youth, and civil society is also examined. Part III of the book covering Chaps.</p><p>24–34 examines the external context, critically evaluating the impact of the</p><p>external context on Kenya and Kenya’s contribution to the global political</p><p>economy.</p><p>The discourse in this handbook is focused on the country’s present histories,</p><p>including the country’s trajectories of development and future imaginations.</p><p>The book’s themes, research methods, and styles of writing are diverse. Beyond</p><p>merely narrating the trajectories of development in the country, the authors go</p><p>further to analyze data, make scientific inquiries, and use existing data to make</p><p>future predictions, using multiple multidisciplinary perspectives.</p><p>Prior to the publication of this handbook, no book had so comprehensively</p><p>examined the state of contemporary Kenya. While a breadth of the previously</p><p>existing literature has examined different aspects of the country’s history or its</p><p>present political, economic, and cultural developments, there has never been</p><p>such a book as this, with a bird’s eye view of different terrains and trajectories</p><p>of the country’s development. Drawing from the proficient knowledge of</p><p>humanities and social science scholars, this book is rich in diverse perspectives,</p><p>imaginations, research methods, and styles of writing. The thirty-two scholars</p><p>who are involved in writing and editing this book are drawn from multiple</p><p>disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, with decades of experience in</p><p>the specific topics they have written about. Most of the scholars are of Kenyan</p><p>nationality or with years of experience in the Kenyan tertiary education system.</p><p>The few writers who are neither nationals nor scholars in its education system</p><p>have acquired years of experience in African history or African studies, thus</p><p>establishing their credibility and authority in participating in writing this book.</p><p>The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Kenya is rich with information on</p><p>Kenyan society. Its critical approach to the diverse ideas, themes, and discourses</p><p>raised can open up opportunities for further debates and investigations in sub-</p><p>sequent literature. The writers and editors of this book hope that historians,</p><p>sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, economists, including stu-</p><p>dents of any of these or related disciplines, plus policymakers and other inter-</p><p>ested readers find this book valuable in their exploration or research of</p><p>contemporary Kenyan society.</p><p>Memphis, TN, USA WanjalaS.Nasong’o</p><p>Nairobi, Kenya MauriceN.Amutabi</p><p>Austin, TX, USA ToyinFalola</p><p>vii</p><p>1 Contemporary Kenya: Politics, Economics, Environment,</p><p>and Society 1</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o, Maurice N. Amutabi, and Toyin Falola</p><p>Part I Independence and the Political Economy of Development 15</p><p>2 Structural Adjustment and Economic Reforms in Kenya 17</p><p>Urbanus Mwinzi Ndolo</p><p>3 Higher Education Policy and Reforms in Kenya 29</p><p>Michael Mwenda Kithinji</p><p>4 Gangs, Militias, and Vigilantes in Rural and Urban Violence</p><p>in Kenya 43</p><p>Musambayi Katumanga</p><p>5 Role of Students in National Politics in Kenya 57</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi and Linnet Hamasi</p><p>6 Kenyan Public Intellectuals and National Development Debates 71</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi and Linnet Hamasi</p><p>7 The Matatu Industry in Nairobi 87</p><p>Mickie Mwanzia Koster</p><p>8 Pastoralism and the Northern Kenya Economy 97</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi and Linnet Hamasi</p><p>committees and</p><p>vigilantes and informal intelligence collection in addressing insecurity. There is</p><p>also a need to cultivate collective protection of vulnerable groups in order to</p><p>have holistic coverage for everyone.</p><p>Globalization has been massively impactful on Kenya through many ave-</p><p>nues. Kenya’s political ideologies of capitalism and socialism have been bor-</p><p>rowed largely from the outside world. This is the subject of Chap. 23. The</p><p>chapter shows how capitalism has penetrated the entire country through its</p><p>structures and institutions such as commerce and industry, banking, insurance,</p><p>market centers, and distribution networks. Social infrastructure and equity</p><p>favored by socialist ideologies are visible through communal work and institu-</p><p>tions born out of Harambee or self-help, as well as the trade union movement</p><p>that was widely socialist but which is turning capitalist in the recent past. In the</p><p>economic realm, modern transportation through airports, railways, harbors,</p><p>and roads; telecommunication networks; the Internet; and media have linked</p><p>the local and the global in many ways. The role of social media and accompany-</p><p>ing consumption of television products, modern news networks, and blogs has</p><p>made sharing of information much more robust and faster. Fashion, fads, styles,</p><p>and tastes in Kenya have become global, with many local networks of major</p><p>chains and franchises having representation in Kenya. Global pandemics such</p><p>as COVID-19 as well as terrorism threats are felt in Kenya’s space just like</p><p>elsewhere in the world, largely due to globalization.</p><p>Part III: theexternal context</p><p>This final part of the Handbook, composed of 11 chapters, examines the exter-</p><p>nal context and its impact on, and implications for, the making and remaking</p><p>of the Kenyan society, economy, and politics. The external context is analyzed</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>11</p><p>under various themes. The first theme is on Kenya’s international borders and</p><p>boundaries, which are porous and have allowed penetration and infiltration of</p><p>unwanted items, things, and people, thereby affecting and compromising its</p><p>security arrangements. This is covered in Chap. 24. It shows that weak border</p><p>management has seen the infiltration of small arms and light weapons, affecting</p><p>security. Kenya also experiences border disputes in three major areas of con-</p><p>cern: the Ilemi Triangle, the Migingo Island in Lake Victoria, and the maritime</p><p>boundary between Kenya and Somalia. The disputes have left Kenya vulnerable</p><p>because they were left unresolved at the time of the departure of the British.</p><p>Kenya does not have a specific border patrol and management unit but relies</p><p>on police, customs, and immigration to manage border points, making it vul-</p><p>nerable as a country. Very few walls and surveillance equipment have been</p><p>installed, leaving the international boundaries vulnerable. There is a need to</p><p>invest more in border patrols and control and improve border demarcation</p><p>through more lasting infrastructure such as walls, electric fences, and surveil-</p><p>lance equipment.</p><p>Chapter 25 examines the issue of human rights and the rule of law in Kenya</p><p>and argues that this is marked by illiberalism. The chapter underscores a char-</p><p>acteristic paradox in the country’s politics: On the one hand, the masses of the</p><p>people seem to cry out for a democratic state; but on the other hand, they seem</p><p>to be possessed by a culture of cynicism and incipient fascism. The elites swear</p><p>by the values of liberalism but practice illiberalism. It is not even the imperfec-</p><p>tion of the idea, the chapter contends. It is, rather, the complete repudiation of</p><p>those ideals in virtually all facets of national life. The country has been gripped</p><p>by an orgy of self-cannibalization in which people say one thing but do another.</p><p>The country’s zeitgeist is a despair of contradictions, most of them debilitating</p><p>to national interests. What is left is a ruinous landscape on which only evil</p><p>seems to germinate. How to reconcile the seemingly genuine desire—and</p><p>often hard-fought struggles—for a progressive, left-of-center, liberal demo-</p><p>cratic state with deep-seated illiberalism speaks volumes about the apparent</p><p>inability of the Kenyan postcolonial state to cohere a national character and</p><p>ethos of democracy. Vertically and horizontally, the chapter asserts that human</p><p>rights and the rule of law are on every lip, yet they are observed more in their</p><p>breach than observance. As elsewhere, a gene of illiberalism lurks everywhere</p><p>in Kenya.</p><p>Kenya’s diaspora remits about 10B shillings to the country annually. The</p><p>remittances have played an important role in Kenya’s development because</p><p>they increase revenue and reduce external borrowing while helping local devel-</p><p>opment like housing and paying school fees, among other economic gains.</p><p>This is the subject of Chap. 26. The recognition of the diaspora’s impact on</p><p>development by the government of Kenya has culminated in the creation of</p><p>voting opportunities for Kenyans living abroad. There is an ongoing dialogue</p><p>between the government and the diaspora community through government</p><p>representatives such as ambassadors and high commissioners in order to</p><p>improve and increase ways through which the diaspora can be more effective in</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>12</p><p>contributing towards Kenya’s development. Kenyan government’s engage-</p><p>ments with diaspora have seen many meetings in which the diaspora represen-</p><p>tatives have asked and received government assurance on fast-tracking of</p><p>issuance and renewal of passports, protection of diaspora investments in Kenya,</p><p>as well as facilitation of diaspora contributions in the management of public</p><p>institutions by appointment to university councils, school boards, as well as</p><p>appointments to other positions of leadership. The diaspora will continue to</p><p>play a key role in Kenya’s development if they are supported and given the</p><p>necessary legal backing, especially in the Arab world, where many of them are</p><p>increasingly abused by employers and end up suffering violence and even death.</p><p>Kenya’s foreign policy has always supported the Anglo-American axis,</p><p>despite claims in the past to be neutral and non-aligned. Chapter 27 addresses</p><p>Kenya’s foreign policy dynamics from independence to the present. What has</p><p>emerged is Kenya’s negotiation with the West and the East in addressing capi-</p><p>talist and socialist, and communist interests. Kenya’s political parties and</p><p>regimes have related and associated differently with the East and the West to</p><p>get economic and social benefits. Although the founding fathers were socialist</p><p>in their ideological inclination, many later changed and became agents of capi-</p><p>talism, thereby changing Kenya’s foreign policy standpoints at regional and</p><p>global levels. The UN and other global entities have often regarded Kenya as</p><p>an important player in geopolitics in Eastern Africa, which is the reason Kenya</p><p>is the only country in Africa hosting two UN agencies of UNEP and Habitat.</p><p>The respect Kenya has at the global level has seen it play important roles in</p><p>peacekeeping operations in many countries across the world.</p><p>The collapse of Somalia in 1991 created insecurity for all the countries in the</p><p>region. The attack on America on September 11, 2001, was done by terrorists</p><p>linked to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda introduced the world to the reality and dangers</p><p>of global terrorism. This is the subject of Chap. 28. Al-Shabaab has been a</p><p>menace in Kenya’s security operations since Kenya’s intervention in Somalia.</p><p>From 2001, war on terror became a major preoccupation by major powers</p><p>such as the USA, Britain, France, and Germany, which spent a lot of resources</p><p>in combatting terrorism and the threat of terror. Kenya’s security apparatus has</p><p>received a lot of support from governments in the global north in dealing with</p><p>terrorism. The country has made great strides in addressing threats of cells of</p><p>terror groups in the country. The anti-terrorism unit</p><p>continuously cooperates</p><p>with other agencies in addressing the threat of terror. The global efforts on</p><p>fighting terror have seen Kenya receive military aid through hardware such as</p><p>aircraft, drones, arms, and ammunition, as well as strategic support in combat-</p><p>ing terrorism.</p><p>Kenya-US relations have been cordial since independence. This is the sub-</p><p>ject of Chap. 29. After independence in 1963, Kenya deployed young Burundi</p><p>Nabwera as the country’s first ambassador to America and started to build</p><p>strong relations with President J.F. Kennedy’s administration, especially in the</p><p>area of scholarships for Kenyans. This witnessed the famous airlifts organized</p><p>by Tom Mboya, which saw hundreds of Kenyans going to study in America</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>13</p><p>under various support structures. Some of these students returned to Kenya</p><p>and became an important part of nation-building. The US government has</p><p>helped Kenya in many areas through international cooperation, military supply</p><p>of arms and aircraft, as well as strategic support, thereby helping ensure stabil-</p><p>ity in Kenya’s defense forces. In the recent past, West Point, the US Military</p><p>Academy, has had more influence on the training of Kenya’s senior military</p><p>officers compared to Sandhurst in Britain in the 1960s to 1990s. Kenya-US</p><p>relations have also led to the development of critical infrastructure as well as</p><p>health, education, and agriculture programs leading to enhanced economic</p><p>stability. The Kenyan diaspora in America is the strongest among all the dias-</p><p>poras as it contributes a lot of remittances.</p><p>Kenya has had relations with China since the ninth century AD, when the</p><p>Chinese Emperor received a giraffe as a gift from East Africa. Ever since Sino-</p><p>Kenya relations have developed to include more exchange of goods and ser-</p><p>vices; this is the subject of Chap. 30. China has helped infrastructural</p><p>development in Kenya with the construction of Nyayo National Stadium, Moi</p><p>Sports Complex Kasarani, Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital in Eldoret,</p><p>Thika Superhighway, and the Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa to</p><p>Nairobi. Kenya has also benefited massively in exchange programs with China,</p><p>where thousands of Kenyans have received training in China. Today China is</p><p>participating in improving infrastructure in many parts of Kenya, including the</p><p>Lamu Port and the Northern Corridor Road and Pipeline from Lamu to</p><p>Turkana. Although there have been accusations of the debt trap and debt bur-</p><p>den with serious implications for the country, there are observers who feel that</p><p>the debts have been necessary for Kenya’s development cycle. Some have</p><p>argued that debts from China do not attract as high interest compared to loans</p><p>from the IMF and the World Bank.</p><p>Kenya has been a major partner in creating the East African Community</p><p>(EAC), which was created in the 1960s, collapsed in 1977, and recreated in</p><p>more recent times. This is the subject of Chap. 31. The EAC has its headquar-</p><p>ters in Arusha, Tanzania, and there is strong evidence indicating that its various</p><p>agencies are responsible for successful integration. Although the integration</p><p>has not come to a full cycle, many aspects of the integration envisaged in the</p><p>strategic plan are in place. There have been tensions between member states,</p><p>with suspicion mounting over Kenya’s dominance of the economic and social</p><p>affairs of the region. A Customs Union is taking shape as well as a Common</p><p>Market, which are the first two pillars of the cooperation. The other two pillars</p><p>of the Monetary Union and Political Federation appear to be in the distant</p><p>future. Recently, three more members—Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan—</p><p>have been added, and there are plans to add Somalia and the Democratic</p><p>Republic of the Congo into the Union. There are many debates about the</p><p>Community’s future, given the level of suspicion among the member states.</p><p>External trade has benefited Kenya, especially in marketing agricultural pro-</p><p>duce and minerals, among others. This is the subject of Chap. 32. The chapter</p><p>examines external trade in Kenya by explaining its importance to development</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>14</p><p>from colonial to postcolonial times. The chapter also addresses the deficit</p><p>between Kenya and its partners such as the UK, USA, and China, where</p><p>Kenya’s trade deficit is massive. There is a need for Kenya to enhance local</p><p>ownership in trade transactions. There is a need for Kenya to reduce the gap in</p><p>its external trade engagements with major powers such as the UK, the USA,</p><p>France, Japan, China, and Germany, among others. Low external trade earn-</p><p>ings for Kenya have contributed to the increasing external debt, which, in</p><p>2022, stood at 10 trillion Kenya shillings. More balanced external trade with</p><p>minimal deficits will enhance Kenya’s debt recovery.</p><p>Kenya has played an important role in world politics largely due to its stra-</p><p>tegic location in East Africa. This is the subject of Chap. 33. Kenya’s role in</p><p>geopolitics has been enhanced by its voting pattern in the UN, which closely</p><p>mirrors that of the USA and the UK. It has also received global attention in</p><p>world politics through its successful peacekeeping missions. The country is a</p><p>major economic hub in East Africa, making it attractive to investors. The inves-</p><p>tors have attracted their home governments such as General Motors and the</p><p>US government, Unilever and the British government, and Block Hotels and</p><p>the Israeli government. It has also created a global presence through its clout</p><p>at the UN, which enabled it to be elected representative of Africa in the UN</p><p>Security Council from 2021.</p><p>Chapter 34, the final chapter of the Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, explores future imaginations of the country based on its current and</p><p>historical trajectories. The chapter argues that the development of Kenya’s</p><p>digital economies continues to enhance the country’s globalization index. It is</p><p>expected, according to the chapter, that Kenya will continue to grow in all</p><p>three crucial areas of the globalization index, including the political, economic,</p><p>and cultural. The chapter contends, nevertheless, that this growth will unleash</p><p>positive and negative outcomes. Perhaps the most debilitating aspect of Kenya’s</p><p>development is the rise of political crises and terrorist activities. The chapter</p><p>concludes that unless effective strategies are put in place to safeguard peace and</p><p>order in Kenya, the envisioned future cultural and economic transformations</p><p>will not be realized. In other words, though the Kenyan government has risen</p><p>to the occasion by initiating and implementing Vision 2030, there are still</p><p>abundant opportunities and challenges to be addressed under the plan.</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>PART I</p><p>Independence and the Political Economy</p><p>of Development</p><p>17</p><p>CHAPTER 2</p><p>Structural Adjustment andEconomic Reforms</p><p>inKenya</p><p>UrbanusMwinziNdolo</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>Development actors target to spur rapid economic growth: one which assumes</p><p>top-down diffusion of its benefits equitably. Growth per se has been treated</p><p>mainly as a function of investment. This view links the appropriate levels of</p><p>investment with the incremental capital output ratio and the desired growth</p><p>rates. It is assumed in principle that the effects of growth would follow a</p><p>sequence of stages, which would ultimately spread benefits to all, with the</p><p>resultant effect being the alleviation of poverty and inequalities in society. It</p><p>was aspired that the diffusion of technology and other attributes of moderniza-</p><p>tion would allow the benefits of development to trickle down to the needy</p><p>sectors of the society (GoK, 1997a and WB, 1994a). After several decades,</p><p>analysts began to notice that economic growth was not necessarily correlated</p><p>with the other aspects of development, such as rapid employment creation,</p><p>reduction of poverty and inequalities, and provision of basic needs, as Brohman</p><p>(1996: 201) asserts. Chenery et al. (1974), on</p><p>redistribution with growth,</p><p>emerged with a new approach to development: sustainable growth required</p><p>redistribution policies and targeted programs for the poor during the initial</p><p>stage of development while waiting for the trickle-down mechanisms to even-</p><p>tually spread the benefits of growth. The structural adjustment policies (SAP)</p><p>that the World Bank and the IMF designed to assist in restructuring the</p><p>U. M. Ndolo (*)</p><p>Tharaka University, Marimanti, Tharaka County, Kenya</p><p>e-mail: urbanus.ndolo@tharaka.ac.ke</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_2</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_2&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:urbanus.ndolo@tharaka.ac.ke</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_2</p><p>18</p><p>economies of their borrowers towards economic recovery and financial stability</p><p>adopted the same development strategy and model (WB, 1994b; Wratten,</p><p>1995 & Steward & Geest, 1995). In response to the widespread criticisms of</p><p>the negative effects of the SAP on the marginalized members of society, the</p><p>World Bank introduced the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) program</p><p>as a control measure. The chapter examines the inherent challenges posed by</p><p>the adjustment policies on the poor.</p><p>the SocIo-economIc SItuatIon PrIor totheSaP</p><p>To begin this chapter, we would respond to one critical question: Would Kenya</p><p>have survived without the uptake of the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) as</p><p>prescribed by the World Bank and IMF then? Prior to the SAP, a number of</p><p>socio-economic events had taken place. The rapid economic growth experi-</p><p>enced earlier declined drastically with the emergence of the disequilibria that</p><p>required immediate remedial and rescue strategies. The 1971 balance of pay-</p><p>ments was attributed to the falling terms of trade and the expansionary bud-</p><p>gets, which was overgrowing the domestic revenue. In an attempt to control</p><p>these pressures, controls were selectively instituted mainly on imports, domes-</p><p>tic credit, domestic prices, and restricted budgetary policies, as Strand (1994:</p><p>74) affirms. These measures resulted in a large drop in private investment.</p><p>Secondly, even before the measures could take effect, there was the first oil</p><p>shock of 1973–1974. The subsequent effect of these events slowed down</p><p>national output, increasing the rate of domestic inflation that stimulated gov-</p><p>ernment’s further external and internal borrowing(WB, 1994b; GoK, 1994a).</p><p>To reverse this trend and strengthen the external position, the shilling was</p><p>devalued by 14% in 1975, thus floating too much liquid cash with less actual</p><p>value. Likewise, a 10% export subsidy was introduced, and import controls</p><p>were made more restrictive (Situma etal., 1995: 21). While the authorities had</p><p>realized and were trying to use the fiscal instruments to stabilize the economy,</p><p>a positive price improvement in the form of a commodity boom in 1976–1977</p><p>postponed such an effort.</p><p>adjuStment meaSureS adoPted InKenya</p><p>Before analyzing how reform policies affected the citizenry, we will first review</p><p>briefly, which reform policies were adopted in Kenya. Structural adjustment</p><p>efforts started in 1980, even though there were earlier attempts. In 1980,</p><p>Kenya received the first structural adjustment loan [SAL] (Hoeven, 1987: 19).</p><p>However, the agreed targets and conditions were violated. A decade of low</p><p>political will, marked by repeated negotiations and a lack of serious commit-</p><p>ment to implementation, followed(GoK, 1994b). It was not until 1987 that</p><p>serious adjustment efforts began at a low pace. Nevertheless, again, the efforts</p><p>were marred by lagged coordination and reversals, culminating in a quick</p><p>freeze of aid disbursement in 1991. Serious implementation began in 1993. In</p><p>U. M. NDOLO</p><p>19</p><p>July 1997, the World Bank and IMF withdrew the Enhanced Structural</p><p>Adjustment Facility [ESAF] package due to a grievous breach of standing</p><p>orders (Economic Review, 1997: 13). This has been associated with a lack of</p><p>transparency and widespread corruption. According to Swamy (1994) and</p><p>GoK (1996), reform policies implemented in the country include:</p><p>1. Deregulation of trade and domestic prices</p><p>2. Deregulation of financial, stock exchange markets and exchange rates</p><p>3. Liberalization of agricultural commodity markets</p><p>4. Introduction of user charges in social services</p><p>5. Civil service reform (retrenchment)</p><p>6. Privatization of Parastatals</p><p>7. Removal of import licensing</p><p>8. Removal of Government subsidies</p><p>the economIc PolIcy InfraStructure InKenya</p><p>What were the expectations of the World Bank and IMF, and how were the</p><p>internal economic affairs in Kenya? Structural adjustment package mainly</p><p>involved changes in macro-economic policies that would make the economy</p><p>adapt to the economic realities and respond to the market forces(GoK, 1986).</p><p>More precisely, these policies aimed at getting the prices right. This required</p><p>changing the relative price structure so that the vector of prices in the economy</p><p>would give efficient signals to the economic agents (Klaus and Fehr, 1999: 40;</p><p>Wuyts etal., 1992). Such prices include the rate of interest, the exchange rate,</p><p>goods prices, and wages. These changes in the relative price structure are sup-</p><p>posed to induce the level of real income and productive structure through rela-</p><p>tive sector profitability and resource allocation. In this case, it was expected</p><p>that the effective change in the relative structure would lead to the resource</p><p>flows with profitable expanding sectors of the economy, as Ankie (1997: 317)</p><p>puts it. At this level, one question is inevitable. How were the low-income</p><p>earners specifically affected by the implementation of these policies? Since the</p><p>majority of the poor live in rural areas in Kenya, they were definitely hurt(GoK,</p><p>Hoeven, 1989;GoK, 1995; Munguti, 1996).</p><p>The Socio-economic Performance Before andDuring SAP</p><p>The comparative annual average of economic indicators in Table2.1 below</p><p>show that during the first year of the adjustment process, the rate of inflation</p><p>went down drastically.</p><p>Likewise, changes in the ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP, the average interest on</p><p>loans, and the current account GDP ratio went down as well. At the same time,</p><p>the real effective exchange rate depreciated remarkably, as well as the debt ser-</p><p>vice ratio (Economic Survey, 1995). This indicates that the economy relied</p><p>2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>20</p><p>Table 2.1 Annual average economic indicators before and during adjustment to 1997</p><p>Variables [%] 1975–1980 1981–1984 1985–1990 1991–1995 1996–1997</p><p>Changes in fiscal deficit/GDP 5.7 −5.8 4.5 2.6 1.9</p><p>Changes in the rate of inflation 3.3 −11.1 4.7 26.8 8.9</p><p>Real interest rate on loans −2.1 −0.3 4.6 10.2 13.6</p><p>Real effective exchange rate −16.9 5.7 −42.3 −20.82 −22.09</p><p>Change in current account/</p><p>GDP</p><p>9.9 −8.2 4.0 −0.4 −0.2</p><p>Debt service/exports 8.0 27.0 30.0 20.0 17.7</p><p>Source: Swamy (1994), World Bank (1997)</p><p>Table 2.2 Annual average macroeconomic and sectoral outcomes</p><p>Variable [%] 1975–1980 1981–1984 1985–1990 1991–1994 1995–1997</p><p>Estim.</p><p>GDP growth 5.6 2.1 5.0 1.1 1.7</p><p>Gross investment/GDP 28.8 23.8 20.0 12.7 7.8</p><p>Agricultural growth 2.6 2.8 3.5 −0.45 −1.21</p><p>Manufacturing growth 7.6 3.7 5.4 1.20 0.97</p><p>Export growth 0.5 −3.4 4.8 8.3 8.9</p><p>Imports growth 10.4 2.5 7.8 19.8 21.3</p><p>Manufactured exports growth 1.1 −8.7 10.5 15.5 9.7</p><p>Total formal employment 3.1 2.0 2.9 2.8 0.5</p><p>Public sector employment 4.5 2.6 2.8 −0.30 −0.10</p><p>Private sector employment 1.8 1.5 2.2 2.0 1.6</p><p>Informal sector employment 6.6 7.6 11.4 10.3 30.9</p><p>Source: Economic Review (1997)</p><p>heavily on foreign finance, except for the rate of inflation that came down</p><p>drastically; the other aggregates had not significantly improved during the</p><p>adjustment era. Hence, the country had to implement further SAPs as it was</p><p>recommended by the World Bank(1990) (Table2.2).</p><p>Perhaps,</p><p>the most important turn of events should have been the growth of</p><p>the economy that SAPs had been trying to inspire, but that was not the case.</p><p>Real interest rate on loans, however, rose constantly within the same period. In</p><p>Table2.3, it is evident that GDP growth and gross investment to GDP ratio</p><p>were high in the earlier periods than in 1991–1994(GoK, 1995). There were</p><p>slight improvements in 1995–1991, maybe due to the mean coffee boom in</p><p>1986 most remarkably in export growth. Manufacturing exports show a steady</p><p>deterioration, most probably due to the high inflation rate and its effect on</p><p>imported imputes. Informal sector employment indicated a steady upward</p><p>growth, particularly after 1993(GoK, 1984 & IMF, 1995). This trend could</p><p>be associated with the current government retrenchment efforts coupled with</p><p>the high unemployment rate and underemployment during the whole period,</p><p>U. M. NDOLO</p><p>21</p><p>Table 2.3 Socio-economic indicators, 1970–1983</p><p>Economic indicators 1970–1973 1980–1983</p><p>Per capita GDP growth 11.5% −1.4%</p><p>Per capita private consumption 137.6 154.4</p><p>Per capita total consumption 130.4 153.5</p><p>Total debt/export ratio 1.0 1.8</p><p>Population (× 1 million) 11.91 17.22</p><p>Population growth 3.6% 3.9%</p><p>Total fertility rate (births per woman) 8.1 7.8</p><p>Life expectancy at birth (year) 50.5 55.4</p><p>Infant mortality rate (per thous. Live births) 100.0 69.2</p><p>Primary school enrolment ratio 58 111.0</p><p>Primary school enrolment ratio (female) 48 106.0</p><p>Labour force, female 42.0% 41.7%</p><p>Headcount n.a 48.9% poor</p><p>32.8% very poor</p><p>Inequality (Gini coefficient) n.a 0.6</p><p>Human development index n.a 0.481</p><p>Source: Mukui (1992)</p><p>as seen above. In the 1995–1997 period, this sector seems to have been the</p><p>biggest avenue for employment creation in the country. In most cases, the</p><p>negative trend for some variables was reversed in 1985–1990 because of the</p><p>high rate of unemployment in the formal sector (GoK, 1997a, 1997b: 53).</p><p>Manufacturing growth had declined sharply in the 1991–1994 period. Perhaps</p><p>this may be associated with the competitive liberalization process taking place</p><p>and relatively cheaper goods that penetrated the local market from the</p><p>region(GoK, 1989 & UNDP, 1994). However, manufactured export prod-</p><p>ucts had increased drastically. This export growth could be associated with the</p><p>political crisis in the neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region at the</p><p>time, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, whose relief operations had benefited</p><p>exporters of manufactured goods mainly. In fact, most of the relief operations</p><p>were managed in Kenya(UNDP, 1998). The fact that Kenya had considerably</p><p>higher quality manufactured goods compared to the products from the neigh-</p><p>boring countries could have had a positive impact as well(Vivian, 1995 and</p><p>Ndengwa, 1997).</p><p>This might also have been influenced by the regional exports into the local</p><p>market (Economic Survey, 1988–1989). The table above does not show a favor-</p><p>able outcome for the economy during implementation of the SAPs. The poor</p><p>and the vulnerable groups were hard-hit since they were and still are unlikely</p><p>to cope with unfavorable macroeconomic conditions. It is evident that the</p><p>overall balance of payments had increased steadily over the whole period. While</p><p>the nominal GDP growth had not kept pace with the sharp rise of the gross</p><p>international reserves, exports show a positive margin but too low compared to</p><p>the domestic growth rate. The Kenya shilling shows a constantly diminishing</p><p>2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>22</p><p>value to the US dollar, as Table2.3 reveals(GoK, 1989 & Smoke, 1994). It is</p><p>therefore evident that the poor suffered most in these circumstances since their</p><p>low income could hardly match the increasing rate of prices for local food-</p><p>stuffs, goods, and services. A comparative analysis of events in earlier years</p><p>(Table 2.2) indicates that the economy had deteriorated considerably later.</p><p>This can be associated with a serious commitment to the implementation pro-</p><p>cess of the policies, where the low-income earners were the most affected</p><p>group of consumers(Narayan & Nyamweya, 1996). However, as the outcomes</p><p>dropped, the eminent question remains whether this trend had a direct link</p><p>with the SAP or not. It is interesting that the economic performance reflects a</p><p>bright take-off in the first years of adjustment. The cause of the constant dete-</p><p>riorating trend in the latter period is still unclear. So, how did the events por-</p><p>trayed by these data specifically hurt the poor? Were the safety nets effective</p><p>enough to protect the low cadre of income levels(IMF, 1995)?</p><p>effectS oftheSaP onagrIcultural Sector reformS</p><p>The guiding question would be, how did liberalization of the agricultural sec-</p><p>tor relate to commodities, and how did the maize market affect the rural sub-</p><p>sistent farmer? The objective of this policy was to reduce poverty by attracting</p><p>highly competitive prices for agricultural products by the end of 1996. It is</p><p>assumed that a free open maize market would lead to rewarding income to the</p><p>farmer. Following the bumper harvests of 1993, peasant farmers in arid and</p><p>semi-arid regions benefited greatly from the decontrol effect, which by sheer</p><p>luck coincided with a good harvest(GoK, 1986, Schadler, etal, 1993). The</p><p>ethnic war in Rwanda and Burundi made maize quite competitive. Most relief</p><p>agencies bought maize in Kenya then. A 90kg bag of maize sold for Kshs.1045</p><p>from Kshs.550 the previous year. Unfortunately, this positive impact led to a</p><p>more serious problem as CBS (1997) report reveals. First, the urban poor</p><p>bought the same commodity at very high prices since it would earn even better</p><p>across the border even if they never bought! Secondly, farmers sold all their</p><p>stocks due to attractively high prices after a long period of drought. In the</p><p>short run, it seemed like all people would afford the cost-sharing fees that had</p><p>been introduced in social services. However, the unexpected came after a few</p><p>months in the same year. A prolonged drought in 1994–1995 suddenly post-</p><p>poned the farmers’ joy. In less than a year, these people had to be sustained</p><p>with imported relief food. The price of a 90kg bag of maize rose to Kshs.1750.</p><p>Fertilizers, whose ingredients are imported, became extremely expensive for</p><p>the subsistent farmer in the country.</p><p>The livestock, which is normally the alternative income earner, became too</p><p>weak and cheap or died. The source of natural organic manure was now gone.</p><p>At the same time, with the reduced number of cattle due to severe drought, the</p><p>prices of meat went up tremendously in the country. Skins, which were the</p><p>only valuable product households would get from their perishing animals,</p><p>became comparatively cheap in rural areas, although national prices of hides</p><p>U. M. NDOLO</p><p>23</p><p>elsewhere were higher. Liberalized, free maize markets across districts also</p><p>attracted middlemen from other districts, and local farmers could not save</p><p>enough for domestic consumption. This is an indication that although farmers</p><p>benefitted initially, they eventually lost(Shaffer,1996).</p><p>In the same period, the inflation rate went as high as 49%, reducing the</p><p>value of the local currency to over half of the US dollar (GoK, 1996: 26).</p><p>Prices for farm implements increased tremendously, reducing future yields con-</p><p>siderably in the sector. Although this move benefited the small farmer in the</p><p>initial stages, to the contrary, it became a leeway to corruption for certain parts</p><p>of the middle class and the rich as they were competing for sales of farm inputs</p><p>and seeds. A new trick infiltrated the system with the importation of sugar,</p><p>cereals, and milk (Hoeven, 1989). Some influential people imported low-</p><p>quality of those products without paying customs duty. At the same time, the</p><p>domestic market became flooded with cheaper agricultural products, which</p><p>was a big boost to the poor in that period of famine. In 1996, events took a</p><p>different turn. Farmers had a good harvest at a time when</p><p>the local market was</p><p>flooded with cheaper stocks from other regions. This led to the collapse of the</p><p>internal revenue income structures. This unfair trading extended to other</p><p>goods like vehicles, used clothes, electrical equipment, fertilizers, and medi-</p><p>cine. Nepotism and corruption penetrated deeper into the community; the</p><p>idea of godfathers, especially who knows who and who belongs to which ethnic</p><p>and political group, became the guiding domain in the import trade. In all</p><p>these, a practical mechanism of acquiring revenue from the business commu-</p><p>nity was lacking since most were shielded from paying taxes. As a result, textile</p><p>industries and factories that relied on farm products like cotton ginneries and</p><p>Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) were closed indefinitely, making many work-</p><p>ers unemployed, most of whom were women and youths.</p><p>Hence the overall objective of the adjustment policy positively achieved its</p><p>goal in the first few years by improving prices for agricultural-related commodi-</p><p>ties. However, the externalities inflicted a painful pinch on the poor. After a</p><p>taste of motivating rewards, they began to buy at exorbitant prices. Their main</p><p>source of income, the farm, was rendered ineffective. Cotton seeds and insec-</p><p>ticides became unbearably expensive. This discouraged the only cash crop for</p><p>dry areas, which would otherwise be a source of income for the marginal</p><p>groups. The highly mechanized farms in the Kenya highlands were not well</p><p>placed either, due to low quotas for coffee and tea in the international market,</p><p>with Brazil becoming more recognized in the quarter system. A positive sign</p><p>was witnessed in 1997, when consumer prices for maize, a staple food in</p><p>Kenyan society, dropped from Kshs.1550 to Kshs.500 per 90kg bag (Economic</p><p>Review, 1998). This was a considerable relief for low-income groups, especially</p><p>the urban poor, while the rural farmer lost considerably.</p><p>Important cash crops, including coffee, pyrethrum, milk, and cereals, were</p><p>handled through the cooperative movements beforehand. Among the poor,</p><p>the Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCO) provided access to</p><p>short-term credit facilities. It was an advantage to the low-income earner</p><p>2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>24</p><p>because it required no collateral, and the interest rates were comparatively</p><p>lower, unlike commercial banks. One obvious effect of deregulating this sector</p><p>was that private traders now compete parallel with cooperative societies in mar-</p><p>keting farmers’ produce. This posed a great challenge to the cooperative societ-</p><p>ies, making them ineffective. This move had exposed the peasant farmers to</p><p>open exploitation by middlemen, a trend that has never changed to date in</p><p>Kenya. The farmer’s produce, formerly used as collateral to borrow from the</p><p>cooperatives, was dismantled since farmers had other channels for marketing</p><p>their produce (Brett, 1997).</p><p>Farmers who had no title deeds could not access credit. In addition, liberal-</p><p>ization had led to high-interest rates for SACCO credit facility to keep face</p><p>with commercial banks. This move had eliminated the very cadre of the poor</p><p>that they were originally established to protect. Consequently, there had been</p><p>adverse corruption among the cooperative workers, most of whom were politi-</p><p>cal appointees. The liberalization of this sector however had its advantages.</p><p>First, farmers were discouraged by incorrect, delayed payments or non-</p><p>payment, which would take many years, including non-collection of produce</p><p>from collecting centers. Secondly, nowadays, because of that painful experi-</p><p>ence, farmers sell their produce instantly (e.g., milk) anywhere at the market</p><p>price without intermediaries.</p><p>retrenchment andcIvIl ServIce reform ProceSS</p><p>As several scholars argue, Kenya’s civil service grew rapidly from 66,000 in</p><p>1968 to 272,000in 1991, excluding teachers and parastatal employees. This</p><p>expansion led to first, complexity in management and administration. Secondly,</p><p>it led to wasteful duplication of services and functions and inflated levels of</p><p>personnel enrolment (including ghost workers in most sectors), which con-</p><p>sumed over 70% of the recurrent budget allocations. The government experi-</p><p>enced a large financial drain through bureaucracies and a large workforce that</p><p>contributed little to development and poverty reduction, as Ikiara and</p><p>Tostensen (1995: 43) claim. Based on this backdrop, retrenchment was inevi-</p><p>table to catch up with what external renters had recommended. The retrench-</p><p>ment process sought to reduce the size of the civil service to barely two-thirds</p><p>by June 1997. The overall objective was to increase the efficiency of their ser-</p><p>vice and improve public sector management through a lean, highly trained</p><p>workforce (GoK, 1996: 7). It was expected that this would be achieved by</p><p>strategically reducing staff levels and their corresponding positions by between</p><p>16,000 and 25,000 annually.</p><p>The reduction would be concentrated on the unskilled and semi-skilled</p><p>employees (job grades A–G), who constituted about 78% of the total civil ser-</p><p>vice workforce. This would be implemented through natural attrition and</p><p>Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme (VERS). By December 1995, over 30,000</p><p>people, about 16% of the target, had been retrenched. The government created</p><p>a task force for Training and Capacity Building for the Retirees (TCBR) to</p><p>U. M. NDOLO</p><p>25</p><p>retrain those who opted to retire voluntarily on how to invest and survive after</p><p>early retirement. A lump-sum severance payment, ranging from Kshs.150,000</p><p>to Kshs.500,000, an equivalent of US$2727 to 9100, was awarded to each</p><p>retiree as a “safety-net” incentive.</p><p>The idea gained high momentum soon after its introduction in 1993.</p><p>Nevertheless, it became a painful outcry only in the first twoyears of imple-</p><p>mentation. It was popularly nicknamed “Golden handshake.” Before one</p><p>acquired the necessary documents to start a small-scale business, the money</p><p>would have run out since most people cleared personal debts and paid for</p><p>dependents’ education first before investment. The task force did not organize</p><p>any retraining course but assumed that a handbook would provide the neces-</p><p>sary guidance for establishing an investment. Unfortunately, retirees never read</p><p>the handbook. This measure was quite myopic and inadequate. Although the</p><p>initiative was good for the economy, such an abrupt political measure, appar-</p><p>ently, with little guidance, would have negative results, as Ikiara etal. (2004)</p><p>assert. These short-term decisions left many households with no permanent</p><p>social security—majority of the retirees invested in retail businesses that have</p><p>since collapsed. With the actual investment fund going virtually to payment of</p><p>rent and domestic use, little was left for business. A good number of such</p><p>people could not even afford to educate and pay for their families’ health care.</p><p>Cost Sharing andPublic Expenditure Cuts</p><p>Since the introduction of SAPs, cost-sharing has been a street vocabulary. Any</p><p>medical attention without money became a foregone case until recently when</p><p>NHIF facilities were introduced. Hospital drug stores dried up, and syringes</p><p>had to be bought at a specific drugstore, mostly owned by government medical</p><p>staff. With most people earning less than a dollar per day, the marginalized</p><p>groups could hardly afford medical healthcare. Since its independence, Kenya</p><p>has adopted a firm commitment to improving people’s welfare by alleviating</p><p>poverty, hunger, ignorance, and disease (GoK 1965, 1996). This objective has</p><p>been achieved by providing subsidy services such as education and health to</p><p>the marginalized groups. Although these services were designed for the poor,</p><p>they were provided as public goods for all (Brett, 1997). Expenditure cuts on</p><p>social services, particularly on health and education, and subsequent removal of</p><p>subsidies on essential goods like foodstuffs, medicine, and transportation had</p><p>caused a burden on the poor (Ochoro and</p><p>Omoro, 1989: 37). The withdrawal</p><p>of government subsidies had shifted most of the financial responsibilities to</p><p>individual households whose capability to provide for them is minimal.</p><p>Privatization ofParastatals</p><p>Privatization involving the sale of the non-strategic government enterprises</p><p>and restructuring of strategic ones through careful improvement to make them</p><p>more efficient and competitive through control mechanisms was introduced.</p><p>2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>26</p><p>The restructuring was intended to give them greater freedom to carry out their</p><p>operations on a commercial basis. One of the negative effects posed by privati-</p><p>zation was instant loss of employment. Out of 207 parastatals, 164 were tar-</p><p>geted for privatization by 1997, and 33 were to be improved. By June 1996,</p><p>the government had divested its holdings in 128 companies from 25in 1995.</p><p>Those enterprises that provided utilities and marketing services were to be</p><p>rehabilitated and modernized (GoK, 1996: 10). The overall effect of privatiza-</p><p>tion and parastatal reform had been a significant reduction in the public</p><p>workforce.</p><p>On the one hand, some laid-off staff joined the job seekers and the unem-</p><p>ployed. While on the other, the exercise reduced a considerable burden on the</p><p>government’s overstrained financial expenditure on a broad wage bill. Some of</p><p>the liquidated firms become more efficient and commercially viable, thus con-</p><p>tributing better to the economic growth of the country. However, the privati-</p><p>zation process snarled, slowed down, and lacked transparency.</p><p>concluSIon</p><p>In conclusion, several short- and long-term effects have direct links with the</p><p>implementation of the SAPs. These include consumer price increases for essen-</p><p>tial goods and services due to decontrols and the removal of subsidies. The</p><p>decline in providing basic services due to expenditure cuts in the social sector</p><p>like education and health placed a heavy burden on the common citizenry. The</p><p>deregulation of trade and influx of cheap imported goods generated consider-</p><p>able competition on local products in rural and urban areas. Introduction of</p><p>user charges in hospitals and removal of subsidies at the same time is no doubt</p><p>a real burden to the common man. Partial cost recovery on some essential</p><p>goods like water supply in urban areas and upward adjustment of interest rates</p><p>on credit are examples of measures that hurt the marginal groups. Removal of</p><p>consumer price controls and high inflation rate resulted in hiking prices, which</p><p>reduced the purchasing power of a large proportion of the population.</p><p>Retrenchment and privatization implied direct loss of income. This has had</p><p>negative effects on food for the rural landless and the urban poor, worsening</p><p>the national status (Ochoro, 1989: 34). However, liberalization and decontrol</p><p>effects have led to the penetration of cheap, better-quality secondhand cloth-</p><p>ing into the country, which has greatly benefited the poor but, at the same</p><p>time, killed the local textile industry. Most local products today are freely</p><p>exported, hence attracting foreign exchange. This is an outcome of SAPs.</p><p>referenceS</p><p>Ankie, H. (1997). 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Wider Publications.</p><p>Ikiara, G.K., & Tostensen, A. (1995). The Political Economy of Poverty Reduction in</p><p>Kenya. CHR.Michelsen Institute, Development studies and human rights, Berge,</p><p>Norway, pp.12–56.</p><p>Ikiara, G. K. J., Olewe, N., & Walter, O. (2004). The Politics of Trade and Industrial</p><p>Policy in Africa: Forced Concensus?, IDRC-CRDI.</p><p>IMF. (1995). Theoretical Aspects of the Design of Fund: Support Adjustment</p><p>Programs. IMF.</p><p>Klaus, M. S., & Ernst, F. (1999). The Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.</p><p>https://Istor.org/satable/2586885</p><p>Mukui, J. K, & Masinde, C. (1992). Effects of Internal Public Debt on Economic</p><p>Growth in Kenya (USAID/ GoK).</p><p>2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>https://Istor.org/satable/2586885</p><p>28</p><p>Munguti, K. (1996). The Face of Rural Poverty: The Case of Makueni District—Kenya.</p><p>In J.Bahemuka, B.Nganda, & C.Nzioka (Eds.), Poverty Revisited: Analysis and</p><p>Strategies Towards Poverty Eradication in Kenya (pp.88–105). Ruaraka Printing Press.</p><p>Narayan, D., & Nyamwaya, D. (1996). Participatory Poverty Assessment Study. Oxford</p><p>University Press.</p><p>Ndengwa, S. (1997). Irresponsible Abandonment of Construction Projects. Auditor</p><p>General’s Report, Saturday, April 11th; and 16th, March.</p><p>Ochoro, W. E. O., & Omorom F. Z. (1989). In Review of Poverty and Antipoverty</p><p>Initiatives in Kenya by Damiano Kulundu Manda, Mwangi S. Kimenya, Germano</p><p>M. Mwambu (2001), Snippet View.</p><p>Odada, J. E. O., & Ayako, A. B. (1989). THe Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies</p><p>on Well-being of Vilnerable Groups in Kenya (UNICEF).</p><p>Pius, S. W., & Owino. (1993). The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Production &</p><p>Availability of Pharmaceutical Products in Kenya, University of Sussex.</p><p>Schadler, S., etal. (1993). Economic Adjustment in Low-Income Countries: Experience</p><p>Under the Enhance Structural Adjustment Facility. IMF.</p><p>Shaffer, P. (1996). Beneath the Poverty Debate: Some Issues. IDS Bulletin, 27(1), 23–24.</p><p>Situma, J. (1978). Increasig Food, Insecurity and Uran Farming in Nairobi, Rowman</p><p>Littlefield.</p><p>Smoke, J.P. (1994). Local Government Finance in Developing Countries. The Case of</p><p>Kenya. Oxford University Press.</p><p>Steward, F., & Geest, W. (1995). Adjustment and Poverty: Options and Choices.</p><p>Routledge.</p><p>Strand, A. (1994). Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies and the Impact on the Poor.</p><p>World Bank Environment Department Paper, No. 034. World Bank.</p><p>Swamy. G. (1994). Kenya: Structural</p><p>Adjustment in the 1980s. World Bank Policy Paper</p><p>No. 1238. Washington, DC: World Bank.</p><p>UNDP. (1994). Human Development Report 1994. Oxford University Press.</p><p>UNDP. (1998). Human Development Report 1998. Oxford University Press.</p><p>Vivian, J. (1995). How Safe Are ‘Social-Nets?’ Targeting and Social Sector Restructuring</p><p>in Developing Countries. European Journal of Development Research, 7(1), 1–25.</p><p>World Bank. (1990). World Development Report. World Bank.</p><p>World Bank. (1994a). Adjustment in Africa: Progress, Payoffs and Challenges. World</p><p>Policy Research Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: World Bank.</p><p>World Bank. (1994b). Kenya Poverty Assessments: Executive Summary: Overview,</p><p>Conclusions and Recommendations. Prepared for Consultative Group Meeting for</p><p>Kenya, Paris. World Bank: Eastern African Department.</p><p>World Bank. (1994c). Kenya: Poverty Assessment. Report No. 13152– KE. Washington,</p><p>DC: World Bank.</p><p>World Bank. (1997). World Development Report Report: The State in a Changing</p><p>World, World Bank.</p><p>Wratten, E. (1995). Urban Poverty: Characteristics, Causes and Consequences. IIED.</p><p>Wuyts, M., Mackintosh, M., & Hewitt, T. (1992). Development and Public Action.</p><p>Oxford University Press.</p><p>U. M. NDOLO</p><p>29</p><p>CHAPTER 3</p><p>Higher Education Policy andReforms inKenya</p><p>MichaelMwendaKithinji</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>This chapter explores the higher education policies in colonial and postcolonial</p><p>Kenya. The establishment of the Makerere University College in Uganda by</p><p>the British colonial government as an inter-territorial institution in 1949</p><p>marked the genesis of higher education in the British East African territories of</p><p>Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. The founding of Makerere by the colonial</p><p>administration thrust the East African state authorities at the core of higher</p><p>education governance and control. Henceforth, the course and direction of</p><p>higher education policy was guided by the whims and interests of the ruling</p><p>elites. Significantly, higher education policy in the colonial and postcolonial</p><p>periods has been characterized by tensions between the forces of elitism that</p><p>preferred limiting access and those that favored democratization of access. As</p><p>this chapter demonstrates, the principle of elitism, which aimed at producing a</p><p>small class of educated Africans, characterized university policies in the colonial</p><p>and early postcolonial periods. That however changed following the rise to</p><p>power of the second president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, who sought to</p><p>expand university access, as a means to advance his political interests.</p><p>HIgHer educatIon development: tHecolonIal context</p><p>The British colonial government initiated higher education in East Africa and</p><p>other parts of its empire in the 1940s, as part of the colonial reform efforts,</p><p>which aimed at creating a new kind of colonial partnership with its subject</p><p>M. M. Kithinji (*)</p><p>Central Arkansas University, Conway, AR, USA</p><p>e-mail: mkithinji@uca.edu</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_3</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_3&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:mkithinji@uca.edu</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_3</p><p>30</p><p>people in the colonies after the Second World War. Oliver Stanley, Britain’s</p><p>Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed the centrality of universities in</p><p>advancing colonial reforms in February 1943 noting it was “one of the most</p><p>important questions in connection with the post-war reconstruction and devel-</p><p>opment of the Colonial Empire” (Ashby, 1966: 211). In the same year, Stanley</p><p>appointed the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, under Cyril</p><p>Asquith, to look into the general question of the principles that should guide</p><p>the development of universities in the colonies (Nwauwa, 1997: 134–165).</p><p>The Asquith Commission report, which was submitted to the Secretary of</p><p>State in June 1945, became the blueprint for the development of universities in</p><p>the British colonies in Africa. It recommended the establishment of university</p><p>colleges affiliated with the University of London in a special relationship</p><p>scheme. On East Africa, the report recommended turning Makerere College in</p><p>Uganda into an inter-territorial university college affiliated with the University</p><p>of London (Kolinsky, 1983: 37–80).</p><p>The inter-territorial university concept came to dominate the higher educa-</p><p>tion discourse in East Africa for the rest of the colonial period and the immedi-</p><p>ate post-independence era. While the vibrant political dynamics of the 1950s</p><p>and early 1960s characterized by African nationalism and decolonization con-</p><p>tributed to the establishment of additional university colleges in Kenya and</p><p>Tanganyika, the spirit of inter-territorial cooperation continued to influence</p><p>university policies in East Africa. Initially, the common university policy for</p><p>East Africa faced intense opposition from European settlers in Kenya. The set-</p><p>tlers preferred provision of technical education to Africans instead of the liberal</p><p>education at Makerere, which they described as contributing to “the moral</p><p>degeneration of the African (Kenya National Archives (KNA), AV/12/228,</p><p>1949).” To counter Makerere, settlers planned to establish a technical institute</p><p>in Nairobi in the late 1940s. At the same time, the Indian community in East</p><p>Africa through their organization, the Gandhi Memorial Academy Society</p><p>(GMAS), also threatened to upset the Colonial Office’s university policy with</p><p>their plan to establish a university in memory of Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian</p><p>anti-colonial icon. Indians in essence were reacting to both the lack of univer-</p><p>sity opportunities in East Africa and the establishment of Makerere, which in</p><p>the racially segregated environment of the colonial period was perceived as an</p><p>African institution (Kithinji, 2018: 27).</p><p>The events of the early 1950s, a period characterized by the Mau Mau upris-</p><p>ing in Kenya, ironically presented the Colonial Office with an opportunity to</p><p>arm-twist the settlers and the Indians to abandon their disparate plans. The</p><p>military intervention by the British forces allowed the Colonial Office to domi-</p><p>nate over the powerful settlers and the local colonial officials who hitherto</p><p>controlled the political affairs in Kenya (Maloba, 1989: 198). Ultimately, the</p><p>Colonial Office coerced the settlers and the Indians to close ranks and contrib-</p><p>ute to the foundation in Nairobi of an East African tertiary institution called</p><p>the Royal Technical College (RTC), which would specialize in technical voca-</p><p>tional training. To accommodate the interests of the GMAS, the new college</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>31</p><p>would also have an academic wing providing university-type education. It</p><p>would, however, take sustained pressure and a shift in the political landscape</p><p>before the colonial government honored the promise to the GMAS.</p><p>The implementation of the inter-territorial university policy commenced in</p><p>the 1950s following the appointment of two education commissions by the</p><p>Colonial Office. The first commission, appointed in 1955 and chaired by</p><p>Alexander Carr-Saunders, was charged with the responsibility of planning the</p><p>future development of university education in East Africa. In a report released</p><p>at the end of its visit to East Africa, the Carr-Saunders Commission endorsed</p><p>the inter-territorial plan reiterating the “fundamental principle that higher edu-</p><p>cation is indivisible, that it is in the truest sense inter-territorial, and that it</p><p>must be so planned as to meet the collective needs of the East African territo-</p><p>ries (WPHE, 1956: 46).” The Commission, however, left room for some</p><p>tertiary- level training that would be provided territorially. The report articu-</p><p>lated a three-tiered higher education policy for East Africa consisting of univer-</p><p>sity level, higher technical, and lower technical work. Makerere College in</p><p>Uganda would be the base for</p><p>university-level work, while the RTC would</p><p>offer higher technical education with lower technical training handled at vari-</p><p>ous territorial institutions. The report further conferred on the RTC a special</p><p>status as both an inter-territorial higher technical college and a territorial insti-</p><p>tution offering lower technical courses to Kenyans only.</p><p>The recommendations of the Carr-Saunders Commission were very modest</p><p>and did not reflect the intensifying nationalistic activities and concomitant</p><p>growing ambitions of different territories to possess institutions of higher edu-</p><p>cation. The nationalistic fervor was reflected in the growing number of Africans</p><p>who were leaving the region for higher education abroad. Moreover, East</p><p>African Indians through the GMAS were forcefully demanding the elevation of</p><p>the RTC into a degree-granting institution since they had contributed immense</p><p>resources to its establishment on the understanding that it would have an aca-</p><p>demic wing. The GMAS opposed the Carr-Saunders recommendation that the</p><p>RTC should become an inter-territorial higher technical college because it pre-</p><p>cluded the possibility of becoming a university. The situation was compounded</p><p>by territorial disagreement on the financing of the RTC.The main cause of</p><p>disagreement was the dual nature and role of the RTC as both a territorial col-</p><p>lege providing lower technical courses to Kenyans and an inter-territorial</p><p>higher technical college for East Africa. Uganda and Tanganyika viewed Kenya</p><p>as enjoying disproportionate advantages from the RTC due to its location in</p><p>Nairobi, which allowed Kenyans to enroll for part-time and evening courses</p><p>unlike students from other territories. The territories also disagreed over what</p><p>courses at the RTC would be classified as either higher or lower technical level.</p><p>These disagreements created a funding crisis since the territories could not</p><p>agree on a financing formula for the RTC.</p><p>The higher education crisis that engulfed East Africa in the second half of</p><p>the 1950s led to the appointment of a second commission on higher education</p><p>in East Africa in 1958 led by J.F.Lockwood charged with:</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>32</p><p>Examining and advising on the proposals for the creation of new institutions of</p><p>higher education in East Africa … and in this connection to examine the desir-</p><p>ability and practicality of carrying out any such development within the scope of</p><p>a single university college of East Africa of which all colleges territorially situated</p><p>would be constituent units (WPHE, 1959: 2).</p><p>The Lockwood Commission visited East Africa in mid-1958 and, in its report,</p><p>supported the GMAS by allowing the RTC to offer “not only courses of train-</p><p>ing in technological and other professional subjects to the highest professional</p><p>standards but also courses leading to university degrees” (WPHE, 1959: 6).</p><p>The Commission also proposed, “the need to undertake measures to make</p><p>practicable the opening of a university college in Tanganyika,” and added that</p><p>the university colleges in East Africa would be associated inter-territorially</p><p>through a common University of East Africa arrangement that would “bind</p><p>the current and proposed East African colleges in a single regional university”</p><p>(WPHE, 1959: 6). The recommendation to associate university colleges in a</p><p>single regional university crystallized around the idea of the University of East</p><p>Africa, which became a reality in 1963. The Lockwood report provided a</p><p>framework that guided the future development of higher education in East</p><p>Africa. The implementation of this framework began with the 1960 elevation</p><p>of the RTC into the second inter-territorial university college of East Africa</p><p>(renamed the Royal College), followed by the establishment of the University</p><p>College, Dar es Salaam, in 1961.</p><p>Initially, the Royal College in Kenya and the University College, Dar es</p><p>Salaam, became, like Makerere, affiliate colleges of the University of London.</p><p>This relationship lasted until June 1963, when the University of East Africa</p><p>(UEA) came into existence with the three university colleges in Kenya, Uganda,</p><p>and Tanganyika as its constituent colleges. The inter-territorial principle as</p><p>crafted by the Asquith Commission in the 1940s sought to establish a few uni-</p><p>versity colleges in Africa aimed at producing a new class of educated Africans</p><p>who, the Colonial Office hoped, would “lead the process of colonial develop-</p><p>ment” (Nwauwa, 1997, 212). Access to the hallowed colonial university col-</p><p>leges therefore had to be limited to the cream of African society. Accordingly,</p><p>the inter-territorial policy contradicted the principle of democratizing access to</p><p>university education and thus went against the aspirations of Africans who</p><p>expected their newly independent governments to provide them with more</p><p>higher education opportunities. The inter-territorial policy would however run</p><p>into the headwinds of national competition as the East African countries began</p><p>to violate the principle of non-duplicity and economic rationality that jus-</p><p>tified it.</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>33</p><p>HIgHer educatIon polIcy andreform:</p><p>tHepost-Independence context</p><p>The main culprits in the violation of the principle of non-duplicity and eco-</p><p>nomic rationality were Kenya and Tanganyika, who sought to expand the uni-</p><p>versity colleges located in their territories, which were undeveloped compared</p><p>to the older Makerere in Uganda. In recognizing the ambitions of Kenya and</p><p>Tanganyika to develop their university colleges, the UEA Development</p><p>Committee in its 1964–1967 triennium plan proposed achieving full parity</p><p>among the three university colleges in the common basic faculties of Arts,</p><p>Science, and Education by 1967. This suggestion however created a conun-</p><p>drum because it meant slowing or halting the pace of development at Makerere</p><p>College, a risky proposal likely to offend Ugandans. Realizing the likelihood of</p><p>igniting a crisis, the Development Committee amended its proposal to extend</p><p>the timeframe beyond 1967, when parity in the levels of development at the</p><p>common faculties of Arts and Science at the three university colleges would be</p><p>achieved. The Committee adopted a modest plan of establishing small faculties</p><p>of Arts and Science at Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Furthermore, the Committee</p><p>planned establishment of a wide range of professional degrees in engineering</p><p>and commerce at Nairobi. At Makerere, the Committee planned to expand the</p><p>faculty of medicine. The Committee’s plans seemed to favor Nairobi and</p><p>Makerere over Dar es Salaam, which angered Tanzanian officials (Kenya</p><p>National Archives, KNA/ED/3/2918, 1963).</p><p>It is Kenya, however, that ignited the biggest crisis when it announced that</p><p>it had begun clinical training for its staff at the Kenyatta National Hospital in</p><p>Nairobi. This announcement by Dr. J.C.Likimani, the Chief Medical Officer,</p><p>was quite misleading since in reality, Kenya had begun academic and clinical</p><p>training of medical practitioners. The announcement prompted protests from</p><p>Uganda’s government, which accused Kenya of undermining the UEA by</p><p>training its own medical doctors. Uganda was not persuaded by Kenya’s claims</p><p>that it had not acted unilaterally but rather the clinical training it was conduct-</p><p>ing was “an extension of the facilities that are available at Makerere.” In</p><p>response, Uganda accused Kenya of flouting “the laws … that entrusted the</p><p>University with responsibility for the planning of higher education in East</p><p>Africa” (Kenya National Archives, KNA/ED/3/2918, 1964).</p><p>Not only was Kenya training medical doctors but also plans were afoot to</p><p>establish a school of pharmacy in Nairobi. Kenya had kept the plan to establish</p><p>a school of pharmacy secret, revealing it only after securing funding. In estab-</p><p>lishing the schools of Medicine and Pharmacy, Kenya had subverted the spirit</p><p>of cooperation and non-duplication of expensive programs that the East African</p><p>nations were expected to uphold in their</p><p>relations with the UEA.It was obvi-</p><p>ous that, barely a year after its creation, national ambitions and conflicting</p><p>priorities were endangering the existence of the UEA.</p><p>Despite the obvious role of Kenya in undermining the UEA, the country’s</p><p>Permanent Secretary for Education, Kenneth Matiba, lamented the lack of</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>34</p><p>coordination among the East African countries on the issue of the UEA.In a</p><p>memo to his East African colleagues, Matiba wanted their governments to</p><p>guarantee that the UEA would continue to exist for at least ten more years to</p><p>allow the colleges in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam a chance to grow before</p><p>becoming full universities. Matiba also suggested that the supranational East</p><p>Africa Common Services Organization (EACSO) should administer the UEA</p><p>to contain the competing interests among the East African governments.</p><p>Matiba noted that Tanzanian officials supported his idea, while “Uganda had</p><p>not yet indicated their position” (Kenya National Archives, KNA/ED/3/135,</p><p>1964). Matiba’s memo demonstrated that Kenya and Tanzania wanted the</p><p>regional university arrangement to be maintained while they continued to</p><p>develop the university colleges located in their territories. Both countries saw</p><p>an early collapse of the UEA as prejudicial to their interests since their univer-</p><p>sity colleges were still in their infancy compared to Makerere. Furthermore,</p><p>they had contributed immensely to the development of Makerere; therefore,</p><p>they felt that they had to reap the full benefits of their investment.</p><p>Uganda, on the other hand, viewed Kenya and Tanzania as holding back the</p><p>development of Makerere as revealed by a tense presentation made by the</p><p>country’s education minister J.S.L.Zake to the UEA Council. Zake, in a pre-</p><p>sentation titled “Uganda Government: Views on the Future of the University</p><p>of East Africa,” attacked the very grounds for the federal university’s existence.</p><p>In dismissing the principle of “non-duplication,” one of the pillars justifying</p><p>the federal university arrangement in East Africa, Zake noted that while it is a</p><p>“sound principle on economic grounds, it collapses in the face of the requisites</p><p>of political status symbol.” He further noted that, since the needs of each</p><p>country varied accordingly, “each of the three constituent colleges of the</p><p>University will have to be an autonomous university sooner or later” (Ogot,</p><p>2003: 174).</p><p>The breakdown of cooperation within the UEA mirrored the emerging</p><p>political differences among the three East African countries. The ruling elites</p><p>in East Africa were beginning to identify themselves with one or the other</p><p>ideological blocs that defined global politics. While President Jomo Kenyatta</p><p>of Kenya remained in the western fold ideologically, by the mid-1960s,</p><p>President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda were mov-</p><p>ing left to embrace socialism. These ideological imbalances in East Africa</p><p>affected universities, with political leaders trying to use the constituent colleges</p><p>of the UEA located in their countries to popularize their ideological positions.</p><p>According to David Court, Nyerere aimed to use the Dar es Salaam University</p><p>College as an intellectual hotbed that would lead to the creation of “a society</p><p>based on socialism, rural development and self-reliance” (Court, 1975: 24).</p><p>Likewise, Furley and Watson (1978: 344) observed that Uganda’s “Move to</p><p>the Left” of the late 1960s “was a move intended to take Makerere with it.” In</p><p>Kenya, Kenyatta aimed at controlling University College, Nairobi, to prevent</p><p>the spread of what he considered socialist radicalism. In essence, the three East</p><p>African governments had hijacked the university colleges located in their</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>35</p><p>territories, turning them into instruments to advance their political and ideo-</p><p>logical goals.</p><p>The UEA crisis became one of the major issues that the East African heads</p><p>of state had to address when they met in 1967 to review the status of regional</p><p>cooperation. This meeting resulted in the signing of the Treaty for East Africa,</p><p>which founded the East African Community and replaced the East Africa</p><p>Common Services Organization that hitherto supervised all regional common</p><p>services besides the UEA.While the Treaty for East Africa aimed at giving a</p><p>new lease of life to East African cooperation, significantly, it excluded university</p><p>education on the basis that the demand for higher education necessitated the</p><p>growth of more universities. The three governments agreed to form a commis-</p><p>sion on higher education that would work out “the way in which and the pace</p><p>at which the various facilities now provided by the three colleges could be</p><p>expected to develop as purely national concerns” (WPHE, 1968: 6). It was</p><p>now time to make university education a national concern in order to allow</p><p>expansion of opportunities without the constraints placed by the regional UEA</p><p>arrangement. The appointment of the commission in August 1968 sealed the</p><p>fate of the UEA.The commission report released in 1969 recommended that,</p><p>“the constituent colleges of the University of East Africa should be given full</p><p>university status and become national universities for the three East African</p><p>republics on 1st July 1970. Concurrently, the University of East Africa would</p><p>be dissolved” (WPHE, 1968: 6).</p><p>from tHeunIversIty ofeast afrIca</p><p>tonatIonal unIversItIes</p><p>Once the East African countries resolved to disband the regional university and</p><p>elevate its constituent colleges to national universities, the Kenyan govern-</p><p>ment, in 1969, appointed a committee to develop a plan for a new Kenyan</p><p>university. The committee comprised of two academics: Professor Arthur</p><p>Potter, Principal of the University College, Nairobi, and his Deputy Professor</p><p>Bethwell Ogot. The other members were civil servants, including permanent</p><p>secretaries of education and finance J.K. Njoroge and J.N. Michuki, respec-</p><p>tively, and the comptroller of State House E.Mathu. An unusual addition to</p><p>the committee was Emma Njonjo, a junior official in the Ministry of Education,</p><p>who was a sister to the powerful Attorney General of Kenya, Charles Njonjo.</p><p>The involvement of Emma Njonjo indicated that the government considered</p><p>the establishment of a national university a sensitive matter that needed close</p><p>monitoring by trusted insiders in its founding committee.</p><p>The two academics in the committee did not have an easy time as many of</p><p>their suggestions were dismissed offhand by the government bureaucrats who</p><p>dominated the committee. It is important to note that the government of</p><p>Jomo Kenyatta had, by the late 1960s, started viewing the University College,</p><p>Nairobi with disdain because of the frequent student protests against the state.</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>36</p><p>The government even banned the members of faculty from using publications</p><p>such as the Political Thoughts of Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao, and</p><p>the Communist Manifesto, which it considered subversive and responsible for</p><p>inculcating students with radical ideas.</p><p>The suspicions of the government towards the academics at the University</p><p>College, Nairobi became clear in 1970 when upon the elevation of the institu-</p><p>tion to a national university known as the University of Nairobi (UON), the</p><p>government appointed Dr. Josphat Karanja, a career civil servant who had until</p><p>then served as Kenya’s High Commissioner in Britain, as its vice-chancellor.</p><p>The appointment of Karanja came as a shocker to the university fraternity who</p><p>had expected Prof Ogot, who had served as deputy principal of the College, or</p><p>any other senior African professor would be appointed as the vice-chancellor.</p><p>The irregular appointment of Karanja pointed to a trend of erosion of univer-</p><p>sity autonomy and academic freedom that would characterize Kenyan universi-</p><p>ties for a long time to come. The trend set by President Kenyatta in interfering</p><p>with university administration was emulated</p><p>by his successor President Daniel</p><p>arap Moi who made sure that he filled the vice-chancellor positions in public</p><p>universities with those whom he deemed to be political loyalists. The conse-</p><p>quence of the executive interference in the appointment of university heads, a</p><p>practice that disregarded skills, credentials, and competencies resulted in the</p><p>erosion of academic freedom and university autonomy.</p><p>In the meantime, the early 1970s witnessed a remarkable expansion of uni-</p><p>versity opportunities in Kenya. As the government established the UON in</p><p>1970, it also transformed the Kenyatta Teachers College into its constituent</p><p>college, thus expanding its size. As the UON expanded, the student enroll-</p><p>ment at the institution also increased. In its first year of existence, the university</p><p>registered an admission of 1254 new undergraduate students, bringing the</p><p>total enrollment to 3438 up from 2666 in 1969, marking a 29% student</p><p>increase. The UON continued to register high growth rates in 1971 and 1972.</p><p>However, this expansion suddenly stopped when the World Bank began to</p><p>pressure the government to curtail “the rate of rapid growth of educational</p><p>expenditures in the budget” (Kenya National Archives, KNA XJ/7/71, 1974).</p><p>The World Bank’s position was influenced by the then popular “rate of return”</p><p>studies that postulated the benefits of basic education vis-à-vis university edu-</p><p>cation in national economic development. The western scholars who con-</p><p>ducted these studies expressed outrage over the highly subsidized university</p><p>education in developing countries. Daniel Rogers, for instance, noted that in</p><p>Kenya, “a year of secondary school costs five times and a year of university costs</p><p>thirty-three times the average income per capita” (Rogers, 1972: 243). The</p><p>government acceded to the World Bank advice by limiting the number of stu-</p><p>dents gaining university admission. In a 1973 circular, the government stated</p><p>that it could not “afford to give every qualified Kenyan a university education</p><p>except in those areas where manpower shortages are still a reality” (Kenya</p><p>National Archives, KNA/XJ/3/222, 1973). The government stepped its aus-</p><p>terity measures a notch higher in 1974 by introducing a university loans</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>37</p><p>scheme. While the government continued to provide free tuition, university</p><p>students would have to repay the subsistence allowances that the government</p><p>provided them for their upkeep. Due to the Kenyatta government policy of</p><p>limited expenditure in university education, the expansionist program that</p><p>began in 1970 slowed down tremendously as the decade wore on.</p><p>HIgHer educatIon reform andexpansIon: tHe1980s</p><p>andBeyond</p><p>Upon coming to office in 1978 following the death of Jomo Kenyatta, President</p><p>Moi embarked on a reform agenda based on a populist platform that aimed at</p><p>enhancing university access, a clear departure from the colonial and Kenyatta</p><p>era policies of restricted access, which had limited the size and the scope of the</p><p>national elite class, thus adversely affecting the marginalized communities,</p><p>especially the nomadic pastoralists. Moi’s reforms aimed at shoring up support</p><p>for the new administration among those hitherto politically and economically</p><p>marginalized and also addressing historical injustices directed against these</p><p>communities. Moi laid his vision for university expansion in October 1978</p><p>when he presided over the graduation ceremony at the then only public univer-</p><p>sity, the University of Nairobi (UON). The following year at the same institu-</p><p>tion, he reiterated his vision to establish a second university, justifying it on the</p><p>need to “open new horizons of opportunity for those who would otherwise be</p><p>deprived” (Moi, 1979). This was the first indication that Moi’s university poli-</p><p>cies aimed at engineering a social transformation by providing opportunities to</p><p>the excluded groups.</p><p>Subsequently, Moi became intimately involved in the affairs of the UON,</p><p>including ordering construction of facilities such as the library and insisting on</p><p>relaxation of admission policies. Moi’s intrusion into university affairs riled</p><p>some bureaucrats at the Ministry of Higher Education who were concerned</p><p>that the modest increase in enrolment was causing the university to “burst on</p><p>the seams in almost all the buildings” (Kenya National Archives, KNA/</p><p>XJ/7/83, 1980). The complaints by the bureaucrats in the early days of Moi’s</p><p>administration were definitely premature considering the impending</p><p>transformation.</p><p>In January 1981, Moi appointed the Presidential Working Party on the</p><p>Second University led by Colin Mackay, a Canadian educator. The recommen-</p><p>dations of the Mackay Commission released later that year marked a turning</p><p>point in Kenya’s education history. Instead of confining itself to the narrow</p><p>mandate of planning for the establishment of a second university, the</p><p>Commission further recommended the overhaul of the education system from</p><p>7-4-2-3 to the 8-4-4 system. The Commission also recommended the estab-</p><p>lishment of a medium-sized university with a total enrolment of students</p><p>between 3200 and 5000 (PWP, 1981: 65).</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>38</p><p>The 8-4-4 education system went a long way in advancing Moi’s plan for</p><p>university expansion due to the elimination of the twoyears of Advanced Level</p><p>high schooling (A-Levels). Under the previous 7-4-2-3 system, students had to</p><p>pass three competitive national examinations before qualifying for university</p><p>admission. With the elimination of the A-Levels, more students could now</p><p>compete for university places after completing only fouryears of high school</p><p>education, thereby increasing pressure for university expansion. In its 1983</p><p>report, the UON’s Grants Committee, expressed concern that in 1990, when</p><p>the first cohort of the new 8-4-4 system was expected to sit for the end of high</p><p>school examination, “over 200,000 candidates will be competing for university</p><p>places compared with the present 17,000” (Kenya National Archives, KNA/</p><p>XJ/3/224, 1984). Obviously, President Moi did not worry much about the</p><p>looming enrolment cataclysm as the Grants Committee did. If anything, the</p><p>enrolment pressure generated by the restructured education system provided</p><p>Moi with the justification to vigorously pursue the university expansion</p><p>program.</p><p>The government enacted the Mackay recommendations by establishing Moi</p><p>University in 1984. It is noteworthy that the president named the new univer-</p><p>sity after himself and also located it in Eldoret, which is in his home region,</p><p>underscoring the personal stake he had in the new institution. Nevertheless,</p><p>the Mackay recommendations for setting up an additional midsized university</p><p>did not go far enough to embrace the kind of university transformation that</p><p>Moi envisioned. Thus, even before setting up the Moi University, the president</p><p>was considering additional universities. In December 1983, Moi directed the</p><p>Ministry of Agriculture to start planning for the upgrade of Egerton Agricultural</p><p>College in Nakuru, and a committee was immediately set up to implement the</p><p>directive.</p><p>The president did not wait for the Egerton committee report before</p><p>announcing during a visit to the Kenyatta University College in March 1984</p><p>his “hope that next year I will award degrees here” (The Nation, 1984). Moi’s</p><p>desire was fulfilled in August 1985 when parliament enacted the Kenyatta</p><p>University Act that created the Kenyatta University. In 1987, the Egerton</p><p>University became a full university. Within a short span between 1984 and</p><p>1987, Kenyan universities had increased from one to four. The expansion trend</p><p>continued with the establishment of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture</p><p>and Technology in 1994 and Maseno University in 2001.</p><p>As the universities expanded, so did student enrolment rise from about</p><p>7000in 1978 to 60,000 by the time Moi retired in 2002. University expansion</p><p>under Moi came at a high-cost necessitating intervention of the World Bank</p><p>contents</p><p>viii CoNTENTS</p><p>9 Venture Capital and Silicon Savannah Valley in Kenya 109</p><p>Daniel oigo ogachi and Zeman Zoltan</p><p>Part II Environment, Globalization, Gender, and Society 123</p><p>10 Environmental Policy and Practice in Kenya 125</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o</p><p>11 Wangari Muta Maathai and the Green Belt Movement 143</p><p>Besi Brillian Muhonja</p><p>12 The Women’s Movement and Gender Politics in Kenya 157</p><p>Damaris Parsitau and Dorothy Nyakwaka</p><p>13 The Youth and Socio-Economic Development in Kenya 173</p><p>Sellah Nasimiyu King’oro</p><p>14 Civil Society and the Politics of Democratization 189</p><p>Wanjala S. Nasong’o</p><p>15 The Second Republic and the Politics of Devolution 199</p><p>Edmond Maloba Were</p><p>16 Ethnicity and Political Violence in Kenya 215</p><p>Linnet Hamasi and Maurice N. Amutabi</p><p>17 Presidential Leadership Styles from Jomo to Uhuru 227</p><p>Eric E. otenyo</p><p>18 Sport and Recreation in Kenya 239</p><p>W. W. S. Njororai and Peter omondi-ochieng</p><p>19 Religion and the Cultures of Kenya 253</p><p>Mary Nyangweso Wangila</p><p>20 Kiswahili in Kenya: Broken Language and Broken Promises 267</p><p>Ken Walibora Waliaula</p><p>21 Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Medicine in Kenya 279</p><p>Maurice N. Amutabi and Linnet Hamasi</p><p>ix CoNTENTS</p><p>22 Kenya’s Security Sector: Reform in a Changing Strategic</p><p>Environment 291</p><p>Stephen Mwachofi Singo and Edmond John Pamba</p><p>23 The Impact of Globalization in Kenya 305</p><p>Mumo Nzau</p><p>Part III The External Context 317</p><p>24 Colonial Boundaries and Emerging Border Contestations in</p><p>Post-Independent Kenya 319</p><p>Peter Wafula Wekesa</p><p>25 Illiberalism, Human Rights, and Rule of Law: A Kenyan</p><p>Paradox 331</p><p>Makau Mutua</p><p>26 Mapping Kenya’s Diaspora and Its National Economic,</p><p>Social, Cultural, and Political Impact 347</p><p>Kefa M. otiso</p><p>27 Foreign Policy and Kenya’s Foreign Relations, 1963–2017 367</p><p>Mercy Kathambi Kaburu and Korwa Gombe Adar</p><p>28 Al-Shabaab and the Regional Security Dilemma 381</p><p>oscar Gakuo Mwangi</p><p>29 Kenya-US Relations and the War on Terror 391</p><p>Mumo Nzau</p><p>30 China in Kenya and Its Impact and Implications 403</p><p>Linnet Hamasi and Maurice N. Amutabi</p><p>31 Kenya and Regional Integration Schemes 417</p><p>Joshua M. Kivuva</p><p>32 Kenya’s External Trade 431</p><p>Caroline Ayuma okello</p><p>x CoNTENTS</p><p>33 Kenya in World Politics 445</p><p>Thomas otieno Juma</p><p>34 Kenya: Future Imaginations 455</p><p>Toyin Falola</p><p>Index 475</p><p>xi</p><p>notes on contributors</p><p>Korwa Gombe Adar is Professor of International Studies, Department of</p><p>Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone. He</p><p>holds an MSc in Political Science and an MA and a PhD in International</p><p>Studies. He is one of the 1992 recipients of the Fulbright Research Grant,</p><p>awarded to senior Africa scholars, which enabled him to conduct research in</p><p>the Library of Congress while based at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced</p><p>International Studies, Washington, DC.He has also served as a council mem-</p><p>ber for various universities in Kenya. He is the Book Review Editor for the</p><p>African Journal of Democracy and Governance. His recent journal articles and</p><p>co-edited volumes include: “Responsibility to Protect and Article 4 of the</p><p>Constitutive Act of the African Union Nexus: Lessons from Kenya’s Military</p><p>Involvement in Somalia, 2011–2012, African Journal of Democracy and</p><p>Governance 1, 2020: 79-100; Popular Participation in the Integration of the</p><p>East African Community: Eastafricanness and Eastafricanization (2020);</p><p>France’s Africa Relations: Domination, Continuity and Contradiction (2019);</p><p>Building Regionalism from Below: The Role of Parliaments and Civil Society in</p><p>Regional Integration in Africa (2018); African Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and</p><p>Leadership: Reflections of Diplomats and Scholars (2016); and Cooperative</p><p>Diplomacy, Regional Stability and National Interests: The Nile River and</p><p>Riparian States (2011).</p><p>MauriceN.Amutabi is Professor and Director of the Centre for Science and</p><p>Technology Studies at the Technical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya. He</p><p>holds a PhD in History from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.</p><p>Amutabi is author of over sixty books, and over one-hundred articles in refer-</p><p>eed journals and edited books. Amutabi has written five novels, which include</p><p>A Trip from the Past and Facing the Unique Acacia Tree. Amutabi has taught at</p><p>Moi University, Central Washington University, Catholic University of Eastern</p><p>Africa, Kisii University, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology,</p><p>Hekima University College, Lukenya University, and the Technical University</p><p>of Kenya and served as a visiting professor at Linkoping University, Sweden.</p><p>xii NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>He is the Chairperson of the Board of Management of the Centre for</p><p>Democracy, Research, and Development. He is the President of the African</p><p>Interdisciplinary Studies Association and Vice-President of Kenya Scholars and</p><p>Studies Association.</p><p>Toyin Falola is Professor of History, University Distinguished Teaching</p><p>Professor, and the Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities,</p><p>the University of Texas at Austin. He is an honorary professor, University of</p><p>Cape Town, and Extraordinary Professor of Human Rights, University of the</p><p>Free State. He has served as the General Secretary of the Historical Society of</p><p>Nigeria, President of the African Studies Association, Vice- President of the</p><p>UNESCo Slave Route Project, and Kluge Chair of the Countries of the South,</p><p>Library of Congress. He is a member of the Scholars’ Council, Kluge Center,</p><p>Library of Congress. He has received over thirty lifetime career awards and</p><p>fourteen honorary doctorates. He has written extensively on Nigeria, including</p><p>A History of Nigeria, Nigerian Political Modernity, Violence in Nigeria, and</p><p>Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria.</p><p>LinnetHamasi works as a lecturer at Technical University of Kenya. She has</p><p>previously worked at Kisii University and the Catholic University of Eastern</p><p>Africa. Dr. Hamasi has published many books and refereed articles. She has had</p><p>visiting fellowships taking her to Sweden and Norway, and she serves on the</p><p>editorial boards of the Journal of Popular Education in Africa and the Journal</p><p>of African Interdisciplinary Studies and as CEo of the African Interdisciplinary</p><p>Studies Association (AISA). She is a member of the African Studies Association.</p><p>She has received research awards from Action Aid, the Swedish Council, and</p><p>the Social Science Research Council–APN Network.</p><p>Thomas Otieno Juma teaches Public Administration at the University of</p><p>Kabianga, Kericho, Kenya, where he also serves as Head of the Department of</p><p>Humanities and Social Sciences. He holds a DPhil and has previously taught at</p><p>the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, and has been a part-time lecturer at</p><p>Moi University, Kisii University, and Rongo University. Juma has authored</p><p>many articles in refereed journals centered on regional security, diplomacy,</p><p>conflict, governance, and policy. He has authored chapters in and co-edited</p><p>four books: African International Relations: Thematic Analysis; Governance</p><p>Framework for a New Africa; A Century Plus Chronicles: A Biography of Hellena</p><p>Omolo; and Election Management in Regions: A Global Security.</p><p>MercyKaburu is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United</p><p>States International University (USIU)–Africa, Kenya. Kaburu is a postdoc-</p><p>toral fellow at Michigan State University under the Alliance for African</p><p>Partnership (AAP)–African Futures Program. She has had several articles and</p><p>book chapters published. Her research interests include Kenya’s diplomacy and</p><p>foreign policy, regionalism and regional integration in the East African com-</p><p>munity, and women and political leadership, particularly the realization of gen-</p><p>der quota in Kenya.</p><p>xiii NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>MusambayiKatumanga is a political scientist trained in France, India, and</p><p>Kenya. He is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and</p><p>Public Administration at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, where he teaches</p><p>which demanded implementation of cost-sharing measures, as part of the</p><p>Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs). Still, Moi’s university expansion pro-</p><p>gram remains an enduring legacy which the succeeding government of Mwai</p><p>Kibaki inherited and enhanced. During the ten-year Kibaki presidency, between</p><p>2003 and 2013, university enrolment grew from 60,000 to 324,560 with the</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>39</p><p>number of public universities increasing from 6 to 31 while private universities</p><p>rose from 9 to 36.</p><p>While Kibaki adopted and enhanced the university expansion trend set by</p><p>Moi, he however discontinued the practice of having the president serve as the</p><p>chancellor of all public universities signaling that his government would desist</p><p>from interfering with universities. Still, the university legal framework that</p><p>Kibaki inherited continued in place until the enactment of the University Act</p><p>of 2012. Among other fundamental reforms, the Act of 2012 granted the pow-</p><p>ers of appointing the chancellor to the senate and alumni associations.</p><p>Furthermore, the Act provided for competitive appointment of vice- chancellors,</p><p>with the university councils serving as the interviewing panel which would</p><p>recommend to the Cabinet Secretary who to appoint. While this law seemed to</p><p>have created a fair process of appointing the VCs, it should be noted that uni-</p><p>versity councils consisted mostly of bureaucrats and members appointed by the</p><p>cabinet secretary, who are mostly cronies of powerful politicians. This dysfunc-</p><p>tion allowed powerful politicians to continue influencing the appointment of</p><p>vice-chancellors.</p><p>The expansion of universities in recent years has made them attractive to</p><p>politically connected commercial buccaneers. By 2019, the three largest uni-</p><p>versities of Nairobi, Kenyatta, and Moi had a student population of about</p><p>84,000, 62,000, and 52,000 respectively, representing more than a third of the</p><p>total university enrolment in Kenya. To political and commercial wheeler-</p><p>dealers, this huge student population represents a commercial opportunity</p><p>which incentivizes them to influence major university appointments. The flaw</p><p>of the 2012 law came to full light in 2017 when Isaac Kosgey was appointed as</p><p>the vice-chancellor of Moi University amid claims that some panelists deliber-</p><p>ately downgraded Laban Ayiro, who was considered a stronger candidate for</p><p>the position. The intrigues surrounding the interview process at Moi University</p><p>prompted Margaret Kobia, who chaired the Public Service Commission (PSC),</p><p>to lament “the worrying trend where some council members award scores that</p><p>are outliers. It makes one wonder if the panel members are measuring agreed</p><p>competencies or had a predetermined candidate” (The Conversation, 2020).</p><p>The 2012 law underwent major amendments following the enactment of</p><p>the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2018 No. 18 of 2018,</p><p>which took away the University Councils’ role in the appointment of university</p><p>administrators, transferring it to the Public Service Commission. Under the</p><p>2018 law, the PSC is responsible for appointing public university chancellors,</p><p>vice-chancellors, and other administrative positions, including deputy vice</p><p>chancellors, principals, and deputy principals of constituent colleges. The 2018</p><p>law therefore effectively eroded university autonomy and granted the state the</p><p>ultimate powers in university governance. Despite the 2018 law, appointment</p><p>of university administrators has continued to generate controversy as demon-</p><p>strated by the crisis surrounding the selection of Stephen Kiama as the Vice</p><p>Chancellor of the UON in 2019. George Magoha, the Cabinet Secretary for</p><p>Education revoked Kiama’s appointment, although he later beat a retreat after</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>40</p><p>the intervention of the courts. This controversy demonstrates the continued</p><p>interference by the state in university governance, which is a reversal of the</p><p>gains of the Kibaki era that saw universities regaining their autonomy.</p><p>conclusIon</p><p>While Kenya has made huge gains in expanding access to both basic and higher</p><p>education, political leaders have continued to exert their influence on univer-</p><p>sity administration, thus undermining their autonomy. The role of universities,</p><p>as institutions that mold the national intelligentsia, is more significant than the</p><p>short-sighted interests of the political elites. Universities therefore should be</p><p>shielded from undue external interferences to enable them to play their rightful</p><p>role as engines of knowledge production and dissemination.</p><p>references</p><p>Ashby, E. (1966). British, Indian, African: A Study in the Ecology of Higher Education.</p><p>Harvard University Press.</p><p>Court, D. (1975). The Experience of Higher Education in East Africa: Prospects for a</p><p>Developmental Role. Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi.</p><p>Furley, O. W., & Watson, T. (1978). A History of Education in East Africa. NOK</p><p>Publishers.</p><p>Kenya National Archives (KNA), AV/12/228. (1949). “Higher Education”. The file</p><p>contains the 1949 Third Report on higher education in East Africa (44) by the</p><p>Inter-University Council Delegation to East Africa that visited between July</p><p>and August.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA XJ/7/71. (1974). “Planning and Development Papers”</p><p>Letter from G.Pennisi, World Bank Official to P.J. Gachathi, P.S.Education dated</p><p>September 11.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/ED/3/135. (1964, November 2). “University of East</p><p>Africa,” a Memo by Kenneth Matiba, the Permanent Secretary for Education to the</p><p>Minister of Education.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/ED/3/2918. (1963, December 5). “Higher</p><p>Education, University of East Africa.” The file contains a Report on Dar es Salaam</p><p>Medical School by the Tanganyika Ministry of Education.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/ED/3/2918. (1964). “Higher Education, University</p><p>of East Africa”. The file contains minutes of the sixth Meeting of the University</p><p>Development Committee held at University College, Nairobi on Friday, 3 February</p><p>1964. Kenyatta National Hospital was formerly known as King George VI Hospital.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/XJ/3/222. (1973, January 13). “Commission of</p><p>Inquiry” File. Contains Circular by G.R. M’Mwirichia, a Ministry of Education</p><p>Official, Responding to the University Grants Committee Recommendations.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/XJ/3/224. (1984, June 30). “University of Nairobi,”</p><p>Second Report of the 1980–83 University Grants Committee Led by Dr. Kiano.</p><p>Kenya National Archives, KNA/XJ/7/83. (1980, August 16). “University of Nairobi</p><p>Estimates,” File Contains “University Development” an Internal Memo at the</p><p>M. M. KITHINJI</p><p>41</p><p>Ministry of Higher Education by W. W. Njaga, the Assistant Director of</p><p>Education (UE).</p><p>Kithinji, M.M. (2018). The State and the University Experience in East Africa: Colonial</p><p>Foundations and Postcolonial Transformations in Kenya. UNISA Press.</p><p>Kolinsky, M. (1983). The Demise of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education</p><p>Overseas: Chapter in the History of the Idea of the University. Minerva, 21(1).</p><p>Maloba, W. (1989). Nationalism and Decolonization, 1947–1963. In W. Ochieng</p><p>(Ed.), A Modern History of Kenya 1895–1980in Honour of B.A.Ogot. Evans Brothers.</p><p>Speech by President Daniel ARAP Moi at the University of Nairobi Graduation</p><p>Ceremony on December 14, 1979.</p><p>Nwauwa, A. (1997). Imperialism, Academe, and Nationalism: Britain and University</p><p>Education or Africans, 1860–1960. Frank Cass.</p><p>Ogot, B. (2003). My Footprints in the Sands of Time: An Autobiography (p. 2003).</p><p>Trafford Publishing.</p><p>Report of the Presidential Working Party. (1981). Nairobi: Government Printer.</p><p>Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa. (1955, July–August,</p><p>1956). Nairobi: Government Printer.</p><p>Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa. (1958, July–August,</p><p>1959). Nairobi: Government Printer.</p><p>Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa. (1968). Nairobi:</p><p>Government</p><p>Printer.</p><p>Rogers, D. (1972). Student Loan Programs and the Returns to Investment in Higher</p><p>Levels of Education in Kenya. Economic Development and Cultural Change,</p><p>20(2), 243–259.</p><p>The Conversation. (2020, January 29). Crisis at Nairobi University Has Its Roots in</p><p>Decades of Political Interference.</p><p>The Nation. (1984, March 20). Be Proud of Kenya, Moi Urges Students.</p><p>3 HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORMS IN KENYA</p><p>43</p><p>CHAPTER 4</p><p>Gangs, Militias, andVigilantes inRural</p><p>andUrban Violence inKenya</p><p>MusambayiKatumanga</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>Modes and forms of violence in Kenya have roots in a long durée distance</p><p>decay complexities. These have, in space over time, been animated by insecu-</p><p>rity enhancing subjective interest-driven leadership culture. This has morphed</p><p>to impact state security culture and non-state-actor inverted mirror-image</p><p>security culture. While the former is characterized by a generalized absence of</p><p>or inability of the State to provide security, the latter spawns auto-security</p><p>predatory violence mediated by mutating gangs, vigilantes, and militias across</p><p>large swaths of rural and urban spaces. Distance decay retains the potential of</p><p>anchoring hybrid threats and state unviability. Notably, a converse strategic</p><p>culture predicated on distance decay reduction, Concerted Operations in</p><p>Vulnerable Areas for Reintegration and Transformative (COVART), is an</p><p>imperative objective antidote for state viability. The chapter is organized around</p><p>five sections. The first recapitulates the roots of distance decay and the evolu-</p><p>tion of termite security challenges. The second treats the geo-graphing activi-</p><p>ties of rustler termite groups. The third examines the rise of ethno-nationalist</p><p>vigilante and militia formations. The fourth analyzes the localization process of</p><p>M. Katumanga (*)</p><p>Research Associate Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa</p><p>(SIGLA), Stellenbosch Military Academy, Stellenbosch University,</p><p>Stellenbosch, South Africa</p><p>University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_4</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_4&domain=pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_4</p><p>44</p><p>regionalized global militias and militarized gangs. The fifth anticipates hybrid</p><p>violence and challenges to stateness in Kenya.</p><p>dIstance decay andevolutIon oftermIte securIty</p><p>challenges InKenya</p><p>Central to state viability is institution-inclined leadership endowed with</p><p>security- enhancing ideas core to the development of organizational infrastruc-</p><p>ture and positive monopoly of instruments of violence (Hutchful, 2000: 211).</p><p>As part of a state’s input and output functions, institutions must regulate and</p><p>provision welfare values (Dawisha & Zartman, 1988, 7), such as hard and</p><p>human security. These engender expansion of legitimacy, acceptance of the</p><p>State as a source of identity and arena of politics (Zartman, 1995: 1–11).</p><p>Security must be conceived as a process of emancipation achievable by people</p><p>and groups without seeking to deprive others of it (Booth, 1991: 313–326). In</p><p>objective terms, it is about the absence of threats to acquired values. The con-</p><p>verse insecurity underpinned by fear of attacks on values at a subjective level</p><p>(Wolfers, 1962, 150) affirms the linear relationship between violence and eco-</p><p>nomic backwardness (McNamara, 1968).</p><p>Strategic security culture is imperative in security provisioning. As a referen-</p><p>tial framework cumulatively built out of long durée praxis, strategic culture is</p><p>about how the state elite adapts to and contains threats over time in space</p><p>mediated by objective interest, courage, and political will. It must evolve into</p><p>a governmental thought and praxis to shape organizational ethos, professional</p><p>attributes, and strategic thinking. This enables threat projection, mediation of</p><p>quotidienne administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive capacities of the</p><p>State. Strategic security culture allows modern governmentality—that expan-</p><p>sive way of thinking about governing and rule in relation to the exercise of</p><p>modern power to be operationalized (Foucault, 1978: 8). Anatomo-political</p><p>practices that go beyond the mere disciplining of the individual human body</p><p>(Foucault, 1978) must be implemented to enable optimization and exploita-</p><p>tion of individuals. These must include enhancement of systemic political, eco-</p><p>nomic, and security spectrums to develop territory, human, and material</p><p>resource trilogy of the State’s physical base (Buzan, 1991). Biopolitical inter-</p><p>ventions and regulatory controls that focus on the body species, mechanisms of</p><p>life, and biological processes complement anatomo-political practices and</p><p>engender biopower mediated “governable spaces.” The converse process</p><p>engenders ungovernable spaces that mediate distance decay. Here, governmen-</p><p>tal entities that should be close and interconnected remain distant and decayed.</p><p>In Kenya, distance decay has roots in England’s strategic imperatives, whose</p><p>end state was the securitization of the Indian Raj through control of Egypt</p><p>and, by inference, the source of the Nile. To effect securitization, a strategic rail</p><p>belt was constructed to connect the “source of the Nile” to the Indian Oceana</p><p>board to enable troop deployments from India. Economic cost imperative</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>45</p><p>consequent to diminished strategic imperatives mediated the geo-graphing of</p><p>the Kenya territory, alienation of land to European settlers, and the conver-</p><p>gence of many ethnic identities within this new entity devoid of meaningful</p><p>state- building efforts. Kenya emerged as and remains essentially an extraction</p><p>project for a few to the exclusion of many. This process underpinned the evolu-</p><p>tion of a duality of spaces and identities. On the one hand, were spaces set aside</p><p>for “citizen settlers” administered under “modern laws” (Mamdani, 1996).</p><p>Together with the rail network, they were conceived as core security objects to</p><p>be protected by the colonial Military and Police. On the other were scheduled</p><p>and bifurcated spaces reserved for “natives.” First were tribal reserves adminis-</p><p>tered under customary law and garrisoned by a tribal paramilitary force. These</p><p>acted as sites for labor production for biopolitical sustenance of settlers. Second</p><p>were anatomo-politically quarantined arid and semiarid spaces to the north of</p><p>the equator reserved for pastoralists. If citizen spaces benefited from colonial</p><p>state services, the pastoralist came off worse compared to sedentary “native”</p><p>communities that over time accessed missionary mediated education infra-</p><p>structure. Racially defined resource distribution and allocation (later predicated</p><p>on elite class), ethnic marginalization, and limited economic investments</p><p>entrenched distance decay.</p><p>Racially defined colonial military and police structures reinforced by collab-</p><p>orative ethnic groups evolved as a mirror image of the English military and</p><p>security culture. Instead of security transformation mediated by the need to</p><p>secure all citizens, they were appropriated by the successor elite and largely</p><p>ethnicized to assure regime consolidation. In pastoral geographies where the</p><p>State was largely absent, the leadership opted to outsource security to poorly</p><p>trained, led, and paid police reservists from community volunteers. This</p><p>evolved a state-sponsored mirror image vigilante and subjective militia culture,</p><p>as opposed to well-structured state-sponsored vigilante, militia military culture</p><p>rooted in well-trained, led security providing auxiliaries operating within orga-</p><p>nized structures. It animated the drift toward inverted multiple mirror image</p><p>security provisioning as communities unable to access security mimicked the</p><p>State to secure themselves.</p><p>Failed economy and political programs equally animated corruption and</p><p>rural-urban migration</p><p>that created urban slum spaces favorable for hosting</p><p>criminal activities. Unable to access security, the citizenry reflected the mirror</p><p>image security characterized by absence and abstinence with the creation of</p><p>organic security provisioning. Their growth was animated by elite neoliberal</p><p>policies of liberalization and privatization. These anchored force downsizing</p><p>and private security provisioning for those who could afford it. The crisis of</p><p>oversight frameworks and competence combined to affect procurement of sys-</p><p>tems, recruitment, promotions, and deployment roles, engendering extraction</p><p>and impunity. The result was the evolution of multiple distance decay, ani-</p><p>mated by the inflation of organic groups and their mutation into organized</p><p>inverted mirror images of state mirror security providers.</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>46</p><p>Administrative distance decay manifests in the crisis of rule imposition and</p><p>control in large parts of the State. Without regulatory frameworks, it animates</p><p>predatory spheres, shifting from State to gang-provided services. Economic</p><p>decay is underpinned by the extent of exclusion and the inability of State to</p><p>engender value addition in large development-starved spaces. State inability to</p><p>dominate instruments of violence has engendered favorable and, in some cases,</p><p>military spaces conducive for gangs, organic and organized vigilante, and mili-</p><p>tia predatory activities. Such spaces used to undermine stateness are a function</p><p>of square millage plus sanctuaries plus obstacles minus information, communi-</p><p>cation, and transport (MS/FS=MI2+OB+SAN-ICT). Obstacles here range</p><p>from physical (geopolitical position, high grounds, raised features, vegetation</p><p>cover, drainage system) to economic. Others include demographic and weather.</p><p>Sanctuaries can be economic, social, and political. Compounding distance</p><p>decay dynamics are low levels of institutional and infrastructure penetration.</p><p>The resultant disconnectivities undergird what Mkandawire (2001) calls ter-</p><p>mite economies around which cascades of violent alliance formation and con-</p><p>testations among termite security providers (organic/organized</p><p>vigilante–militia), state security (including elite actors), and the community out</p><p>contest either as parasitic or symbiotic partners in a bid to extract criminal capi-</p><p>tal. The entire dynamics underpin termite security challenges.</p><p>the geo-graphIng rustlers termIte groups</p><p>The fall of Idi Amin’s regime in 1979 engendered an influx of automatic weap-</p><p>ons into Northeastern and Western parts of Uganda and Kenya, respectively.</p><p>This distorted the balance of power among pastoralists and, with it, the classi-</p><p>cal framework for responding to drought devastation through rustling. Raids</p><p>were militarized, taking on political and economic predatory imperatives. The</p><p>nascent Moi regime initially opted for overt containment using both military</p><p>and paramilitary anti-stock theft units. The latter had been formed consequent</p><p>to the co-optation of the Ngoroko militia outfit initially formed by elements</p><p>within the internal security framework to prevent Moi from succeeding Mzee</p><p>Jomo Kenyatta as president (Karimi & Ochieng, 1980).</p><p>Imperatives of regime consolidation in the 1990s animated a new symbiotic</p><p>and parasitic logic that mediated a triage of community, State, and local elite</p><p>interests in Northwestern Kenya. To counter its opposition, the regime elite</p><p>rented organized Pokot violence to impose a politically favorable space through</p><p>forced expulsions or compliance to the regime in West Pokot, Trans Nzoia,</p><p>Turkana, and Elgeyo Marakwet districts, currently known as counties. Local</p><p>elite that organized these activities was facilitated to consolidate control over</p><p>political power. Its militia was allowed free reign to raid and acquire livestock</p><p>from their victims. To counter the Pokot and the Turkana, other groups in</p><p>Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet, evolved their organic self-defense vigilantes. These,</p><p>in turn, morphed into organized ethno-national militia, transforming the</p><p>entire region into a war zone characterized as the triangle of hell.</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>47</p><p>Armed police reservists were largely co-opted in their respective ethno-</p><p>nationalistic formations as inverted mirror image security providers. While</p><p>their predatory raids transformed them into parasites, their symbiotic relations</p><p>with their host milieu and political class transformed them into an ethno-</p><p>national vigilante–militia. By the mid-1990s, rustling morphed into a bandit</p><p>economy. Elite networks enabled the transport of cattle to Nairobi’s beef</p><p>industry. Between 1996 and 2002, more than 300,000 cattle, estimated to cost</p><p>Kshs.3 billion (US$3m), were rustled, while an estimated 1200 people lost</p><p>their lives. Between December 2002 and May 2003, an estimated 3779 fami-</p><p>lies were displaced (Katumanga, 2007, 311). Subsequent governmental disar-</p><p>mament operations have failed. Part of the problem lies in the strategy of</p><p>arming elite-connected reservists who end up consolidating local elite power</p><p>base while animating violence.</p><p>Reservists remain a mismatch to militias who over time have accessed</p><p>weapon systems and appropriated knowledge from state institutions before</p><p>innovatively adopting them in their terrain, to the chagrin of security institu-</p><p>tions. The government’s disarmament projects have failed given demand and</p><p>supply imperatives. Security distance decay engendered by State absence or</p><p>abstinence is compounded by poor communication and transport infrastruc-</p><p>ture. The low depth of paramilitary and military personnel staying power to</p><p>sustain disarmament ensures that the State is constantly challenged by force to</p><p>space ratios and mass and economy of force principles. Bandits have, in turn,</p><p>evolved patience and ability to wait out the State. Demand for arms remains,</p><p>given the presence of thousands of banditry-dependent uneducated and unem-</p><p>ployed youths.</p><p>While the government, in 2015, destroyed 5000 arms seized between 2011</p><p>and 2014 during its annual disarmament operation campaign cycles, it has less</p><p>knowledge of the situation of guns in circulation. A security officer captures</p><p>this succinctly; “It is true that we have no register and do not know how many</p><p>guns we have given out over the years … it is scary, and we are seating on a time</p><p>bomb. We are only lucky that we have never had a civil war in this country,</p><p>otherwise we have an armed militia out there” (Kamau, 2019: 14). In 2013,</p><p>Baringo became the main focus, with more than 20,000 people displaced.</p><p>Residents suffered a loss of 6000 herds of cattle and 14,000 goats due to raider</p><p>predation (Kiprotich, 2013: 11). Here, organized militias killed at least 40</p><p>well-armed police and paramilitary elements before disorganizing and dispers-</p><p>ing the rest of the company.</p><p>In one incident in 2015, sustained predatory attacks occasioned the death of</p><p>over 100 civilians (Otuki, 2018) and displacement of over 40,000. In late</p><p>March 2017, the president deployed Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) after vio-</p><p>lence engulfed the counties of Laikipia, Baringo, and West Pokot, claiming 75</p><p>lives between March 2017 and October 2016. This was in addition to the</p><p>destruction of conservancies despite the presence of 2000 police officers (The</p><p>Star, 2017, March 23). Raids engender marginalization of communities, pov-</p><p>erty, and human rights violations by bandits and security actors. In 2016, 38</p><p>schools were closed (Turkana-8, West Pokot-10, Baringo-20). Some have</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>48</p><p>remained closed for the last 20years. A total of 32 schools, 7in Turkana, 8in</p><p>West Pokot, and 17 in Baringo, were completely destroyed. Violence has</p><p>equally occasioned the exit of teachers. Many schools in West Pokot do not</p><p>have government teachers. Where they exist, the teacher-pupil ratio is 1:105 or</p><p>250% beyond the recommended ratio of 1:42 (Maweu, 2018).</p><p>Community access to water</p><p>is constrained given the destruction of 14 and</p><p>10 water infrastructures in Turkana and Baringo, respectively. Tiaty subcounty</p><p>in Baringo has no doctors in the 54 government medical facilities. Fourteen of</p><p>these were closed. There are 48 nurses for a total population of 173,429. A</p><p>total of 880 cattle, 12,592 goats, 2242 sheep, 165 camels, and 115 donkeys</p><p>were predated in Turkana South subcounty in the decade between 2005 and</p><p>2015. During the same period in West Pokot, 1316 cattle, 3757 goats, 1070</p><p>sheep, and 118 camels were predated, occasioning a loss of Kshs 478,937,300</p><p>(US$ 478,940) (Maweu, 2018). In the said period between 2005 and 2015,</p><p>573 people lost their lives, 1752 were injured, and a total of 589 houses</p><p>burned. Between January and May 2019, an estimated 30 people were killed</p><p>in banditry activities in Baringo, West Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Samburu,</p><p>and Laikipia. Thousands have been displaced, and economic activities dis-</p><p>rupted. A notable phenomenon is a systematized intensity of violence relative</p><p>to the discovery of strategic mineral resources such as oil deposits and pro-</p><p>jected vertical arteries for their conveyance, such as Lamu Port-South Sudan-</p><p>Ethiopia- Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). Pokot’s narratives point to the</p><p>desire to gain control of the Turkwell hydroelectric project, oil, and water</p><p>resources. Turkana and Samburu have their eyes fixed on conservancies con-</p><p>trolled by former settlers, and the post-independence landed elite class.</p><p>In January 2019, the government effected a policy, opting for disarmament,</p><p>vetting of reservists, and registration of their arms. Security agents see politi-</p><p>cians as part of the “banditry” problem. They blame them for “running the</p><p>multi-billion shillings meat trade resultant from stolen cattle” (Daily Nation,</p><p>2019: 1, 4). Six thousand guns and 90,000 rounds of ammunition out of an</p><p>estimated 500,000 arms in circulation in the region had been surrendered by</p><p>26 of May 2019. In January 2019, 350 arms, part of a 12,000 new assault rifles</p><p>consignment, were seized in Nakuru by a police unit (Odiambo, 2019). These</p><p>were to be issued to reservists in Turkana in preparation for 2022 elections</p><p>subsequent to secret transfer from police warehouses in Nairobi. Of these, 150</p><p>rifles were in transit to Turkana North. Two hundred were to be transported</p><p>to Turkana South. Amos Gathecha, a senior officer at the Office of the</p><p>President, ordered a stop to the distribution exercise and an immediate audit</p><p>of reservists and their arms. Of the 12,000, Kenya police were slated to get</p><p>1200, while administration police were to be issued 800. The remaining</p><p>10,000 were to be distributed to reservists. It is not a surprise that, by 2018,</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>49</p><p>there were 750,000 firearms, up from 680,000in 2016, in the hands of civil-</p><p>ians in Kenya. Of these, only 8136 or 1% were registered.</p><p>organIzed ethno-natIonalIst vIgIlante andmIlItIa</p><p>termIte formatIons</p><p>In the 1970s, rural banditry mediated by gangs such as Angola-Msumbiji in</p><p>Kakamega was characterized by murders, muggings, and burglaries. This gang</p><p>logic shifted in the mid-1990s as State monopoly over violence diminished,</p><p>occasioning a rise in symbiotic and parasitic relationships between militia ser-</p><p>vices and citizen capital. The more distanced from the center of the State geo-</p><p>graphically and economically people became, the stronger their relationship</p><p>with non-state violence providers.</p><p>Given an apparent State abstinence or absence, society demanded, or was</p><p>forced, to seek protection, dispute resolution, debt collection, defense of a col-</p><p>lective ethnic identity, and security provision services from vigilantes as organic</p><p>or organized militias. Political elite seeking to capture or retain political power</p><p>also engaged militia, hence the inflation of multiple organic and organized</p><p>groups trading in security as a commodity and, by inference, violence. The net</p><p>result was the evolution of contested and sometimes ungovernable spaces</p><p>occupied by extractive termite movements and bandits.</p><p>Among these are the Sungu Sungu brand of gang formations in Kisii and</p><p>Nyamira counties that emerged in 2002 as organic vigilante groups to counter</p><p>criminal activities. Residents were extorted to offset their operational costs</p><p>incurred on patrols affected to counter criminals, torching “witches,” and</p><p>extrajudicial killings. Their twin Amachuma and Chinkororo militias forma-</p><p>tions exist in an inverted mirror image of the police and the army, respectively.</p><p>These were set up to effect internal and external security against criminals and</p><p>aggression of their Kalenjin and Masai neighbors, respectively. Appropriation</p><p>of private violence by the Moi regime in an attempt to counter political plural-</p><p>ism equally helped to morph gang activities. It provided a transitivity dynamic</p><p>that allowed gangs to mutate into militias while animating the nurturing of</p><p>new organic groups as countervails. The 1991–1992 pre-election and 1993</p><p>postelection cycles were characterized by militia violence that engulfed Rift</p><p>Valley Province and parts of Western Kenya. Seven hundred seventy-eight per-</p><p>sons died, while 62,000 were displaced (Government of Kenya, 2008). The</p><p>Human Rights Watch, on its part, put the number of the dead at 1500 and</p><p>300,000 as displaced consequent to the activities of the Kalenjin Warriors</p><p>(Human Rights Watch, 1992).</p><p>Mungiki/Muingi/Kiama (united people) emerged as a counterpoise to</p><p>Kalenjin warriors in a bid to protect their Kikuyu brethren. By 2002, it had</p><p>evolved into a renowned vigilante militia group. Organized around cells, it had</p><p>a nationwide structure. Through negotiations with the Kenya African National</p><p>Union (KANU) regime, Mungiki assumed control over public transport</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>50</p><p>network realms in Nairobi, Central province, and parts of the old Rift Valley</p><p>Province as realms for economic extraction. They also took control of 10</p><p>Military Land Rovers. An attempt by the new Kibaki regime to contain them</p><p>in 2003 using paramilitary units engendered 2days of clashes. A violent con-</p><p>frontation with Matatu owners resulted in the death of 50 people in Nairobi.</p><p>In June 2007, Mungiki beheaded ten defectors in Mathare slums alone.</p><p>Their violence against other communities in Nairobi’s Mathare and Kibera</p><p>slums engendered clashes with the Taliban, a vicious ethnic militia that had</p><p>emerged as an offshoot of the Bagdad Boys militia in Kisumu. The latter had</p><p>risen as a protective shield for opposition leaders against the KANU regime-</p><p>mediated violence in the early 1990s. The Bagdad boys had regressed to its</p><p>cell-like gang components that included Nyamasaria, Massive, Chief’s Squad,</p><p>Kenda, Kondele Bagdad for peace, Karamojong boys, Saba, Artur Magaryan,</p><p>China Squad, and American Marines. In 2007–2008 postelection violence,</p><p>Taliban aggregated other gangs like Siafu to emerge as a defense bulwark</p><p>against Mungiki in Nairobi.</p><p>Mungiki was appropriated as an inverted mirror image of an army, armed</p><p>and enabled to fend off attacks directed against Kikuyu in the Rift valley. It</p><p>played a major role in violence and displacements in Nairobi and Nakuru</p><p>directed at the non-Kikuyu. A total of 1300 people died in these clashes, while</p><p>600,000 persons were displaced. Equally consolidating parallel to Mungiki</p><p>were Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) rural rebels. With roots in agrarian</p><p>land dispossession grievances dating back to the Colonial State and animated</p><p>by elite expropriation of land in the Chebyukk settlement scheme they con-</p><p>ceived as ancestral, SLDF formed in 2005 and concentrated its struggle around</p><p>Mount Elgon. Its actions and the resultant security operations engendered the</p><p>death of 600 people and displacement of 66,000 people within 8months of its</p><p>tense activities. SLDF ran an administration sustained through racketeering</p><p>and predation. A military campaign, Operation Okoa Maisha, ended its</p><p>activities.</p><p>The foregoing</p><p>dynamic underpins the cascade tendency of gangs to morph</p><p>into organized criminal and extractive agents on steroids before mutating into</p><p>“legitimate” ethnic militia protecting ethno-nationalistic interest and later cas-</p><p>cading into their “peace time state” as organized predatory entities. Herein lies</p><p>their triple symbiotic relations with communities, State, political security/</p><p>opposition elite when interests converge around values provided such as vio-</p><p>lence, protection rackets, and sometimes capital access to the community</p><p>through economies of affection. Antecedents of conflict emerge when bandit</p><p>activities become costly and attempts at independence are made, especially</p><p>after the elite aggregate becomes oligopolistic, consequent of political settle-</p><p>ments. Here, the elite in power tends to unleash reserve violence of the State</p><p>on them. The communities, on their part, tend to set up counterpoise vigilante</p><p>groups once the state feints absence or abstinence. This was the situation in</p><p>Gathaithi Village when vigilantes killed 15 suspected Mungiki adherents. Their</p><p>revenge claimed 29 people in Gathaithi village on April 20, 2009. In Kirinyaga,</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>51</p><p>Mungiki-Hague vigilante war claimed 80 lives over a 3-month period (The</p><p>Standard, 2009). To date, an estimated 100 criminal gangs and vigilante mili-</p><p>tias remain operational (Ngiracha, 2018).</p><p>The 2013 postelection cycle saw militia violence engulf Bungoma and Busia</p><p>Counties. Organized militias carried out attacks on nine villages on the election</p><p>day of 4 March 2013in Mukhuyu village (Busia) and spread to Bungoma by</p><p>11 April 2013. By 11 May 2013, 14 people had been hacked to death and 150</p><p>injured. The worst attack came on 26 April 2013 in Bungoma’s Kikwechi</p><p>Village, where 54 people were slashed with machetes (Human Rights Watch,</p><p>2014: 13). Businessmen in Bungoma recruited young fighters aged between</p><p>20 and 30years in the run up to the 2007 elections. Kshs 250,000 (US$2500)</p><p>was spent on recruiting the fighters to defend the government and the prop-</p><p>erty of businessmen. Sixty young fighters were taken to Naivasha for combat,</p><p>knife, and sword training (Human Rights Watch, Ibid). The Inspector-General</p><p>affirmed this, noting, “those of you who have been down there and know what</p><p>is happening in Busia and Bungoma also know that these attacks are political”</p><p>(Human Rights Watch, 2014). Between April and May 2019, it was the turn</p><p>of Kakamega County, where more than 20 people were killed in politically</p><p>enabled gang violence (Wafula & Misiko, 2019).</p><p>localIzIng regIonalIzed global mIlItIas</p><p>andmIlItarIzed gangs</p><p>Kenya’s Coastal and Northeastern counties experienced marginalization with</p><p>differentiated responses. In the latter, a 4-year armed resistance emerged under</p><p>Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF). Government attempts</p><p>to counter this led to many atrocities, such as those in Garbattulla and Wagalla,</p><p>in which 2700 and 3000 people died, respectively. The counties equally expe-</p><p>rienced extreme distance decay that anchored banditry. In March 1997, armed</p><p>Shangilas militia from Ethiopia killed 100 people, including 19 security offi-</p><p>cers. A repeat attack engendered the death of 200 Degodias.</p><p>Coastal grievances found expression through Mwambao party and later</p><p>Islamic party of Kenya (IPK) in the 1990s. This soon began to manifest militar-</p><p>ily through Kaya Bombo raiders who, in August–September 1997, executed</p><p>attacks on police installations in Likoni under the leadership of Juma Bemba,</p><p>killing six officers before taking off with 43 G3 rifles and 1500 rounds of</p><p>ammunition (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1997). Targeted throughout</p><p>the month of December 1997 (when elections were held) were people from</p><p>the mainland before retreating into the Kaya forests. Ruling elite politicians</p><p>who sought to exploit historical grievances for electoral campaigns instigated</p><p>the attacks. Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) militia emerged to upgrade</p><p>these demands with calls for secession. A government clamp down on MRC</p><p>without responding to land injustices, impunity, and economic, political, and</p><p>social distance decay blurred its ability to anticipate radicalization and</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>52</p><p>recruitment activities of many youths. At the core of radicalization and recruit-</p><p>ment into Al Shabaab-related activities were preachers based at Sakina Mosque,</p><p>such as Makaburi and Abud Rogo. By the time the government intervened,</p><p>thousands had crossed into Somalia to fight.</p><p>Activities in Nairobi were coordinated by Ahmed Iman Ali, who used foot-</p><p>ball to access marginalized youth suffering from economic, political, and social</p><p>distance decay in slum areas of Majengo. Recruits cut across ethnic polarities</p><p>and were provisioned economic seed resources to open up businesses. In 2012,</p><p>Iman was appointed leader of Al Shabaab operations in Kenya and commander</p><p>of hundreds of foreign fighters, most of them childhood friends such as Ali</p><p>Salim Gichunge, who would lead the 2019 Dusit Du2 attack in Nairobi with</p><p>the help of his wife Violet Kemunto Omwoyo, a graduate from Masinde Muliro</p><p>University in Western Kenya. There were others like Juma Ayub Otit, in charge</p><p>of shuttling recruits from Nairobi slums and other parts of Kenya to an Al</p><p>Shabaab training base in Majimmo Sector of Southern Somalia. Titus Nabiswa</p><p>led the 2010 operations that killed a policeman and six people in a twin gre-</p><p>nade attack at an evangelical rally.</p><p>Al Shabaab’s activities morphed and intensified as it sought to operational-</p><p>ize its caliphate. Its intelligence network, Amniyaat, prosecuted operations in</p><p>Nairobi’s Westgate with local logistical support on 21 September 2013, killing</p><p>71 people (62 civilians, 5 soldiers, and 4 attackers). Its military wing Jaysh al</p><p>Usra was reorganized with its Kenyan commander in lower and middle Juba;</p><p>Mohamed Kunow Dulyadeyn ordered to increase operations in Garrisa and</p><p>Wajir counties. Al Hijra’s attacks at Garrissa University killed 147 students</p><p>(BBC, 2018). His counterpart in Gedo, Adan Garar, launched operations in</p><p>Mandera. Its Jayshi Ayman Command at the Kenyan Coast effected attacks in</p><p>Mpeketoni, killing 15 people (Wikipedia, 2007). These operations sought to</p><p>insert and consolidate multiple Focis in the counties of Lamu, Garissa, Mandera,</p><p>and Wajir as part of a mutually reinforcing twin strategy—terror-insurgency in</p><p>urban cities and insurge-terrorism in rural spaces with regional and global</p><p>implications.</p><p>Under the first are terror acts underpinned initially by bombs and light</p><p>weapons and later by gangs privileging knives as weapons of choice, especially</p><p>in Mombasa City, where an estimated 116 gangs operate, and in Kwale County.</p><p>In the latter, trifurcated armed encounters involving paramilitary, Al Shabaab</p><p>agents and returnees transformed Kwale into a “contested” space anchoring</p><p>disappearances of an estimated 110 and death of members of the public</p><p>(Hussein, 2018). Under the second are a nascent insurgency within the Juba</p><p>corridor which hosts the strategic Lamu County, the habitat of Kenya’s mega</p><p>LAPSSET geo-strategic infrastructures and the predominantly Somali Counties</p><p>of Mandera, Wajir, and Garrissa, bordering Somalia. Jayshi Ayman (consisting</p><p>of members from Coastal, regional, and global elements) and Al Hijra (mainly</p><p>elements from Somali clans) FOCOs operate here, respectively. More than 30</p><p>police and paramilitary officers were killed in the period of May through</p><p>November 2017. In January 2018, 100 heavily armed insurgents took over</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080)</p><p>53</p><p>and hoisted their flag in an abandoned police station in Ishakani village in</p><p>Lamu East before subjecting villagers to their preaching (Mukinda & Mohamed,</p><p>2017). Over the last 3months, Al Shabaab affiliates have executed heavy casu-</p><p>alties on KDF and other security forces, road communication networks, and</p><p>infrastructure using cost-effective</p><p>motor vehicle improvised explosive devices</p><p>(MVIED), small arms and light weapons, bombs, and improvised explosive</p><p>devices (IEDs).</p><p>Al-Shabaab seeks to force the dispersal of Kenyan security forces both in</p><p>Somalia and Kenya subsequent to its own. It seeks to recalibrate its means to</p><p>objectives through deployment of insur-terrorism in Lamu and counties in for-</p><p>mer Northeastern Province to supplement operations in Somalia against</p><p>KDF.One such deployment in El Adde in 2016 saw over 100 KDF soldiers</p><p>killed (Ngiracha, 2018) and another on Kolbyo in 2017, in which nine soldiers</p><p>died. In both cases, Al Shabaab deployed MVIED to breach KDF defenses</p><p>with devastating effects. The group’s attacks point to innovativeness, improvi-</p><p>sation and adaptation of technology, maturity, autonomy, coordination, com-</p><p>mand and control, and a maximization of and diffusion of fieldcraft within</p><p>their cells. Equally apparent is the presence of external and internal enablers</p><p>engendered by felt and real distance decay dynamics in both Kenya and Somalia</p><p>borderlands. These spaces effectively anchor criminal capital that sustains the</p><p>trafficking of sugar, charcoal, drugs, and human beings. The business and</p><p>political elite in Kenya and insurgents symbiotically feed on these activities;</p><p>hence, the symbiotic and parasitic relations are woven around values exchanged</p><p>and derived by criminal networks, organic and organized gangs, political and</p><p>security actors, and local communities.</p><p>Groups seeking to out-administer the State maximize these variables to cre-</p><p>ate time for reflection, organization, training, and cause development built on</p><p>a felt sense of marginalization while sharpening identity polarities. This allows</p><p>them to embed and effect a favorable force to space ratio, enough to disrupt</p><p>state countermeasures. The ability to sustain is apparent in the ability to embed</p><p>in society through a choice of aspects of security objects (ideas, institutions,</p><p>and the physical base). It is a reflection of success in building infrastructure</p><p>within existing favorable geographies.</p><p>In Kwale and Mombasa, Al Shabaab, under Titus Nabiswa since 2011, nur-</p><p>tured gangs as an alternative line of operation. By 2015, they had become</p><p>operational, providing a space for hardening recruits, launching disruptive and</p><p>diversionary violence away from anti-terror actions, disrupting socioeconomic</p><p>activities, killing, and stealing police arms. It provides recruits with a no-return</p><p>option, given some of the crimes committed. Attacks on women have engen-</p><p>dered fear while eroding government legitimacy. At some point, leadership fell</p><p>on Ramadhan Kufungwa, a Digo from Ukunda who mediated robberies and</p><p>killings of police with the help of Mahir Khalid Riziki, who was later killed in</p><p>the Dusit D2 attack. Other elements set up camp in Boni forest under Jaysh</p><p>Ayman. Within its ranks are well-trained, educated, and uneducated elements</p><p>known for their petty crime and drug addiction. Among their celebrated</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>54</p><p>actions were attacks on Mpeketoni that claimed 97 lives in June–July 2014.</p><p>According to John Elungata, the Coast Regional Security Coordinator, the</p><p>strategy of targeting businessmen in their robbery operations has transformed</p><p>them into new drivers of terror-related activities (Mohamed, 2019). The</p><p>Director of Criminal Investigation, George Kinoti, has acknowledged the pres-</p><p>ence of active sleeper cells.</p><p>On 15 January 2019, Al Shabaab executed a terror-insurgency operation at</p><p>Dusit D2 hotel using a largely Kenyan cell. More than 15 people died. Its</p><p>insurgency terrorism has been on the rise in the Northeastern counties. Here,</p><p>Al Hijra adherents have executed kidnap operations while planting IEDs. On</p><p>12 April 2019, Al Shabaab kidnapped two Cuban doctors. On 6 June 2019, a</p><p>General Service Unit (GSU) Recce unit on patrol between Harare and Liboi</p><p>hit an IED, killing six people. On 15 June 2019, seven administration police</p><p>officers were killed by an IED in Wajir East (Otsialo & Kimanthi, 2019). A few</p><p>hours earlier, Al Shabaab had executed a police reservist at Boji Garas and kid-</p><p>napped three others.</p><p>hybrId vIolence andchallenge forstateness InKenya</p><p>Al-Shabaab’s protracted insurgency within Kenya is a pointer to a dialectical</p><p>inverse degeneration of stateness. This distance decay is a function of elite orga-</p><p>nizing ideas that instrumentalize ethno-nationalism to dissimulate the core of</p><p>their predatory projects to power conservation. Erosion of institutional probity</p><p>and competence, diminishing ability to invest in Kenya’s physical base, growth</p><p>of gangs and militia activities, deployment and exploitation of technology as a</p><p>force multiplier by militia terror networks, and their localization of regional-</p><p>ized global networks are inclining Kenya toward hybrid violence. The conver-</p><p>gence of these elements on human and material components of the physical</p><p>base animates risks of state unviability.</p><p>Both Al Shabaab and cattle bandits maximize the dynamics of information,</p><p>communication, and transport to coordinate their activities. They maximize</p><p>money transfer applications such as Mpesa as force multipliers to disperse their</p><p>criminal capital, as do political and security actors who maximize their symbi-</p><p>otic nexus with criminal elements to engender illegal imports.</p><p>Any potential for transforming this situation calls for a net reassessment of</p><p>material (means) multiplied by the variable of will relative to the ability of the</p><p>State to match the former and the ability to degrade the latter. This will imply</p><p>total mobilization and unification of Clausewitz’s trinity, the people, the popu-</p><p>lation, and the government variables (Clausewitz, 1984) as part of the estimate</p><p>process that precedes the evolution and shaping of a requisite strategy. The</p><p>foregoing hybrid violence, predatory corruption, and instrumentalized ethnic</p><p>ideology must be conceived as forms of subversion demanding alternative,</p><p>inclusive state-building ideas. This should constitute the base on which believ-</p><p>able cause and a broad strategy or counter-insurgency are structured. If insur-</p><p>gency can be defined as a protracted process borne out of a conceived theory</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>55</p><p>of organized resistance whose end state is the defeat and eventual collapse of</p><p>the existing order and its replacement with an alternative, counterinsurgency</p><p>war must seek the converse defeat of this desire. To prevent recidivism, coun-</p><p>terinsurgency strategy must be mediated by the desire for the transformation of</p><p>the social order. It demands emancipation of people to overcome differentia-</p><p>tions, sectionalism, intolerance, corruption, and cronyism for equality, fairness,</p><p>good governance, and inclusion as a counter mobilizing cause.</p><p>This is best conceived as a process of a protracted Concerted Operations of</p><p>Vulnerable Areas, Reintegration, and Transformation (COVART) to contract</p><p>time through denial of both population and space. It is dependent on surging</p><p>underutilized military, human, and material resources capital of the State capac-</p><p>ity into spaces of contention as distance decay reduction process (DDRP) to</p><p>force a strategic culmination on the part of these networks. Imperative here is</p><p>a revisualization of a mutually reinforcing duality of land and maritime domains</p><p>and the setting up of inclusive integrative security and economic cooperation</p><p>platforms to assure the security interests of communities, State, and the region,</p><p>addressing historical and contemporary resource extraction, land disposses-</p><p>sion, and the redesigning of the leviathan’s governance logic. Failed efforts will</p><p>see the consolidation of Focos here and elsewhere in Eastern Africa, maximiz-</p><p>ing the dynamics of distance decay and resources denial.</p><p>references</p><p>BBC. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa- 32169080.</p><p>Booth, K. (1991). Security and Emancipation. Review of International Studies,</p><p>17(4), 313–326.</p><p>Buzan,</p><p>B. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies</p><p>in The Post-Cold War Era. Pearson.</p><p>Clausewitz, C. V. (1984). On War. M. E Howard and P Paret (Trans), Princeton</p><p>University Press.</p><p>Daily Nation. (2019). https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Battle- of- El- Adde%2D%2DMany-</p><p>questions- still- linger/1056- 4935076- 1arhud/index.htmland</p><p>Dawisha, A., & Zartman, W.I. (1988). Beyond Coercion. Durability of The Arab State.</p><p>Croom Helm.</p><p>Foucault, M. (1978). Power. The New Press.</p><p>Government of Kenya (GoK). (2008). Parliamentary Fact-Finding Mission on the Post-</p><p>Election Violence in Kenya.</p><p>Human Rights Watch. (1992). Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Violence in Kenya.</p><p>Human Rights Watch.</p><p>Human Rights Watch. (2014). ‘We Were Sent to Kill You,’ Gang Attacks in Western</p><p>Kenya and The Government’s Failed Response. Human Rights Watch.</p><p>Hussein, K. (2018, September 8–9). Enforced Disappearances in Kenya Are a Ticking</p><p>Time Bomb. The Star, p.4.</p><p>Hutchful, E. (2000). Understanding the African Security Crisis. In A.-F. Nusah &</p><p>K.Fayemi (Eds.), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma. Pluto Press.</p><p>4 GANGS, MILITIAS, AND VIGILANTES IN RURAL AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN KENYA</p><p>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Battle-of-El-Adde--Many-questions-still-linger/1056-4935076-1arhud/index.htmland</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Battle-of-El-Adde--Many-questions-still-linger/1056-4935076-1arhud/index.htmland</p><p>56</p><p>Kamau, J. (2019, May 27). The Enemy Within, Crisis of Guns in Wrong Hand. Daily</p><p>Nation, p.14.</p><p>Karimi, J., & Ochieng, P. (1980). The Kenyatta Succession. Trans-Africa Publishers.</p><p>Katumanga, M. (2007). Geo-Strategic Implications of Shirikisho La Afrika Mashariki.</p><p>In A.Eyakuza (Ed.), East African Scenario Project. Nairobi.</p><p>Kenya Human Rights Commission. (1997). Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood,</p><p>Violence, Ethnicity and The State in Coastal Kenya. KHRC.</p><p>Kiprotich, A. (2013, February 5). Government Turns Blind Eye on Residents Plight,</p><p>Worsening Insecurity. The Standard, p.11.</p><p>Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late</p><p>Colonialism. Fountain Publishers.</p><p>Maweu, C. (2018, June 20). Public Inquiry on Security and Its Impact on Enjoyment of</p><p>Fundamental Human Rights in the North Rift Region of Kenya. Nairobi: KNHRC.</p><p>McNamara, R.S. (1968). The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. Harper and Row.</p><p>Mkandawire, T. (2001). Thinking About Developmental States in Africa. Cambridge</p><p>Journal of Economics, 25(3), 289–314.</p><p>Mohamed, A. (2019, April 30). Al Shabaab Returnees Join Criminal Gangs Targeting</p><p>Business Premises. Daily Nation, p.12.</p><p>Mukinda, F., & Mohamed, A. (2017, January 21). 58 Students Have Abandoned</p><p>Varsities to Join Terror Groups. The Sunday Nation, p.4.</p><p>Ngiracha, J. (2018, February 4). Organized Gangs Continue to Operate Despite Ban.</p><p>Daily Nation.</p><p>Otsialo, M., & Kimanthi, K. S. (2019, June 16). AP’s Killed in Bomb Explosion.</p><p>Sunday Nation, p.6.</p><p>Odhiambo, M. (2008, May 27). Rift Leaders Turn Heat on Uhuru in NPR Disarmament</p><p>Row.” The Star.</p><p>Otuki, N. (2018, July 26). Shock as Number of Guns in Private Hands Hit 750,000.</p><p>Business Daily.</p><p>The Standard. (2009, June 30). Death Toll Rises as Mungiki Vigilante Feud</p><p>Simmers Silently.</p><p>The Star. (2017). KDF Deployed to Laikipia After Mukutan Retreat Raid, UK. The Star</p><p>30 Mar 2017. https://www.thestar.co.kenews2017-03-30.kdf.de</p><p>Wafula, P., & Misiko, H. (2019, May 10). Inside Story of the Brutal Killings of Matungu</p><p>Village. Daily Nation.</p><p>Wikipedia. (2007). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Mpeketoni_</p><p>attacks.</p><p>Wolfers, A. (1962). Discord and Collaboration. John Hopkins University Press.</p><p>Zartman, I. W. (1995). Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse. In</p><p>W.Zartman (Ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate</p><p>Authority (pp.1–11). Boulder, CO.</p><p>M. KATUMANGA</p><p>https://www.thestar.co.kenews2017-03-30.kdf.de</p><p>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Mpeketoni_attacks</p><p>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Mpeketoni_attacks</p><p>57</p><p>CHAPTER 5</p><p>Role ofStudents inNational Politics inKenya</p><p>MauriceN.Amutabi andLinnetHamasi</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>University students have played a major role in the leadership and democrati-</p><p>zation process in Kenya since independence. It is generally believed that uni-</p><p>versity students constitute the future intelligentsia who will one day take over</p><p>society’s leadership positions. They constitute the largest reservoir of highly</p><p>trained manpower and thus a source of technocrats needed for Kenya’s devel-</p><p>opment. University students are always considered the vehicles of ideological</p><p>dissemination and representatives of the left. Although not a popular subject</p><p>of scholarly endeavor, university students have a long history of student activ-</p><p>ism, and they often engage authorities in running battles, some of them vio-</p><p>lent (Erlich, 1989). At the level of national politics, university students often</p><p>rally behind radical politicians and former university students. In the case of</p><p>Kenya, university students have left an indelible mark on the politics of the</p><p>country (Mazrui, 1995). Titus Adungosi and Mwandawiro Mghanga are per-</p><p>haps the most famous student leaders produced by the University of Nairobi,</p><p>while James Orengo remains perhaps the most enduring former student leader</p><p>on the national stage. Titus Adungosi (or Tito as he was famously known) was</p><p>the Student Organization of Nairobi University (SONU) Chairman during</p><p>the 1982 attempted military coup in Kenya. Adungosi died at Kamiti Maximum</p><p>Security Prison in 1988 and this raised his hero status. Mwandawiro Mghanga</p><p>was also arrested and later served as a Member of Parliament in Kenya. James</p><p>M. N. Amutabi (*) • L. Hamasi</p><p>Technical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>e-mail: amutabi@gmail.com</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_5</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_5&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:amutabi@gmail.com</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_5</p><p>58</p><p>Orengo has been in parliament throughout except for one term in 1997–2002,</p><p>when he went against Raila Odinga’s political influence and contested on a</p><p>different party’s platform. This article looks at how university students and</p><p>former student leaders have participated in shaping national politics in Kenya.</p><p>the role ofStudentS InnatIonal PolItIcS</p><p>The role of students in national politics is not new to Kenya. Many countries</p><p>worldwide have always had the role of students in national politics. Many revo-</p><p>lutions, such as the French and Cuban revolutions, have involved students. In</p><p>apartheid South Africa, students played a very important role in the country’s</p><p>liberation from minority white rule. Steve Biko was a student leader who</p><p>planned an important role as a mobilizer against apartheid in Black South</p><p>African universities. Using black consciousness, he galvanized many campuses</p><p>to rise against apartheid, leading to uprisings such as the Soweto riots, which</p><p>were organized by students (Nkomo, 1984). In Zambia, students were involved</p><p>in rising against Kenneth Kaunda (KK) regimes demanding increased demo-</p><p>cratic space in the state. Ali Mazrui has indicated that “[i]n 1991 students</p><p>played the singularly constructive role of bringing the government and the</p><p>militant opposition together into discussion about what to do about the new</p><p>proposed constitution” (Mazrui, 1995: 167).</p><p>In Nigeria, students have always participated in national politics and univer-</p><p>sities have been at the center of change. The Biafra war in Nigeria was declared</p><p>at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka campus. In Sudan, students “helped to</p><p>force Jafaar Nimeeiry out of power in 1985” (Mazrui, 1995: 166). In Kenya,</p><p>the university students of the 1960 and 1970s were not as active in national</p><p>politics as those of the later years, and there were many reasons for this. Many</p><p>of the students were assured of employment and lived comfortable lives on</p><p>campus under free education and scholarships. The government catered to all</p><p>their needs and they lived on handsome allowances (Amutabi, 2002). The stu-</p><p>dents were assured of employment, and many received letters of offer before</p><p>even graduating. This was when the government of Kenya was actively engaged</p><p>in the Africanization program of the civil service, when it was getting rid of</p><p>expatriates. Kenyans pursuing diploma and degree programs in Kenya and</p><p>overseas were massively recruited into the civil service. The university students</p><p>were isolated in their privileged positions in ivory towers (Abdallah, 1985).</p><p>They did not concern themselves with the suffering of the masses but were</p><p>interested in their own social mobility. They were indifferent to politics and</p><p>lived in a state of denial of the realities of politics on the ground. They were</p><p>afraid to fight the ruling elite who held their future in their hands. Kenya had</p><p>just come from a colonial state in which natives were subdued harshly and were</p><p>afraid to question authority.</p><p>Kenyan university students first got involved in national politics in the 1969</p><p>fallout between Oginga Odinga and Jomo Kenyatta when he formed Kenya</p><p>Peoples Union (KPU) to oppose Kenya African National Union (KANU).</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>59</p><p>Oginga Odinga infiltrated students on campus and carried the KPU message</p><p>through university students and unemployed youths. For the first time, the</p><p>students were divided in their allegiance, especially after the brutal assassination</p><p>of Tom Mboya in 1969 and Ronald Ngala in 1972 (Macharia, 2015). The</p><p>students were nervous in realizing that the regime was becoming rogue, and it</p><p>required a watchdog to oppose it. The students were also nervous that they</p><p>were likely to become victims of the state like the assassinated national leaders</p><p>(Smith, 1968). The government was worried about the heightened radicaliza-</p><p>tion on campus and started to plant a special branch on campus.</p><p>the Kenyatta era</p><p>Kenyatta was concerned about the state of affairs at the University of Nairobi</p><p>and wanted to have full control of affairs on the campus. For this reason, he</p><p>appointed the first Vice-Chancellor from the civil service to have full control</p><p>and also wanted a person he could trust. In 1971, he appointed Josphat</p><p>Karanja, a fellow Kikuyu, to run the University (Amutabi, 1998;Barasa, 2002).</p><p>Karanja was confronted with student activism and staff radicalism, especially</p><p>those with Socialist and Marxist leanings. The government responded swiftly in</p><p>dealing with these elements, who were mainly from the faculties of arts, law,</p><p>and education. To divide the staff and student population, the government</p><p>transferred the Faculty of Education to Kenyatta University College, over</p><p>20km away. Even after separating the students and lecturers, the government</p><p>was surprised to find them organizing jointly; student riots at the University of</p><p>Nairobi often spread to Kenyatta University College. When one campus closed</p><p>because of riots, the other campus almost inevitably followed (Amutabi, 1997).</p><p>Many of the strikes and mass actions were about human rights, rule of law, cor-</p><p>ruption, and violence against innocent civilians.</p><p>The first major confrontation between the government of Kenya and uni-</p><p>versity students occurred in 1969 when the government stopped Jaramogi</p><p>Oginga Odinga from addressing university students in Taifa Hall. The govern-</p><p>ment had just introduced the Education Loan Scheme for university educa-</p><p>tion, and it knew that Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was going to address this issue</p><p>and he was going to be in sympathy with his students. Oginga Odinga believed</p><p>in free education for all as a socialist and made this known to everybody</p><p>(Kiewiet, 1971). By stopping him from addressing the students, the govern-</p><p>ment ignited the riots that followed. The second major confrontation occurred</p><p>in 1974 after the assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (JM) in what appeared</p><p>to be political fallout. A student organization of the University of Nairobi,</p><p>SONU, mobilized students and camped at parliament buildings asking the</p><p>government for an explanation for the disappearance and death of JM Kariuki</p><p>(Amutabi, 1994). Every morning since the death on March 3, 1974, members</p><p>of the parliamentary committee chaired by Elijah Mwangale addressed the stu-</p><p>dents on the issue.</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>60</p><p>Things got out of hand when the report of the parliamentary committee was</p><p>put to the vote in parliament and occasioned major fallout in which cabinet</p><p>members who voted for the motion were dismissed from their positions.</p><p>Students went on rampage after hearing this. They rejected the address by then</p><p>vice-chancellor Dr. Josphat Njuguna Karanja and rejected his appointment as</p><p>VC because he was selected over three more qualified professors—Simon</p><p>Ominde, Bethuel Allan Ogot, and David Peter Wasawo (Kenya Human Rights</p><p>Commission, 1992). There was a government crackdown on staff and students</p><p>opposed to the appointment of Josphat Karanja, and the university reopened.</p><p>The students complained about the lack of experience of Josphat Karanja, who</p><p>was a bureaucrat recalled from the United Kingdom and made VC.After the</p><p>failure to convince them to go back to class, the university was closed, and this</p><p>marked a major milestone when major national events affected the university</p><p>system in Kenya.</p><p>In this chapter, we seek to highlight major political events in which students</p><p>were involved and changed the direction of politics in the country. After the</p><p>1975 demonstrations, university students celebrated every 2nd of March in</p><p>remembrance of J.M Kariuki and this made the university unstable. Due to</p><p>these riots, the government got closely involved in monitoring the activities of</p><p>radical students and lecturers in the universities (Bergan, 2003). Radical stu-</p><p>dent leaders such as James Orengo, Mwandawiru Mghanga, Rumba Kinuthia,</p><p>and Makau Mutua, among others, were targeted by the state. Liberal lecturers</p><p>such as Ngugi wa Thiongo, Taban Loliyong, Okot P’Bitek, Ali Amin Mazrui,</p><p>Kamoji Wachira, Edward Oyugi, Oki Ooko Ombaka, Michael Chege, Peter</p><p>Anyang Nyong’o, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Shadrack Gutto, Nicholas Nyangira,</p><p>Kivutha Kibwana, Ngotho Kariuki, Kariuki Gathitu, Chris Wanjala and William</p><p>Ochieng, Odegi Awuondo, Micere Mugo, Maina wa Kinyatti, Mukaru</p><p>Ng’anga, Elisha atieneo Odhiambo, Katam Mukangi, and Willy Mutunga were</p><p>targeted by security machinery(Amutabi, 1998).</p><p>Many of the radical lecturers and student leaders were detained without</p><p>trial. Some lost their university positions. The state started to post intelligence</p><p>officers to the universities to crack down on radical students and lecturers. This</p><p>led to many closures of universities and the arrest of students (Emmerson,</p><p>1968). The year 1974 was also a major milestone because the students demon-</p><p>strated for the first time, opposing the introduction of tuition fees and loans to</p><p>students. Before then, university education was free, and students were given</p><p>bursaries but in 1974, the government wanted to introduce bursaries in the</p><p>form of loans, a move that was rejected through student demonstrations</p><p>(Barkan, 1975).</p><p>It was not until the 1980s that loans were introduced into the university</p><p>system. The student body as a force in national politics became prominent</p><p>when they forced the government to stop detentions of lecturers at the</p><p>University of Nairobi after Ngungi Wa Thiong’o was detained in 1977.</p><p>Students defied the government ban on Ngugi’s books, such as Petals of Blood</p><p>and Detained, which they openly circulated and shared (Foster & Long, 1970).</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>61</p><p>During this time, the government started a crackdown on authors of seditious</p><p>pamphlets such as Pamabana and Mwakenya, which were</p><p>linked to radical</p><p>politicians, students, and lecturers. This period coincided with the rise of leftist</p><p>politicians who were sympathetic to student interests. The national assembly of</p><p>parliament started to relate to student grievances and used student leaders to</p><p>mobilize riots against unpopular leaders in Nairobi (Association of African</p><p>Universities, 1995). The crackdown by the state led to more detentions to</p><p>deter radicalism in the universities. Students continued agitating for freedom of</p><p>speech, association, and assembly. The highlight of the Kenyatta era was when</p><p>university students made “JM Kariuki day” a national event.</p><p>MoI era andStudentS InnatIonal PolItIcS</p><p>When Kenyatta died in 1978 all political detainees were released by the new</p><p>president Daniel Arap Moi and they included Martin Shikuku, Raila Odinga,</p><p>Gibson Kamau Kuria, Willy Mutunga, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Maina wa Kinyati,</p><p>Mukaru Nganga, Katam Mukangi (eight lecturers and six politicians) (Amutabi,</p><p>1995a, 1995b). The released detainees released a statement thanking Moi</p><p>under Martin Shikuku for releasing them but warned him that if he did not</p><p>address the grievances for which they were detained, which included freedom</p><p>of expression, assembly, association, and speech, they would still invite him to</p><p>detain them (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1992). They said they were</p><p>prepared to defend the blood of their brothers who had been assassinated and</p><p>whose killers had not been brought to book. They invited President Moi to</p><p>investigate and get to the killers of JM Kariuki (1975), Tom Mboya (1969),</p><p>Ronald Ngala (1972), Bruce McKenzie (1978), Argwings Kodhek (1969),</p><p>Kung’u Karumba (1974), and Pio Gama Pinto (1965).</p><p>The released detainees also demanded the settlement of the land question of</p><p>the 4M acres in the Rift Valley, which were meant for the freedom fighters</p><p>(Nyandarua) and peasants (White highlands). They also demanded an apology</p><p>and compensation for the time they were detained by the state. The Moi regime</p><p>was conciliatory and promised to work together with politicians from all sides</p><p>of the political spectrum (Erlich, 1989). Student leaders expressed optimism</p><p>about the new regime and called for recognition of the university staff union,</p><p>which had been banned by Jomo Kenyatta (The Committee for the Release of</p><p>Political Prisoners (RPP) in Kenya, 1983). The students also called for the</p><p>reemployment of all lecturers who had been sacked from the university, espe-</p><p>cially Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (Ericson, 1975). The government categorically</p><p>refused to re-employ the lecturers in a circular released by the then head of the</p><p>civil service. The university, on the other hand, continued its crackdown on</p><p>radical students and lecturers, and many lecturers fled to exile led by Ngugi Wa</p><p>Thiong’o, Micere Mugo, and Maina wa Kinyati, among others. President Moi</p><p>also reconstituted the operations of the state by situating KANU in the run-</p><p>ning of political affairs of the nation by creating political kingpins in the eight</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>62</p><p>provinces of the nation. This was a departure from the Kenyatta regime, which</p><p>functioned almost entirely through provincial administration.</p><p>Theregional kingpins of the ruling Kenya National African Union (KANU)</p><p>partygave Moi the chance to reach the grassroots (Miser, 1988). It also allowed</p><p>Moi to engage in political recruitment. People regarded as radical and progres-</p><p>sive were recruited into KANU and given positions within the state. Former</p><p>firebrands such as Elijah Mwangale, Masinde Muliro, and Martin Shikuku were</p><p>given cabinet positions. The radical elements at the university continued with</p><p>their activism and demanded more freedom for Kenyans. It therefore came as</p><p>no surprise in 1982 that there was an attempted coup against the Moi regime</p><p>and university students were part of the organizers (Lipset, 1993). They were</p><p>all arrested and detained as well as other regular students. A total of 76 stu-</p><p>dents were taken to court and jailed, led by the SONU chairman Tito Adungosi,</p><p>Gacheche Wa Miano, and Rumba Kinuthia. Tito Adungosi was moved from</p><p>prison to prison and tortured while students went on strike, demanding his</p><p>release. There was continuous rioting at the university for 3weeks, following</p><p>which the government closed the university for the longest period of one year</p><p>(1982–1983), and there was a return to university form signed by all students</p><p>promising not to revive the issue of jailed university students.</p><p>As soon as the university resumed, activism against the state continued. The</p><p>new SONU committee led by Mwandawiru Mghanga demanded the release of</p><p>all the jailed student leaders. The government embarked on a crackdown, the</p><p>student union was dissolved, and new elections were held. The resulting crisis</p><p>at the university led to a crisis meeting between Jonathan Ng’eno, the new</p><p>minister of education, and the students for a way forward. In the resulting</p><p>meeting, the government changed the name to NUSO to break away from</p><p>SONU, which was regarded as radical. This did not bring about the desired</p><p>change because the students were still electing leaders regarded as radical such</p><p>as Mwandawiru Mghanga, who was still re-elected.</p><p>The Moi regime decided to use divide and rule on the student population,</p><p>making some students for the government and others against. Due to this, the</p><p>subsequent elections always brought two camps—those for and against the</p><p>government. The university was never the same again because it was riddled</p><p>with a lot of instability and chaos and experienced one closure after another.</p><p>The closures created backlogs leading to delay in student graduation, which</p><p>eventually led to government intervention (Abdallah, 1985). The University of</p><p>Nairobi closures created anxiety in the national political framework where the</p><p>government had to step in to stop the backlog. As a result, the Moi govern-</p><p>ment created a double intake in the university from 1985 and 1986in order to</p><p>remove the backlog (Mghanga, 1998).</p><p>The government was unable to stop student protests because of a residual</p><p>student population that remembered JM Kariuki day and other student griev-</p><p>ances. The large number of students on campus created a rise of new grievances</p><p>where students complained about congestion in the hostels, long queues during</p><p>meals at dining halls, the presence of spies and informers on campus, and</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>63</p><p>poor-quality lectures because of congestion. The government was increasingly</p><p>interfering with the freedom of assembly and association and the students con-</p><p>stantly protested (Amutabi, 1997). Students were also calling for “Kamukunji”</p><p>which were open-air meetings that were banned by the Moi regime.</p><p>The Moi regime therefore started a very controversial relationship with stu-</p><p>dents. The first Moi era, a student was killed at the Moi University and at the</p><p>University of Nairobi. The regime demonstrated the use of force on students.</p><p>The students responded by organizing more riots and demonstrations and</p><p>making more demands, asking to be represented in the senate and University</p><p>management. They wanted to be allowed to participate in policymaking at the</p><p>university. They complained about nepotism, and political interference in the</p><p>university curriculum development where the government did not want the</p><p>use of such titles as political science, among others (Amutabi, 1994).</p><p>The government banned books such as Communism Manifesto, Petals of</p><p>Blood and Detained, among others. Students also demanded transparency in</p><p>the promotion of staff because they complained that in the past, there was</p><p>appointment of charlatans, sycophants, stooges, and incompetent managers in</p><p>various departments. The students also complained about politicization of the</p><p>university and the killing of popular politicians by regimes (Bergan, 2003).</p><p>They wanted democratic dispensation in the country. Another complaint was</p><p>that the president was</p><p>the Chancellor of all the universities and appointed VCs,</p><p>some of whom were not qualified. Some of them were made VCs when they</p><p>were still Assistant Professors and Doctors when the practice in the</p><p>Commonwealth was to appoint full professors for such positions.</p><p>The students complained about the government introducing a new educa-</p><p>tion system of 8-4-4 without consulting university students as important stake-</p><p>holders. They were worried that when they graduated, they may not fit in an</p><p>education system different from the one they were attending. This grievance</p><p>was particularly acute at Kenyatta University, where teacher training students</p><p>were worried about how they were going to fit in a new education system when</p><p>they graduated. They lamented not being adequately prepared for the new cur-</p><p>riculum and felt that the government had shortchanged them. The issue</p><p>became critical and led to an address by the Ministry of Education (MoE)</p><p>Hon. Peter Oloo Aringo. The Minister assured the students of employment</p><p>when they graduated. After the address in Kenyatta University, the students in</p><p>the University of Nairobi (UoN) also demanded for the address on the same—</p><p>that the new system will not render their degrees moribund.</p><p>The Moi regime responded to student grievances with a mix of dialogue and</p><p>force. This was the case of the introduction of the second university in Kenya</p><p>in the 1984/1985 academic year when students who completed their A level</p><p>exams in 1984 found themselves selected and posted to a new and unknown</p><p>university called Moi University located where they considered to be a bush.</p><p>The first-year students boycotted classes demanding to be addressed by the</p><p>head of state. They complained about inadequate lecturers, learning facilities,</p><p>and general unpreparedness of the campus. Due to the fact that this was the</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>64</p><p>brainchild of the president, he lavished a lot of attention on them, and in no</p><p>time, the Moi University Kisses Campus received a lot of attention from the</p><p>government, following which many buildings were ready for occupation, con-</p><p>structed by the Mugoya Construction Company (Commission for University</p><p>Education, 2014). He also followed this by recruiting lecturers from overseas</p><p>and gave the university buses, vans, and authorized secondment of many staff</p><p>from UoN at extra pay because of the remote location of the university. The</p><p>road from Cheptiret and Kisses Campus was tarmacked within a short time and</p><p>Moi University students calmed down.</p><p>Despite the improvement of infrastructure at the University of Nairobi,</p><p>Kenyatta University, and Moi University, there was still congestion in learning</p><p>facilities, which occasioned the elevation of Egerton University to a full-fledged</p><p>University (Egerton University, 1999). The problem with the regime was</p><p>political patronage in the appointment of VCs and a lack of autonomy in</p><p>decision- making. There was massive dissatisfaction with how the universities</p><p>operated and worry that academic standards were going down. Many of the</p><p>universities were operating in congested learning environments without ade-</p><p>quate facilities and unqualified staff. This led to a new heightened level of</p><p>strikes in Kenyan universities, which occurred almost every semester. Strikes</p><p>were brought down by the intervention of the General Service Unit and strike</p><p>leaders expelled.</p><p>The Kenyan population, especially led by politicians, became interested in</p><p>the affairs at the university. Stakeholders were worried, believing that there was</p><p>little learning taking place at the universities. The arrival of the first 8-4-4 stu-</p><p>dents at the universities heralded a new wave of strikes, which increased almost</p><p>tenfold. The education system was being run as part of the state in a dictatorial</p><p>manner and student protests were increasingly met with more force. Violent</p><p>confrontations made students even more radical (Lizzio & Wilson, 2009). The</p><p>government elevated two more universities, Jomo Kenyatta University of</p><p>Science and Technology and Maseno University, to deal with the congestion.</p><p>The five state universities became part of the state bureaucracy, and the univer-</p><p>sities were dominated by demonstrations, protests, marches, sit-ins, and other</p><p>mass action activities.</p><p>KIbaKI era andStudent ProteStS</p><p>President Mwai Kibaki ascended to the presidency on populist agenda that</p><p>galvanized the entire opposition. He was regarded as progressive by many</p><p>political observers and pundits, and he did not disappoint in a certain regard.</p><p>One of his first acts in office was to abolish the idea of the president being a</p><p>chancellor in all the public universities in the country. He surprised many peo-</p><p>ple by appointing people from groups that were regarded as radical as chancel-</p><p>lors of some of the public universities and retained himself as a chancellor of</p><p>only one university, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology</p><p>(MMUST). He appointed Ali Mazrui to be the Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>65</p><p>University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) as Ali Marui was regarded</p><p>for a long time by the government as one of the most radical intellectuals that</p><p>Kenya had ever produced. Kibaki also surprised many by empowering univer-</p><p>sity councils to appoint Vice Chancellors (VCs) and Deputy Vice Chancellors</p><p>(DVCs), and Principals through competitive interviews. During his tenure,</p><p>universities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy in daily management and</p><p>appointments of senior members of staff.</p><p>In 2005 during the national referendum, university students got sucked up</p><p>in national politics divided among supporters of orange and banana. The</p><p>orange represented those who were for constitutional change led by Raila</p><p>Amolo Odinga and the Banana represented those who were against the refer-</p><p>endum led by Mwai Kibaki. Almost all universities in the country were pene-</p><p>trated by agents of orange or banana, and during that year, many elections of</p><p>student unions were massively funded by these two groups with different</p><p>results or outcomes. The UoN was at the center of this and the student leader-</p><p>ship in that university was inclined toward the orange. The activities of major</p><p>urban areas where universities were located were constantly disrupted as a</p><p>result of these campaigns. Orange attracted more politicians, both conservative</p><p>and liberal, whereas the banana appeared to attract only conservatives inter-</p><p>ested in preserving the status quo (Lumby, 2003). When the government side</p><p>lost the referendum to orange, it led to massive division in the government and</p><p>Mwai Kibaki was forced to dismiss seven members of his cabinet who were on</p><p>the side of the orange group and replace them with elements loyal to him. This</p><p>was the culmination of the division that would later play out in the 2007 elec-</p><p>tions, which polarized the state and almost brought Kenya to the brink of col-</p><p>lapsing as a state (Macharia, 2015). The 2007 elections put a black spot on</p><p>Kibaki’s legacy; the subsequent post-election violence led to the death of 1300</p><p>people and displacement of over 1.5million people who became Internally</p><p>Displaced Persons (IDPs) in many parts of the country.</p><p>University students were among the most active in the Post Election</p><p>Violence (PEV), especially in Nairobi, agitating for recognition of legitimate</p><p>results they believed were won by Raila Odinga. The deaths and stalemates that</p><p>were occasioned by the quick swearing-in by Kivuitu at night got the country</p><p>into more violence until the intervention that brought in the former UN</p><p>Secretary-General Koffi Annan to broker peace. Prominent African leaders</p><p>who joined in to broker peace included Graca Machel and Benjamin Mkapa. As</p><p>a result of the peace settlement, a government of national unity was formed</p><p>with Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, but the</p><p>country was already broken. The PEV led to the rise of more radical students</p><p>in the universities</p><p>political theory, advanced international relations, security and strategic studies,</p><p>disaster management, African politics, comparative politics, conflict, and</p><p>regional cooperation. He has researched and has had his work published widely</p><p>in these areas.</p><p>SellaNasimiyuKing’oro is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya, a social</p><p>researcher, gender specialist, mediator, and facilitator of reconciliation/dia-</p><p>logue processes in East and West Africa. She is the Senior Gender Advisor at</p><p>the British Peace Support Team (Africa). This follows a twelve-year public ser-</p><p>vice function as the Head of the Research and Policy at the National Cohesion</p><p>and Integration Commission in Kenya. Dr. King’oro is also a member of the</p><p>Inclusive Narratives Practice Group convened by the Institute for Integrated</p><p>Transitions (IFIT) and a jury of the national Diversity Inclusion Awards and</p><p>Recognition Awards in Kenya. She is the Global Peace Index ambassador and</p><p>is the Rotary Peace Fellowship Coordinator for Africa. She has a PhD in Peace</p><p>and Conflict Studies, an MA in International Studies, a Bachelor of Laws, and</p><p>a Bachelor of Education from various universities in Kenya.</p><p>MichaelMwendaKithinji is Associate Professor of History and Co-director</p><p>of the African and African American Studies Program at the University of</p><p>Central Arkansas, Conway. He is a recipient of the ohio Academy of History’s</p><p>2011 outstanding Dissertation Award, the Bowling Green State University</p><p>Graduate College’s Distinguished Dissertation Award for 2010–2011, and the</p><p>BGSU History Department’s Friedman Dissertation Award for 2010–2011.</p><p>His research and teaching interests are in colonial and post- colonial Africa,</p><p>education and intellectual history, policy history, and Pan- Africanism and the</p><p>African Diaspora. His book The State and the University Experience in East</p><p>Africa: Colonial Foundations and Post-Colonial Transformation in Kenya</p><p>investigates the dynamics that have influenced the development of university</p><p>education in Kenya and the wider East African region in the colonial and post-</p><p>colonial period. In addition, he co-edited the two-volume Kenya After 50:</p><p>Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones (Palgrave Macmillan,</p><p>2016) and Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Education, Gender, and Policy</p><p>Milestones (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). His other publications appear in the</p><p>Canadian Journal of African Studies, OFO: Journal of Transatlantic Studies,</p><p>and the Dictionary of African Biography.</p><p>Joshua M. Kivuva is a Fulbright scholar, senior lecturer, Department of</p><p>Political Science, and a research fellow, Institute for Development Studies,</p><p>University of Nairobi. Dr. Kivuva is a visiting scholar at the African Studies</p><p>Program, University of Pittsburgh, where he teaches African politics. Dr.</p><p>Kivuva holds a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. His expertise is in</p><p>democratization and electoral politics and human rights and governance. In</p><p>xiv NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>2017 he drafted Kenya’s National Public Participation Policy for the State Law</p><p>office. In 2018–2019, he was part of the team that drafted the Public</p><p>Engagement Strategy for the City of Pittsburgh’s Department of Planning. Dr.</p><p>Kivuva is consulting for various resettlement agencies in Pittsburgh, helping</p><p>with the resettlement of hundreds of refugee families from Burundi and the</p><p>Democratic Republic of Congo.</p><p>MickieMwanziaKoster is Associate Professor of History in Africa and the</p><p>African Diaspora at the University of Texas located in Tyler, Texas in the United</p><p>States. She has an MA and a PhD in History from Rice University. She teaches</p><p>a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses, specializing in African</p><p>American and African histories and historiography. Her book The Power of the</p><p>Oath: The Making of Mau Mau in Kenya, 1952–1960 examines nationalism,</p><p>ethnicity, and gender during the Mau Mau war. She is also the co-author of</p><p>Hip Hop and Social Change in Africa: Ni Wakati. She co-edited the two-</p><p>volume book series titled Kenya at Fifty: Challenges and Prospects Since</p><p>Independence.</p><p>BesiBrillianMuhonja is Associate Vice-Provost for Scholarship and Diversity,</p><p>Equity and Inclusion at James Madison University. She also serves as Black</p><p>Faculty Advisory Associate to the Academic Affairs Division at the same univer-</p><p>sity. Before that, she served as Director of the African, African American, and</p><p>Diaspora (AAAD) Studies Center. She is Professor of African, African American,</p><p>and Diaspora Studies and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. In the</p><p>recent past, she has won several awards, including the Woman of Distinction</p><p>Award, Provost’s Award for Excellence in Inclusivity, Edna T. Shaeffer</p><p>Distinguished Humanist Award, Diversity Enhancement Award, and Feminist</p><p>Scholarship Award. Dr. Muhonja’s work engages the interfaces of transnation-</p><p>alism, gender and sexuality in the politics, identities, philosophies, and prod-</p><p>ucts of/from Africa, the larger Global South, and the Black Diaspora.</p><p>Specifically, using interdisciplinary and decolonial approaches, she studies and</p><p>teaches critical African(a) studies, critical race studies, critical transnational</p><p>feminisms, queer studies, and utu/ubuntu studies. She is also a leading Wangari</p><p>Maathai scholar. Dr. Muhonja is the author of Radical Utu: Ideas and Ideals of</p><p>Wangari Maathai (2020) and Performing Girlhood and Womanhood: Rituals</p><p>of Kenya's Twenty-First Century Middle Class (2018), and co-editor of the</p><p>book volumes Gender and Sexuality in Senegalese Societies: Critical Perspectives</p><p>and Methods (with Babacar M’baye, 2019) and Mothers and Sons: Centering</p><p>Mother Knowledge (with Wanda Bernard Thomas, 2016), among many other</p><p>scholarly activities.</p><p>Makau Mutua is State University of New York (SUNY) Distinguished</p><p>Professor and the Floyd H. and Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar at SUNY</p><p>Buffalo Law School, where he served as Dean between 2008 and 2014. Makau</p><p>was the first in the history of the Buffalo Law School to be named SUNY</p><p>Distinguished Professor. He was educated at the University of Nairobi, the</p><p>xv NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>University of Dar es Salaam, and Harvard Law School, where he obtained his</p><p>LLM and SJD.Prof. Mutua is the author of several books, including Human</p><p>Rights Standards: Hegemony, Law, and Politics (2016); Kenya's Quest for</p><p>Democracy: Taming the Leviathan (2008); Human Rights NGOs in East Africa:</p><p>Political and Normative Tensions (2008); and Human Rights: A Political and</p><p>Cultural Critique (2002). He has published numerous scholarly articles as well</p><p>as dozens of articles for popular publications such as The New York Times,</p><p>Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, Chronicle of Higher Education, and</p><p>Washington Post. He has conducted numerous human rights, diplomatic, and</p><p>rule-of-law missions to countries in Africa, Latin America, and Europe.</p><p>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi is Associate Professor of Political Science in the</p><p>Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of</p><p>Lesotho. He teaches various courses in the fields of comparative politics, inter-</p><p>national relations, and political theory. His research interests are in the areas of</p><p>governance, conflict, security, and development in eastern and southern Africa,</p><p>with a focus on state fragility, democratization, counterterrorism, environmen-</p><p>tal security, and human security. He has had several book chapters and interna-</p><p>tionally refereed journal articles published.</p><p>WanjalaS.Nasong’o is Professor of International Studies and former depart-</p><p>ment chair at Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee, where he has taught since</p><p>2005. He teaches courses in comparative politics, international relations, and</p><p>African politics. He has previously taught at the University of Tennessee,</p><p>Knoxville, University of Nairobi, and Kenyatta University, both in Kenya.</p><p>Additionally, Prof. Nasong’o has held summer fellowships at Riara University,</p><p>Egerton University, and St. Paul’s University, all in Kenya. A political compara-</p><p>who played an even bigger role in national politics.</p><p>The ascendance of Babu Owino, aka Paul Ongili as the president of SONU</p><p>was predicated on the PEV in which university students decided to play a</p><p>prominent role. The subsequent election of Babu Owino as the MP of Embakasi</p><p>East in 2017 makes the connection between student politics and national lead-</p><p>ership in Kenya quite clear. The role he played as a close associate and confidant</p><p>of Raila Amolo Odinga and his ascendance into national politics demonstrates</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>66</p><p>the linkage between student activism and national leadership in Kenya that</p><p>goes way back to Siaya Senator James Orengo, former Nakuru MP Rumba</p><p>Kinuthia, former Mukurueni MP Kabando wa Kabando, former Wundanyi MP</p><p>Mwandawiru Mghanga, and Women representative Homa Bay County Gladys</p><p>Wanga, among others.</p><p>Kibaki’s highest achievement as president was the promulgation of the 2010</p><p>constitution, which created the impetus for devolved structures in Kenya. The</p><p>new constitution created a lot of promise to provide democratic space because</p><p>it created seven independent commissions and a clear separation of powers of</p><p>the executive, judiciary, and legislature. It laid the background for checks and</p><p>balances in Kenya’s affairs. The constitution provided one of the best bill of</p><p>rights in the world, recognizing the sovereignty of Kenyan citizens, which gave</p><p>prominence to the role of individuals in running the affairs of the state.</p><p>According to the 2010 constitution, activists such as Okia Omutata, Maurice</p><p>Odhiambo, Boniface Mwangi, and Gladwell Otieno got prominence, and ver-</p><p>dicts got their way in the court system. The 2010 constitution and vision 2030</p><p>proposed to create a university in each county and president Mwai Kibaki acted</p><p>fast on this by granting charters toten universities in 2013 (Republic of Kenya,</p><p>2012). The constitution indicated the vision of Mwai Kibaki in recognizing the</p><p>role of universities in championing the creation of high-quality human resources</p><p>that helped Kenya become a middle-income country in 2015.</p><p>The universities and university colleges reached 31 under Mwai Kibaki and</p><p>this created many opportunities for learners who would have been left out by</p><p>previous arrangements because any student who got C+ grade was admitted.</p><p>The new universities and colleges became triggers of development in many</p><p>parts of the country where they were located (Obiero, 2012). For the first</p><p>time, northern Kenya received two university colleges—Garissa and Turkana</p><p>University Colleges—areas previously regarded as marginalized. Even the coast</p><p>region, which Mazrui had lamented for lacking higher education institutions,</p><p>received three chartered universities—Technical University of Kenya, Pwani</p><p>University, and Taita Taveta University.</p><p>uhuru era andunIverSIty StudentS</p><p>There have been strikes in various universities during the Uhuru Kenyatta era,</p><p>concerned with the increase of tuition in public universities. The students have</p><p>been able to put pressure on the government since 2014 to delay the imple-</p><p>mentation of new fees. The first Minister for Education in the Uhuru and</p><p>(William) Ruto government, Hon. Prof. Jacob Kaimenyi negotiated with stu-</p><p>dent leaders and the proposed tuition was moved forward. The status quo was</p><p>sustained by Hon. Amina Mohammed and Hon. George Magoha. The Uhuru</p><p>Kenyatta era from 2013 has not been as eventful as the previous students’ lead-</p><p>ers in national politics because many of them have not acquired national leader-</p><p>ship positions. The death of a student leader at Meru University of Science and</p><p>Technology led to the removal of the Vice-Chancellor. University students</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>67</p><p>were largely responsible for the election of Babu Owino, aka Paul Ongili, as</p><p>MP for Embaksi East in the 2017 General Elections. Babu Owino has not been</p><p>as vocal on students’ matters as he was when he was the Chairman of SONU.He</p><p>has been responsible for ensuring the success of the Kenya University Students</p><p>Union (KUSU), for which he is the patron. Universities have had relative peace</p><p>since the 2017 elections.</p><p>concluSIon</p><p>From the foregoing, there is evidence to suggest that university students have</p><p>played important roles in national politics in Kenya from independence up to</p><p>the present. The article has demonstrated that students have played an impor-</p><p>tant role in fighting for social and economic justice in the country through</p><p>strikes and demonstrations. The university students have questioned the</p><p>excesses of regimes and fighting for social equality. It was largely due to this</p><p>that JM Kariuki day was born, and students were implicated in the 1982</p><p>attempted coup. It has given examples of the role of students in national poli-</p><p>tics from 1963 to 1978 during the Kenyatta era and 1978 to 2002 during the</p><p>Moi era, and the final segment looks at the post-Moi era of Mwai Kibaki and</p><p>Uhuru Kenyatta eras. The paper addresses all major events with national impli-</p><p>cations in which students participated in order to bring about change. Using</p><p>political economy theoretical orientation, the article has shown that through-</p><p>out history, Kenyan politics have been by and large driven by political parties</p><p>and individual interests around key figures and families, with students playing</p><p>a minimal role. The article has shown that student leaders from Kenyan univer-</p><p>sities have paid the ultimate price, such as Titus Adungosi, who died in prison,</p><p>while others such as James Orengo and Mwandawiro Mghanga have been</p><p>jailed. The chapter has shown that students’ disturbances have had a disruptive</p><p>pattern of blocking major roads and causing mayhem to attract attention from</p><p>the state. It has shown that other protests have taken the form of protest litera-</p><p>ture through various media forms, theater, and gravity. Some of them have</p><p>taken to activism and lobbying by mounting media campaigns as well as galva-</p><p>nizing the students’ body.</p><p>referenceS</p><p>Abdallah, A. (1985). The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt,</p><p>1923–1973. Spear.</p><p>Amutabi, M. N. (1995a, January 11–13). Education and Democracy in Kenya and</p><p>Botswana. Paper Presented at the All-Africa Conference “Education and Democracy</p><p>Education,” Education Association of South Africa (EASA), Rand Afrikaans</p><p>University, Johannesburg, South Africa.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (1997, August 23–26). Governance and Its Impact on Development</p><p>in Africa: The Case of Kenya. Paper Presented at the Second National OSSREA</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>68</p><p>Conference, ‘Socio-Economic and Political Transformation in Africa Since the</p><p>1960s,’ Kitale, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (1994). Human Rights and Democracy in Africa. Paper Presented at</p><p>the Ford Foundation Conference on Governance in Africa, Center for African</p><p>Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville.</p><p>Amutabi, M. N. (1995b). Strikes at the University of Nairobi: Causes and Possible</p><p>Solutions. Unpublished Manuscript, Institute of Human Resource Development,</p><p>Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (1998). The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Kenya’s Second</p><p>Liberation. Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Development Studies, Moi</p><p>University, Eldoret, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, M. N. (2002). Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining</p><p>the Role of Students in National Leadership and the Democratization Process.</p><p>September 2002. African Studies Review 45(02):157–177.</p><p>Association of African Universities. (1995). The Role of Students in the Future Mission</p><p>of African Universities. Paper Presented for the ‘Joint Colloquium on the University</p><p>in Africa in the 1990’s and Beyond,’ Lesotho.</p><p>Barkan, J. D. (1975). An African Dilemma: University Students, Development and</p><p>Politics in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda. Oxford University Press.</p><p>Egerton University. (1999). Egerton University Calendar, 1999/2000. Education</p><p>Media Center.</p><p>Barasa, S. (2002, March). Disabusing Student Politics</p><p>on Campus. Coffee Connection.</p><p>Bergan, S. (2003). Student Participation in Higher Education Governance.</p><p>Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/Governance/</p><p>SB_student_participation_FR.pdf.</p><p>Commission for University Education. (2014). CUE news. Newsletter Sept-Dec 2014.</p><p>Retrieved from http://www.cue.or.ke/images/phocadownload/CUE_Newsletter_</p><p>Sep- Dec_2020.pdf.</p><p>Erlich, H. (1989). Students and University in Twentieth Century Egyptian Politics.</p><p>Frank Cass.</p><p>Emmerson, D.K. (Ed.). (1968). Students and Politics in Developing Nations. Praegar.</p><p>Ericson, E.E. (1975). Radicals in the University. Stanford University Press.</p><p>Foster, J., & Long, D. (1970). Protest! Student Activism in America. William Morrow</p><p>and Company.</p><p>Kenya Human Rights Commission. (1992). Haven of Repression: A Report on University</p><p>of Nairobi and Academic Freedom in Kenya. Kenya Human Rights Commission.</p><p>Kiewiet, C.W. (1971). The Emergent African University: An Interpretation. American</p><p>Council of Education.</p><p>Lipset, S.M. (1993). Rebellion in the University. Transaction Publishers.</p><p>Lumby, J. (2003). Distributed Leadership in Colleges: Leading or Misleading?</p><p>Educational Management and Administration, 31(3), 283–293.</p><p>Lizzio, A., & Wilson, K. (2009). Student Participation in University Governance: The</p><p>Role Conception and Sense of Efficacy of Student Representatives on Departmental</p><p>Committees. Studies in Higher Education, 34, 69–84.</p><p>Macharia, M. J. (2015). Comrades’ Power: Student Representation and Activism in</p><p>Universities in Kenya. Journal of Student Affairs in Africa, 3(1), 19–34, 2307-6267,</p><p>https://doi.org/10.14426/jsaa.v3i1.90.</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/Governance/SB_student_participation_FR.pdf</p><p>http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/Governance/SB_student_participation_FR.pdf</p><p>http://www.cue.or.ke/images/phocadownload/CUE_Newsletter_Sep-Dec_2020.pdf</p><p>http://www.cue.or.ke/images/phocadownload/CUE_Newsletter_Sep-Dec_2020.pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.14426/jsaa.v3i1.90</p><p>69</p><p>Mazrui, A. A. (1995). The Polity and the University: An African Perspective. In</p><p>S.K. Adjibolosoo (Ed.), The Significance of the Human Factor in African Economic</p><p>Development (pp.165–182). Praeger.</p><p>Mghanga, M. (1998). Patriotism: The Legacy of JM Kariuki Lives On. The Kenyan</p><p>Socialist, 4(03).</p><p>Miser, K.M. (Ed.). (1988). Student Affairs and Campus Dissent: Reflection on the Past</p><p>and Challenges for the Future. National Association of Student Personnel</p><p>Administrators.</p><p>Nkomo, M. O. (1984). Student Culture and Activism in Black South African</p><p>Universities: The Roots of Resistance. Greenwood Press.</p><p>Obiero, N. (2012). The Involvement of Students Leaders in the Governance of the</p><p>University: An Implication of Shared Leadership. Unpublished MPhil Thesis,</p><p>University of Oslo, Oslo.</p><p>Republic of Kenya. 2012. Universities Act 2017. Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 19</p><p>(Act No. 42). Nairobi: Kenya Government Printers.</p><p>Smith, G.K. (1968). Stress and Campus Response. Jossey-Bass.</p><p>The Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (RPP) in Kenya. (1983). University</p><p>Destroyed: Moi Crowns Ten Years of Government Tera in Kenya. Committee for the</p><p>Release of Political Prisoners. in Kenya.</p><p>5 ROLE OF STUDENTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA</p><p>71</p><p>CHAPTER 6</p><p>Kenyan Public Intellectuals andNational</p><p>Development Debates</p><p>MauriceN.Amutabi andLinnetHamasi</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>The major debates discussed in this chapter are first majimboism in Kenya</p><p>African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National Union</p><p>(KANU) ranks in the 1960s(Arrighi and Saul, 1968). The second is an exami-</p><p>nation of pursuits of socialism and capitalism among Kenyan elites. Third, are</p><p>debates around the Kenyatta succession. Fourth is the debate on multipartyism</p><p>in Kenya, which was met with a lot of resistance from the Moi government.</p><p>Fifth is the 2005 referendum that split the government, leading to the move-</p><p>ment toward a new constitution promulgated in 2010. Sixth is the debate</p><p>around the new constitution that created the hybrid constitution we have today.</p><p>the orIgIns ofdebates around MajIMboIsM InKadu</p><p>andKanu ranKs</p><p>The debates around majimboism started after independence in 1963.</p><p>Majimboism would ensure self-government at the local level and oversight</p><p>over resources while at the same time providing checks and balances for the</p><p>exercise of power at the national level (Anderson, 2005; Mamdani, 2000).</p><p>KADU was led by Ronald Ngala, Daniel Moi, Masinde Muliro, Martin</p><p>Shikuku, John Konchella, and other KADU members were against centralized</p><p>government as (Oyugi, 1992). Their interest in federalism was predicated on</p><p>three major factors. First was the fear of domination by Kikuyu and Luo, which</p><p>M. N. Amutabi (*) • L. Hamasi</p><p>Technical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_6</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_6&domain=pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_6</p><p>72</p><p>at the time were regarded as the two major ethnic communities in Kenya</p><p>(Mueller, 1984). The two groups dominated affairs in Kenya largely as a result</p><p>of colonial privileging. Kagwanja and Mutunga (2001) indicate that the pre-</p><p>independence government was dominated by Kikuyu and Luo elites led by</p><p>Jomo Kenyatta, James Gichuru, Mbiu Koinange, Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya,</p><p>and Achieng Oneko, among others. In order to extricate themselves from the</p><p>Kikuyu-Luo hegemony, leaders from the so-called small ethnic groups regarded</p><p>majimbo as a panacea to ethnic domination (Amutabi & Hamasi, 2017).</p><p>The second was the colonial structure which appeared to favor Kikuyu and</p><p>Luo in government, and therefore their members, dominating many positions</p><p>within the civil service and private sector. The two ethnic groups had the most</p><p>educated people per capita, creating legitimate fear among members from</p><p>other ethnic groups. The two communities represented by the Kenyattas and</p><p>the Odingas have political dynamics that define what ought to have been and</p><p>what actually is in the Kenyan body politic (Falola & Nasong’o, 2016). The</p><p>third factor was mutual suspicion and ideological factors between KADU and</p><p>KANU leaders. There were subtle differences on many issues of national devel-</p><p>opment as (Amutabi, 1996) notes that ethnicity played an important role in</p><p>the undercurrents of majimboism.</p><p>Interviews with people who had political consciousness after independence</p><p>have revealed the deep-seated suspicion between KADU and KANU and their</p><p>support for federalism on one side and centralized administration on the other.</p><p>Informant 8 said:</p><p>KADU supported federalism because there was evidence in how positions were</p><p>shared out in government that Kikuyus and Luos were prepared to dominate</p><p>positions in government. Young boys like Kenneth Matiba were appointed per-</p><p>manent secretaries at the age of 29 years and boys like Tom Mboya appointed</p><p>ministers at the age of 32 years. So, people feared this Kikuyu–Luo affair.</p><p>The above direct quote reflects almost accurately the tensions that played out</p><p>in the 1960s in Kenya. There was fear that Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga</p><p>were interested in shutting members from other ethnic groups out of govern-</p><p>ment. Issues surrounding majimbo were part of the constitutional debates in</p><p>the 1960s and 1970s. The independence cabinet confirmed that there were</p><p>more Kikuyu and Luo in the cabinet compared to other ethnic groups, as</p><p>stated by Gertzel (1990). It was not lost to observers that business in parlia-</p><p>ment, as reflected in the Hansard, records that the national assembly was</p><p>divided. Increasingly, the members of KADU created a vocal opposition while</p><p>the members of KANU increasingly became the government for both front</p><p>and backbenchers.</p><p>Ministers in KANU and ministers in KADU areas did not fare very well</p><p>because they</p><p>were seen as traitors (Bienien, 1994). For instance, in western</p><p>Kenya, the minister for education Daniel Otiende, who had been elected on a</p><p>KANU ticket in Vihiga, found it very difficult to operate in a largely KADU</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>73</p><p>stronghold (Amutabi, 2009). There were also supporters of KANU who felt</p><p>that the country was young and needed a unified approach to development and</p><p>not a federal approach. According to Oyugi (1992), these supporters believed</p><p>that federalism created division in the country. The problem however was that</p><p>majimboists tended to be ignored in government and parliament and these fac-</p><p>tors may have created negative energy in the KADU ranks. Informant 5 said:</p><p>KANU was progressive and through harambee tried to ensure that everybody was</p><p>on board in terms of development and access to resources. KANU built schools,</p><p>roads, health centers and other infrastructure with very limited resources. The</p><p>country was young and needed to be together but majimboism made people to</p><p>pull in different directions and led to negative movements in Kenya such as</p><p>Mwambaoism fronted by coastal and Shifta menace in northeastern.</p><p>Views such as the one above reflect deep-seated support for KANU in</p><p>Central and Nyanza provinces, where the Kikuyu and Luo communities saw</p><p>nothing wrong with hegemonic development approaches that were taking</p><p>place in the country (Mazrui, 1994). The breaking of the support came in</p><p>1966 when Vice President Oginga Odinga resigned and in 1969 when Foreign</p><p>Affairs Minister Argwings Kodhek and Planning Affairs Minister Tom Mboya,</p><p>who were Luo, were assassinated (Nyong’o, 1993).</p><p>The divisions within KANU escalated when socialist-leaning members of</p><p>parliament who were Kikuyu, such as Bildad Kaggia and Kungu Karumba,</p><p>were isolated by the KANU regime. Kung’u Karumba disappeared while on a</p><p>business trip in Uganda and has never been found. One respondent pointed</p><p>out that KANU lost its followers in the chaos of 1966 and 1969. Informant 4 said:</p><p>When Argwings Kodhek and Tom Mboya died and then Kung’u Karumba disap-</p><p>peared mysteriously, ordinary KANU members realized that the KANU regime</p><p>had changed and was no longer interested in the affairs of ordinary people. There</p><p>was solidarity among the ordinary people against the rich and KANU never</p><p>recovered from this. It became a party of the state and increasingly authoritarian</p><p>in order to retain power. When Tom Mboya died only one kikuyu J.M.Kariuki</p><p>attended his burial.</p><p>The frustration of ordinary Kenyans became increasingly represented and</p><p>articulated in parliament by individuals who carried views similar to those car-</p><p>ried in the above quote. Kodhek and Mboya were popular politicians among</p><p>the Luo and Kikuyu alike (Karimi & Ochieng, 1980). Kodhek had represented</p><p>Mau Mau veterans in court and, as the only African criminal lawyer, carried the</p><p>burden of the oppressed. There is evidence that his death and the cold govern-</p><p>ment response meant that the government did not have empathy for its citizens</p><p>(Amutabi, 2009). Despite being a conservative member of parliament, Tom</p><p>Mboya represented Kamukunji constituency in parliament which was a cosmo-</p><p>politan, multiethnic, and largely middle-class area of Nairobi and was immensely</p><p>popular among Kenyan workers (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). His death was</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>74</p><p>received negatively with a lot of chaos in Nairobi, Kisumu, and other parts of</p><p>the country.</p><p>Kenyans did not forgive the KANU regime for the deaths of these two lead-</p><p>ers. It was largely a result of the grudge against the government that Kenyatta’s</p><p>motorcade was stoned in Kisumu in 1969, which escalated tensions in the</p><p>country, as noted by scholars such as Mutunga, (1999). It was an extraordinary</p><p>occurrence in the history of Kenya for a presidential motorcade to be pelted</p><p>with stones and eggs, which revealed deep-seated anger for the regime. After</p><p>this incident, Kenyatta never went beyond Nakuru until he died in 1978.</p><p>The KANU-KADU rivalry played out until president Jomo Kenyatta opted</p><p>for a middle ground because of the chaotic scenes inside and outside parlia-</p><p>ment (Karimi & Ochieng, 1980). Jomo Kenyatta wanted to consolidate his</p><p>regime, but strong KADU elements made this impossible by advocating for</p><p>majimbo. Jomo Kenyatta was against majimbo and did not mince words about</p><p>his hatred for the system. In his opinion, majimbo was divisive and against pull-</p><p>ing together in the Harambee slogan of nation-building (Nyong’o, 1992).</p><p>Kenyatta also feared that majimbo would breed regional and ethnic kingpins</p><p>who were emerging strongly in the 1960s, such as Masinde Muliro and Musa</p><p>Amalemba for the Luhya, Daniel Moi and Taita Towet for the Kalenjin, John</p><p>Konchella for the Maasai, Ronald Ngala for the Miji Kenda, Lawrence Sagini</p><p>for the Abagusii, Paul Ngei for the Kamba, Harvester Angaine for the Meru,</p><p>and Jeremiah Nyagah for the Embu and Mbeere, Oginga Odinga and Tom</p><p>Mboya for the Luo, Eliud Mwamunga for the Taita, among other potential</p><p>kingpins.</p><p>In order to curtail the emergence of kingpins under majimboism, Kenyatta</p><p>gradually but systematically started to break up KADU by appointing leading</p><p>lights of KADU to his cabinet. Kenyatta appointed Daniel Moi, Masinde</p><p>Muliro, and Ronald Ngala among others to the KANU cabinet. Many of those</p><p>appointed to the cabinet were senior KADU leaders, which opened discussions</p><p>between KADU and KANU and led to the dissolution of KADU in 1964</p><p>(Chavance, 2000). Although the majimbo debate raged inside and outside</p><p>parliament, it was of little consequence under the emerging single-party dis-</p><p>pensation. The vocal KADU backbenchers led by Martin Shikuku, who were</p><p>for majimboism, found themselves increasingly isolated. The KADU radicals</p><p>had no choice but to cross the floor and join KANU and Martin Shikuku was</p><p>the last to cross the floor.</p><p>The KANU-KADU merger of 1964 virtually ended the debate on majimbo-</p><p>ism. President Jomo Kenyatta declared that the nation would forge a unified</p><p>government and closed the debate on majimboism (Maxon, 2016). The clo-</p><p>sure of official debates on majimbo opened a new era of underground move-</p><p>ments in support of majimboism. Two movements that came out of this were</p><p>the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) which advocated for the indepen-</p><p>dence of the coastal region (Abdullahi, 2013) and the Shifta movement in the</p><p>northeastern province, which advocated for secession to Somalia (Markakis,</p><p>1999). The consequences of these underground movements led to active</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>75</p><p>government suppression using security agents. Some of these secessionist</p><p>movements remain active and underground up to this day.</p><p>Amutabi and Hamasi (2019b) explain that creating devolved systems under</p><p>county governments has slightly minimized tensions because of the semi-</p><p>autonomy enjoyed under the 2010 constitution. Majimboism is however still</p><p>debated through communities that advocate for federalism in Kenya (Branch</p><p>& Cheeseman, 2010). Debates on majimboism took place at the same time</p><p>when debates for socialism and capitalism were taking place in the country.</p><p>the PursuIt ofsocIalIsM andcaPItalIsM InKenya</p><p>Kenya’s independence elite was divided ideologically. There were those advo-</p><p>cating for socialism and those advocating for capitalism. Socialist ideology</p><p>appeared to have the upper hand immediately after independence, and this</p><p>resulted in the country looking to Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, among other</p><p>socialist presidents in Africa (Arrighi & Saul, 1968). Just before independence,</p><p>Kenya had sent young cadres to Ghana for training in leadership, such as Tom</p><p>Mboya. The Ghana model of gigantic national projects was copied by Kenya.</p><p>For example, Akosombo dam became replicated in Kenya as Masinga dam</p><p>(Roger, 1969).</p><p>Kenya’s blueprint for development was coined at this time as Sessional Paper</p><p>No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and application to planning in Kenya</p><p>(Government</p><p>of Kenya (GoK), 1965). The blueprint highlighted gigantic</p><p>national projects, but there was emerging division in the cabinet despite this.</p><p>Mboya and Kenyatta were increasingly becoming capitalists, while Odinga led</p><p>a group of socialists in the parliament. After 1965 divisions emerged between</p><p>socialist and capitalist ideology when the president started to resist Chinese and</p><p>Soviet development assistance and increasingly embraced western support.</p><p>According to Amutabi and Nasong’o (2013), Tom Joseph Mboya and Jomo</p><p>Kenyatta teamed up to frustrate Oginga Odinga in parliament and outside.</p><p>Kenya started to receive a lot of western aid due to the influence of Tom</p><p>Mboya, James Gichuru, Mbiu Koinange, and others. A group within the gov-</p><p>ernment led by Odinga Oginga continued to embrace development from the</p><p>East; much of it was channeled to Nyanza, such as Russia hospital and Tom</p><p>Mboya Labour College. The ideological division got into the open in 1966</p><p>during the Limuru KANU annual general meeting, where a scheme was</p><p>hatched by Kenyatta and Tom Mboya to reduce the powers of Vice President</p><p>Oginga Odinga.</p><p>In the Limuru Meeting, KANU proposed to create eight vice president</p><p>positions in the country and Oginga was supposed to take one to represent</p><p>Nyanza. The scheme was meant to undermine Odinga and clip his influence in</p><p>the country (Branch, 2013). So, as a result, Oginga Odinga resigned from</p><p>Jomo Kenyatta’s government, allowing Kenyatta to appoint a new vice presi-</p><p>dent. When Odinga resigned, he created a new party, Kenya People’s Union</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>76</p><p>(KPU) in 1966, in which he was joined by ten MPs who resigned to run for</p><p>re-election on this new party.</p><p>The formation of KPU as a socialist party was meant to counter the KANU</p><p>hegemony and become the mouthpiece for socialism and communism in</p><p>Kenya. Unfortunately, KPU was not given enough time to grow and get sup-</p><p>port because it was fought at every point by the KANU regime, culminating in</p><p>the party’s banning in 1969 and the detention of Oginga Odinga and all mem-</p><p>bers of KPU (Ndegwa, 2011). This culminated in the beginning of a single</p><p>party in Kenya where freedom and rights of individuals were emasculated by</p><p>the KANU regime, making Kenya informally a one-party state.</p><p>Despite the apparent banning of KPU, socialist and communist ideas con-</p><p>tinued to thrive in Kenya, especially among intellectuals. Many followers of</p><p>Oginga Odinga, such as Oyangi Mbaji, Bildad Kaggia, Mark Mwithaga, and</p><p>others, continued to articulate socialist ideas whenever they got the chance.</p><p>Intellectuals such Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Ali Mazrui, Maina Kinyati, Casper</p><p>Odegi Awuondo, Mukaru Ng’ang’a, and Katama Mukangi, among others,</p><p>continued to advocate Socialist, Communist, and Marxist ideals in the country</p><p>(Mazrui, 1982). There was a feeling among many that Harambee was initially</p><p>a socialist idea and Kenyatta was not able to abandon it even as he became capi-</p><p>talist. Harambee was created during the hay days of socialism and capitalism in</p><p>Kenya because it advocated for sharing resources in which access to education</p><p>was broadened (Mbithi, 1972). Over half of Kenya’s 7000 secondary schools</p><p>and 12,000 primary schools were built through Harambee. Informant 12 said:</p><p>Many Kenyans do not know that the socialist policies advocated by KPU influ-</p><p>enced the Sessional paper number 10 of 1965 which still guides development in</p><p>Kenya today. The role of socialist ideology is responsible for harambee schools,</p><p>institutes, and hospitals as well as a lot of voluntary infrastructure. Although peo-</p><p>ple say Kenya is a capitalist country, we are actually a socialist democratic country</p><p>because people always look for their own ethnic groups and support democratic</p><p>values to some extent.</p><p>The above quote reflects the thinking among some intellectuals in Kenya today,</p><p>where the Harambee spirit has led to the enactment of Constituency</p><p>Development Fund (CDF), which helps in supporting useful infrastructure at</p><p>the grassroots. Kenyans still build schools and hospitals based on fundraising</p><p>and voluntarism. There is a lot of support that religious groups and NGOs</p><p>provide in supporting rural development.</p><p>The Harambee schools expanded access to education all over the country.</p><p>Some of the Harambee schools became prominent and have been elevated to</p><p>national schools in the recent past. The fact that communities could be mobi-</p><p>lized to set up these schools using their local resources and volunteering their</p><p>labor is a great ideal found in socialist countries (Himbara, 1994). What is even</p><p>more remarkable is that the Harambee spirit also led to the creation of training</p><p>institutes, many of which have become universities in Kenya, such as Masinde</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>77</p><p>Muliro University of Science and Technology, Rongo, Taita Taveta University,</p><p>and Meru University.</p><p>The socialist ideals also led to the building of health centers, roads, bridges,</p><p>and other social infrastructure. Himbara (1994) says that the interesting dis-</p><p>course in this socialist-capitalist debate is that the capitalists seem to have lost</p><p>out at the grassroots where activities remained communal, collective, and</p><p>cooperative, which manifested themselves strongly through the cooperative</p><p>movements that, unfortunately, were hijacked by capitalists at a later age.</p><p>debate onKenyatta successIon</p><p>The debate on the Kenyatta succession was one of the most dynamic in Kenya’s</p><p>public debates. This is an issue that was well articulated by Ali Mazrui in his TV</p><p>series on the Africans Triple Heritage. The debate was also well covered by</p><p>Karimi and Ochieng (1980). The debate pitted the Kiambu Mafia (Uthamaki)</p><p>against other Kenyan communities. The Attorney General Charles Njonjo was</p><p>aware that many members ofthe so-calledKiambu Mafia led by James Gichuru,</p><p>Mbiyu Koinange from Kiambu and Kenyatta inner circle insiders such as Julius</p><p>Gikonyo Kiano from Murang’aand Kihika Kimani from Nakuruwere uncom-</p><p>fortable with Vice President Daniel Arap Moi succeeding Kenyatta. There was</p><p>public concern that Kenyatta was old and ailing.</p><p>Many politicians started to look around for possible successors and did not</p><p>regard Vice President Daniel Moi as one of them (Gertzel, 1990). What fol-</p><p>lowed was a scheme by the Kiambu Mafia to front candidates they could con-</p><p>trol if the president passed on. They looked up to people such as Mbiu</p><p>Koinange, Mwai Kibaki, G.G.Kariuki, and Kihika Kimani as potential succes-</p><p>sors of Jomo Kenyatta. There were also others who looked beyond central</p><p>Kenya to leaders such as Jeremiah Nyagah as potential successors. The Kiambu</p><p>Mafia excluded Charles Njonjo as a potential successor because he was close to</p><p>Vice President Daniel Moi. Njonjo’s strategy was that Moi being weak will eas-</p><p>ily create room for him to become president, and he went out of his way to</p><p>create possible strategies to ensure that Moi became president after Kenyatta.</p><p>Amidst the Kenyatta succession, Attorney General Charles Njonjo declared</p><p>that it was treasonable to imagine the president’s death and warned those hold-</p><p>ing such debates to stop. This earned him favor amongst those who supported</p><p>Moi as the potential successor of Kenyatta (Throup & Hornsby, 1998).</p><p>The Kenyatta succession debate led to a rift in the KANU ranks, as explained</p><p>by Karimi and Ochieng, in which Kihika Kimani, Mbiu Koinange, and James</p><p>Gichuru advocated for a successor from among the Kikuyu while other KANU</p><p>members led by Charles Njonjo supported Moi succession. The rift led to seri-</p><p>ous fights and conflicts around the president, which eventually moved to mem-</p><p>bers of the provincial administration such as Jeremiah Kareithi, who was head</p><p>of Civil Service, and James Mathenge and Eliud Mahihu, who were Provincial</p><p>Commissioner (PCs) supported by various District Commissioner (DCs)</p><p>(Karimi & Ochieng, 1980).</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>78</p><p>The debate led to falling</p><p>out, and one of the earliest victims of this debate</p><p>was J.M.Kariuki, who was not supported by either Kiambu mafia or by Charles</p><p>Njonjo’s team, but he was known to harbor ambitions. Having served as</p><p>Kenyatta’s personal assistant and being an MP and assistant minister, he enjoyed</p><p>a great deal of influence largely because of wealth and friendship created with</p><p>security personnel such as Ben Hinga and Ben Gethi (Ogot, 2012). The politi-</p><p>cal arrogance and popularity of J.M.Kariuki did not sit well with either camp.</p><p>It was no surprise when he was killed and his body dumped in Ngong forest.</p><p>Fingers were pointed at the government, but it was clear that this was a plot</p><p>that was hatched in the lower echelons of government. His death created fear</p><p>and anxiety in the intelligentsia and literati. Informant 14 said:</p><p>J.M.Kariuki was popular among all Kenyans because he helped everybody regard-</p><p>less of their ethnic groups. He was the only politician who gave more money at</p><p>fundraisers than the president Jomo Kenyatta. He was widely popular among the</p><p>common people because he shared his wealth wisely with the poor. He strongly</p><p>related to the poor by attending meetings in all kinds of places which raised envy</p><p>among his political enemies. He could have easily contested and won a political</p><p>seat anywhere in the country.</p><p>The popularity of J.M.Kariuki was his undoing among the political elite in</p><p>Kenya. Evidence suggests that his assassination was a scheme hatched in high</p><p>places because no killers were brought to book. Inquiry into his death led to</p><p>much political casualty and split parliament down in the middle.</p><p>After J.M. Kariuki’s death, parliament opened a probe on the manner in</p><p>which he was killed. A committee was appointed by parliament chaired by</p><p>Bungoma East Member of Parliament Elijah Mwangale. Young (1994) points</p><p>out that after investigations, the committee submitted a report in which it</p><p>indicted the government for involvement in the death of J.M.Kariuki. After a</p><p>lengthy debate on the murder probe debate, the matter was put to vote and</p><p>word came through Vice President Daniel Moi that the issue should not be</p><p>debated or put to vote. However, MPs defied this and continued to put the</p><p>motion to vote.</p><p>The results were that seven members of government voted with the MPs to</p><p>adopt the report of this committee, but they were sacked and arrested within</p><p>the premises of parliament. They included Masinde Muliro, Peter Kibisu,</p><p>Waruru Kanja, Mark Mwithaga, and Maina Wanjigi, among others. The inci-</p><p>dent scared many members of parliament and made them confirm that perhaps</p><p>the government was complicit in the death of J.M.Kariuki, and this was almost</p><p>confirmed when his Rolex watch was found in a bathroom at Makongeni police</p><p>station. According to Nyong’o (1992), the death of J.M.Kariuki seemed to</p><p>also suggest that the Kenyatta succession issue had taken a turn for the worse</p><p>because it seemed those potential successors were now being targeted for elim-</p><p>ination. Earlier in the debate on Kenyatta succession, a senior minister Ronald</p><p>Ngala had been killed in a road accident on December 12, 1972, while going</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>79</p><p>to Mombasa. The tradition at the time was that ministers attended Jamuhuri</p><p>day celebrations in Nairobi and it surprised many that a minister was headed to</p><p>Mombasa on the eve of Jamuhuri day and attacked by bees (Ogot &</p><p>Ochieng, 1995).</p><p>Fingers pointed to the government. There was a lot of external and internal</p><p>interest in the Kenyatta succession, especially for the British investors interested</p><p>in smooth succession and stability. The understanding was that the British</p><p>investors would not lose. The foreign interests were represented by the Minister</p><p>for agriculture, called Bruce Roy Mackenzie. The minister was regarded as a</p><p>leading opinion shaper in Kenya’s internal affairs, and many felt that he might</p><p>play a role in deciding on the Kenyatta succession. On May 24, 1978,</p><p>fourmonths before Kenyatta died, Bruce Mackenzie was killed in an aircraft</p><p>accident on his way from Uganda while going to land at Wilson airport. The</p><p>implication of the death of Ronald Ngala, J.M.Kariuki, Tom Mboya, Bruce</p><p>Mackenzie, Argwings Kodhek, and Pio Gama Pinto suggested that the Kenyatta</p><p>succession debate was not to be taken lightly. As the debate raged, there were</p><p>indications that a clique within the inner cabinet had taken charge and was</p><p>already making appointments without the president’s knowledge (Chege,</p><p>2008). There appeared to be a consolidation of power around the office of the</p><p>president under Mbiu Koinange and his supporters such as Munyua Waiyaki,</p><p>J.J. Kariuki, and Njoroge Mungai, among others. Unfortunately for the</p><p>Kiambu Mafia, Njonjo had crafted a strategy with the civil servants that worked</p><p>when Kenyatta died on August 28, 1978. Moi was sworn in as the president of</p><p>Kenya. One respondent said:</p><p>The struggle for succession was an intra-elite one, the two factions striving to</p><p>control the regime and once the succession was decided the elite had one com-</p><p>mon goal of stabilizing the regime on which they thrived. They had to work</p><p>together whether willingly or unwillingly in order to forge forward for the sake of</p><p>the development of the nation.</p><p>There is evidence to suggest that the Kenyatta succession had many casualties</p><p>because it created rifts in KANU ranks and many politicians who were opposed</p><p>to the Moi succession did not make it to parliament in the snap 1979 elections.</p><p>Over half of Kenyatta’s cabinet did not make it back to parliament, giving Moi</p><p>a chance to craft his cabinet. The scars laid by the succession debate never died</p><p>out but haunted the Moi regime throughout the 24years he was in power as</p><p>president. Elements that opposed his succession were isolated and, in the</p><p>extreme, were assassinated, and others brought up in their place. Realizing the</p><p>strength of members of the PCs under Kenyata, many of whom were Kikuyu,</p><p>Moi shifted the locus of power and created party supremos in provinces and</p><p>districts as KANU chairpersons (Maxon, 2016). This saw the rise of political</p><p>kingpins such as Mulu Mutisya, Sharif Nassir, Okiki Amayo, Burundi Nabwera,</p><p>Moses Mudavadi, Maalim Muhamed, Jeremiah Nyagah, Kariuki Chotara, and</p><p>Wilson Leitich, among others.</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>80</p><p>Ndegwa (2011) says that the hatred for Moi by the elements he left out of</p><p>his government created a very strong opposition within KANU. There was also</p><p>a group of members who had been expelled from KANU and were now agitat-</p><p>ing for multipartyism in the country. These two groups expelled members of</p><p>KANU and radical members of KANU came together to constitute a signifi-</p><p>cant mass to form the Forum of Restoration of Democracy in Kenya led by</p><p>Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, Joseph Nthenge,</p><p>Ahmed Bahmariz, Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, James Orengo, and</p><p>Mukhisa Kituyi, among others.</p><p>the debate onMultIPartyIsM InKenya</p><p>The movement for multiparty in Kenya was led by Oginga Odinga, Masinde</p><p>Muliro, Martin Shikuku, Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Ahmed Bahmariz,</p><p>and Joseph Nthenge, among others. The unifying factor for this group was</p><p>their opposition to Moi’s way of doing things (Matiba, 2000). They were iso-</p><p>lated and many of them had suffered detention and other forms of oppression.</p><p>These groups joined forces and took advantage of the wind of change blowing</p><p>in Africa. This wind of change was helped largely by the collapse of the Soviet</p><p>Union and the end of the Cold War. Many dictators in Africa found themselves</p><p>isolated because the International Monitory Fund (IMF) and World Bank</p><p>(WB) believed that the development problems in Africa were caused by poor</p><p>governance due to dictatorship and authoritarianism (Ogot, 2012). The Moi</p><p>regime was increasingly becoming dictatorial after the failed coup of 1980 and</p><p>a lot of efforts were being put in place to consolidate the regime against new</p><p>democratic</p><p>demands. Advocates of multiparty found a lot of support from the</p><p>church, civil society, and the international community.</p><p>The church was vocal in addressing the oppression of KANU under the</p><p>leadership of Henry Okullu, Archbishop Ndingi Mwana Nzeki, Bishop</p><p>Alexander Muge, and Reverend Timothy Njoya, among others (Morton,</p><p>1998). These religious leaders spoke against the oppressive KANU regime and</p><p>were willing to be quoted on the virtues of good governance. They were hated</p><p>by the state and the death of Alexander Muge was blamed on the utterances of</p><p>minister Okondo, who had threatened him not to go to Busia, otherwise, he</p><p>would come back dead. Henry Okullu preached against dictatorship and wrote</p><p>a famous book on the church and the state in which he condemned dictator-</p><p>ship. Rev. Timothy Njoya presided over St Andrews church in Nairobi and</p><p>preached radical sermons against President Moi’s regime. He received a lot of</p><p>state harassment and at one time was flogged in public outside parliament by</p><p>KANU thugs led by Likhotio. He was a strong advocate of multiparty democ-</p><p>racy and was at the forefront of praying for opposition rallies. Rev. Njoya prayed</p><p>at the first saba saba rally in Kamukunji on July 7, 1991 (Throup & Hornsby,</p><p>1998). His church, fearing retribution from the Moi regime, transferred him</p><p>to a rural presbytery but he defied the transfer and would be found in Nairobi</p><p>most of the time addressing the press or attending opposition rallies. The</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>81</p><p>NCCK was also active in fighting against the KANU regime, especially under</p><p>its secretary-general Mutava Musymi. Informant 16 said:</p><p>Without the church and the civil society coming in there was no way KANU</p><p>would have been defeated because Moi was very secure in the thinking that he</p><p>had everybody behind him. He detained people and placed security intelligence</p><p>everywhere which scared many Kenyans. But his under belly was exposed through</p><p>the wind of change blowing through Africa and when some of his close support-</p><p>ers started to fall out and join the opposition including Mwai Kibaki who had said</p><p>that removing KANU from power was like trying to cut a tree with a razor blade.</p><p>The civil society was led by people such as Willy Mutunga, Kivutha Kibwana,</p><p>Robert Buke, Maina Kia, Makau Mutua, and Wangari Maathai. The civil soci-</p><p>ety led demonstrations and organized civil education campaigns against the</p><p>KANU regime (Kibwana, 1994). Some of the members were arrested or</p><p>harassed by the state but refused to give up. They formed part of the nucleus</p><p>of Forum of Restoration of Democracy (FORD).There was also external assis-</p><p>tance to the multiparty democracy movement in Kenya. One of the most</p><p>ardent advocates of democracy was the US ambassador to Kenya Smith</p><p>Hempstone who was not afraid to criticize the Moi regime and openly associ-</p><p>ated with opposition leaders. This wave formed by opposition elements,</p><p>churches, civil society groups, and individuals culminated in the creation of</p><p>FORD, which organized many rallies across the country, exerting pressure on</p><p>the Moi regime that led to the removal of section 2a of the constitution leading</p><p>to restoration of democracy in Kenya. Moi was afraid of the united FORD</p><p>movement, and he created mechanisms to ensure division in the opposition</p><p>ranks (Kivuitu, 2002). In the 1992 multiparty elections, KANU under Moi ran</p><p>for elections against a highly divided opposition of FORD Kenya under</p><p>Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, FORD Asili under Kenneth Matiba, Democratic</p><p>Party under Mwai Kibaki. The joint opposition vote count was almost 60% of</p><p>the total votes but Moi beat them with less than 40%. This was a tacticthat Moi</p><p>used again in 1997 to win his final second term. In 2002, the opposition united</p><p>under Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga, Michael Wamalwa Kijana, Kalonzo Musyoka,</p><p>and Moody Awori to beat KANU at the historical polls (Mutunga, 2002). This</p><p>opposition triumph marked the high point of Kenya’s democracy because, for</p><p>the first time, people voted for opposition candidates not based on ethnic affili-</p><p>ation but ideas.</p><p>the debate foranew constItutIon</p><p>Yash Pal Ghai chaired the constitutional review committee at Bomas of Kenya</p><p>and came up with the Bomas draft. Ghai was convinced that the draft was the</p><p>best constitution that Kenya needed, and many scholars endorsed the draft as</p><p>ideal for Kenya (Ghai, 2012). Some members of the political class were not</p><p>comfortable with the political class, although they admitted that Kenya needed</p><p>a new constitution away from the archaic first independence constitution. By</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>82</p><p>2000 two groups had emerged in Kenya around the constitution. One group</p><p>was for the improvement of the old constitution with interest in making a few</p><p>changes that would transform the old constitution into a democratic one. This</p><p>group was led by KANU party hawks such as Joseph Kamotho, George Saitoti,</p><p>Dalmas Otieno, and Nicholas Biwott, among others. This group was mainly</p><p>interested in the status quo and it felt that a new constitution would dislodge</p><p>them from power (Ghai & Cottrell, 2014). Then there was a political group</p><p>that was vehement about the new constitution in Kenya and this group wanted</p><p>a totally new constitution. It was led by intellectuals and politicians such as</p><p>Willy Mutunga, Anyang Nyong’o, Kivutha Kibwana, Raila Odinga, Michael</p><p>Wamalwa Kijana, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, Koigi Wamwere, Wangari</p><p>Maathai, Martha Karua, and Charity Kaluki Ngilu, among others. This group</p><p>made the opposition ranks and believed that only a new constitution would</p><p>bring about proper democratic dispensation in Kenya (Cheeseman, Lynch &</p><p>Willis, 2020). This group exerted a lot of pressure on the government that led</p><p>to the creation of the Bomas Draft. Informant 22 said:</p><p>Yash Pal Ghai meant well for Kenya and the Bomas draft was perhaps the best</p><p>constitution that Kenya has never had. The constitution was born out of broad</p><p>consultation and conscience before it was watered down by the Wako draft. It will</p><p>not be surprising if in future Kenya reverts to the tenets of the Bomas draft which</p><p>advocated for a parliamentary system of government under a federal system. The</p><p>misfortune was the unitary government sympathizers-controlled state machinery</p><p>and feared losing power.</p><p>The Bomas draft did not come that easily because there were many competing</p><p>forces, such as those for and against. When the Kenya constitution review com-</p><p>mission was appointed, and Yash Pal Ghai was appointed as chair, many pro-</p><p>gressive elements in Kenya believed that he would deliver a new constitution.</p><p>The members of the review commission, such as Mutakha Kangu believed that</p><p>the draft addressed many of the concerns in the country (Gibson & Long,</p><p>2009). Unfortunately, there were some changes that were made to the draft by</p><p>the AG Amos Wakowhich annoyed the main opposition leaders who felt that</p><p>the Bomas Draft had been interfered with. According to Ghai (2012), the draft</p><p>constitution that was put to a referendum on November 21, 2005, was slightly</p><p>different from the Bomas draft and many in the opposition felt that it had been</p><p>watered down. When the referendum question was asked, Kenyans were sup-</p><p>posed to respond NO for Orange or YES for banana.</p><p>The referendum quickly became Raila Odinga with Orange team and</p><p>President Mwai Kibaki with Banana team. The understanding at the time was</p><p>that the Bomas draft was parliamentary with the president leading from outside</p><p>parliament and the prime minister from inside parliament. Kibaki supported</p><p>the draft because the presidential powers remained intact. Raila opposed the</p><p>draft because it did not embrace the changes suggested at the Bomas meetings</p><p>(Maxon, 2011). During the referendum, Kibaki and the banana side lost very</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>83</p><p>badly to the orange team and Raila came from the team energized, and they</p><p>were sure that they were going to beat Kibaki in the</p><p>2007 elections.</p><p>All opinion polls carried out by major pollsters in the run-up to the 2007</p><p>elections showed that Raila and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)</p><p>team were leading. It was widely expected that Raila would win the election</p><p>with a landslide as he did in the referendum because he had all the major oppo-</p><p>sition leaders on his side (Mbugua, 2008). Kibaki realized that he might not</p><p>win re-election and went into overdrive mode to mobilize government</p><p>resources to ensure he won. The build-up to the 2007 elections had Raila</p><p>Odinga, William Ruto, Musalia Mudavadi, Kalonzo Musyoka, and others pre-</p><p>senting a much-unified force (Cheeseman, 2008). But something happened</p><p>just before election, in choosing the presidential flag bearer, that saw Odinga</p><p>and Kalonzo go separate ways. Kalonzo Musyoka went with the Orange</p><p>Democratic Movement in Kenya and Raila Odinga in the Orange Democratic</p><p>Movement(Amutabi & Hamasi, 2019a). Kibaki calculated that the opposition</p><p>would split its votes, but Kalonzo had very little following.</p><p>During the election, Kibaki and Party of National Unity (PNU) garnered</p><p>4,584,721 (46.42%) votes and ODM under Raila garnered 4,352,993</p><p>(44.07%). Many observers believed that Kalonzo’s vote was negligible. Kibaki</p><p>lost in almost all the districts and had minority MPs in parliament (Gibson &</p><p>Long, 2009). The problem was that the returning officer Kivuitu declared that</p><p>he did know who won the election, and the country descended into chaos in</p><p>the famous 2007/2008 post- election violence. This is because Raila Odinga</p><p>declared victory and Kibaki was sworn in on December 30, 2007.</p><p>What followed were chaotic scenes in which 1300 people were killed and</p><p>over 1,000,000 displaced as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Violent</p><p>scenes across the country quickly deteriorated into anarchy before the interna-</p><p>tional community intervened through the former UN secretary-general, the</p><p>Late Koffi Annan. Koffi Annan was able to bring the warring parties together</p><p>and convince them to form a coalition government with Kibaki as president</p><p>and Raila as prime minister. They shared the ministerial positions in half and</p><p>started to work toward a new constitution as recommended by Koffi Annan</p><p>(Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). There was a realization on both sides</p><p>that the only savior for Kenya not to revert to such violence was a new constitu-</p><p>tion and Kibaki and Raila were committed to this constitutional making pro-</p><p>cess, which resulted in the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 (Taylor,</p><p>2016). The new constitution was implemented during the 2013 elections,</p><p>which recreated Kenya into 47 Counties under a national government hybrid</p><p>of presidential and parliamentary systems. What was not lost on observers was</p><p>the fact that elections held under the new constitution in 2013 were doubtful</p><p>like those of 2007. It was because of this that there emerged clamor for revision</p><p>of the 2010 constitution with the view to create a parliamentary system with</p><p>prime minister and president with various deputies.</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>84</p><p>conclusIon</p><p>From the foregoing discussion, Kenya’s intellectuals have played a very impor-</p><p>tant role in creating a healthy democratic state. Political and intellectual elite</p><p>such as Kenneth Matiba, Masinde Muliro, Charles Rubia, Raila Odinga,</p><p>Michael Wamalwa, Wangari Maathai, Martha Karua, Charity Kaluki Ngilu,</p><p>Mwai Kibaki, Paul Muite, Mukhisa Kituyi, William Ruto, James Orengo,</p><p>Mashengu Wa Mwachofi, Koigi Wamwere, and Farah Maalim Muhamed</p><p>among others have all played important roles in Kenya’s second liberation not</p><p>to mention the role of religious leaders such as Rev. Timothy Njoya, Bishop</p><p>Alexander Muge, Bishop Henry Okulu, and Rev., Mutava Musyimi. The intel-</p><p>lectual abilities of academia and civil society activists such as Kivutha Kibwana,</p><p>Willy Mutunga, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Ali Mazrui, and a whole range of many</p><p>scholars can also not be ignored. Kenya’s intellectual history will never be com-</p><p>plete without the mention of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Pius Masinde Muliro,</p><p>Joseph Martin Shikuku, and Joseph Nthenge in Kenya’s second liberation. The</p><p>success can be seen in the promulgation of the 2010 constitution. The sacri-</p><p>fices they made to water the tree of freedom with their blood will remain and</p><p>endure for many years to come. Kenya has not attained full democratic status</p><p>because there are a few constitutional hurdles as well as concerns in creating</p><p>cohesion and integration largely due to negative ethnicity. Many intellectuals</p><p>hope that rapid urbanization, creation of classes, more equitable sharing of</p><p>resources, intermarriage, and creation of democratic institutions will create</p><p>more stability in the country in the years ahead.</p><p>references</p><p>Abdullahi, B. (2013). Kenya Must Engage with Mombasa Republican Council, Not</p><p>Demonize It. Sahan Journal, 2, 7–9.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (1996). Federalism as a Solution to Tribalism. In B.A. Ogot (Ed.),</p><p>Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa (pp. 176–186). Maseno</p><p>University Press.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (2009). Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating Kenyatta,</p><p>Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development. Kenya</p><p>Studies Review, 1(1), 55–84.</p><p>Amutabi, M. N., & Hamasi, L. (Eds). (2017). Africa: A Continent in Transition.</p><p>Nairobi: Centre for Democracy, Research and Development (CEDRED),</p><p>Nairobi, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, M. N., & Hamasi, L. H. (Eds.). (2019a). Global Trends in Africa’s</p><p>Development. Nairobi.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N., & Hamasi, L.H. (Eds.). (2019b). Development Trends in Modern</p><p>Africa. Centre for Democracy, Research and Development (CEDRED),</p><p>Nairobi, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, N., & Nasong’o, S. (Eds.). (2013). Regime Change and Succession Politics in</p><p>Africa: Five Decades of Misrule. Routledge.</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>85</p><p>Anderson, D.M. (2005). ‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo.’ Nationalism and the Party</p><p>Politics of Decolonisation in Kenya, 1955-64. Journal of Contemporary History,</p><p>40(3), 547–564.</p><p>Arrighi, G., & Saul, J.S. (1968). Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical</p><p>Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 6(2), 141–169.</p><p>Bienen, H., Londregan, J. and Walle, Nicholas van de. (1994). Ethnicity, Leadership</p><p>Succession and Economic Development in Africa. 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Nairobi: Government Printer.</p><p>Himbara, D. (1994). Kenyan Capitalists: The State and Development. East African</p><p>Educational Publishers.</p><p>Kagwanja, P., & Mutunga, W. (2001, May 20). Is Majimbo, Federalism? Constitutional</p><p>Debate in a Tribal Shark-Tank. The Daily Nation, Nairobi.</p><p>Karimi, S., & Ochieng, P. (1980). The Kenyatta Succession. Trans-Africa Books.</p><p>Kibwana, K. (1994). Laying a Foundation for Democracy and Peace in Kenya: The</p><p>Role of Government, Opposition and Civil Society. Paper Presented at a Public</p><p>Symposium, Organized by KHRC, LSK, & CLARION, Nairobi.</p><p>Kivuitu, S. M. (2002). Election Handbook for Political Parties and Candidates on</p><p>Parliamentary and Civic Elections. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.</p><p>Mamdani, M. (2000). The Social Basis of Constitutionalism. The Journal of Modern</p><p>African Studies, 28(3), 359–374.</p><p>Matiba, K. (2000). Aiming High. People.</p><p>Markakis, J. (1999). Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa. In P.Yeros (Ed.),</p><p>Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary</p><p>Politics (pp.65–80). Macmillan.</p><p>Maxon, R.M. (2011). Kenya’s Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and</p><p>End of Empire. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.</p><p>6 KENYAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATES</p><p>86</p><p>Maxon, R.M. (2016). The Demise and Rise of Majimbo in Independent Kenya. In</p><p>M. M. Kithinji, M. M. Koster, & J. P. Rotich (Eds.), Kenya After 50. African</p><p>Histories and Modernities (pp.19–48). Palgrave Macmillan.</p><p>Mazrui, A.A. (1982). Africa Between Nationalism and Nationhood: A Political Survey.</p><p>Journal of Black Studies, 13(1), 23–44.</p><p>Mazrui, A. A. (1994). Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization. International</p><p>Herald Tribune, Pretoria, 4 August 1994.</p><p>Mbugua, K. (2008). Kenya’s Crisis: Elite and Factional Conflicts in Historical Context.</p><p>Conflict Trends, 1, 3–9.</p><p>Mbithi, P.M. (1972). Harambee Self-Help: The Kenyan Approach. The African Review,</p><p>2(1), 147–166.</p><p>Morton, A. (1998). Moi: The Making of an African Statesman. O’Mara Publishers.</p><p>Mueller, S. D. (1984). Government and Opposition in Kenya. Journal of Modern</p><p>African Studies, 22(3), 399–427.</p><p>Murunga, G., & Nasong’o, S. (2006). Bent on Self-Destruction: The Kibaki Regime in</p><p>Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24(1), 1–28.</p><p>Mutunga, W. (2002). The Unfolding Political Alliances and Their Implications for</p><p>Kenya’s Transition. In L.M. Mute etal. (Eds.), Building an Open Society: The Politics</p><p>of Transition in Kenya. Clari Press.</p><p>Mutunga, W. (1999). Constitution-Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transition</p><p>Politics in Kenya, 1992–1997. SAREAT/MWENGO.</p><p>Ndegwa, D. (2011). Walking in Kenyatta Struggles: My Story. Kenya Leadership</p><p>Institute.</p><p>Nyong’o, A. P. (Ed.). (1993). Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies in</p><p>Internal Conflicts. Academy Science Publishers.</p><p>Nyong’o, A.P. (Ed.). (1992). 30 Years of Independence in Africa: The Lost Decades?</p><p>Academy Science Publishers.</p><p>Ogot, B. A., & Ochieng, W. R. (Eds.). (1995). Decolonization & Independence in</p><p>Kenya, 1940–93. Ohio State University Press.</p><p>Ogot, B. A. (2012). Essence of Ethnicity: An African Perspective. In H. Hino,</p><p>J.Lonsdale, G.Ranik, & F.Stewart (Eds.), Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability</p><p>in Africa (pp.91–126). Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Oyugi, W.O. (1992). Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in</p><p>Kenya. African Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 41–69.</p><p>Roger, G. (1969). Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana. Praeger.</p><p>Taylor, C.F. (2016). Ethnic Politics and Election Campaigns in Contemporary Africa:</p><p>Evidence from Ghana and Kenya. Democratization, 24(6), 951–969.</p><p>Throup, D., & Hornsby, C. (1998). Multiparty Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and</p><p>Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. James Currey.</p><p>Young, C. (1994). The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. Yale</p><p>University Press.</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>87</p><p>CHAPTER 7</p><p>The Matatu Industry inNairobi</p><p>MickieMwanziaKoster</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>In November, the Daily Nation reported that the matatu system stopped when</p><p>matatu drivers withdrew from roads following a major police crackdown</p><p>throughout the country (Daily Nation, 2018). Imagine the disruption that</p><p>occurred in Alabama during the African American bus strikes initiated by Rosa</p><p>Parks, but this was on a much wider and more urban scale in Kenya. Through</p><p>the transport ministry, the Government of Kenya has subjected public trans-</p><p>port operators to multiple crackdowns to ensure road safety measures are com-</p><p>plied with. This decision by the public transport operators was deliberately</p><p>delivered amidst the police crackdown on vehicles without speed governors,</p><p>seat belts and the traditional bold yellow line running across these vehicles.</p><p>These were the same rules established 15years ago by the then transport min-</p><p>ister, John Michuki (Ogonda, 1992). However, the crackdown raised a far cry</p><p>among the very users and owners of these vehicles.</p><p>Essentially, from the 1960s to the present, the public has relied on this mode</p><p>of transport for movement within and outside the city of Nairobi. In her book,</p><p>‘Matatu’, Kenda Mutongi (2017) highlights the rather unique fact that the</p><p>matatu industry is the only sector that has not been aided by any external or</p><p>local sorts of funding. Interestingly, the industry has presented itself as a private</p><p>entity that generally contributes to a huge chunk of the Kenyan economy by</p><p>dominating the transportation of passengers and small-sized goods throughout</p><p>the country. Yet, the government has continually struggled to manage the sec-</p><p>tor, as time has shown over and over (Mutongi, 2017). This management</p><p>M. MwanziaKoster (*)</p><p>University of Texas, Tyler, TX, USA</p><p>e-mail: mickie@mwanzia.com</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_7</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_7&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:mickie@mwanzia.com</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_7</p><p>88</p><p>impacts all that use and rely on the matatu system as systems of control often</p><p>surface without warning, often resulting in retaliation. These challenges raise</p><p>the question, should the government solely assume the role and completely</p><p>eliminate this private sector form of business to ensure that transport is man-</p><p>aged as deemed fit? Is this government able to take on this task, and does it</p><p>have the resources in place to sustain and enforce it? This paper reflects on the</p><p>matatu system in light of Nairobi’s current transportation challenges. It argues</p><p>that despite many challenges, the matatu system is the backbone of transporta-</p><p>tion in Kenya; from its origin, it has served as a key function and transport need</p><p>in Nairobi based on its unique history and development.</p><p>the hIstory anddevelopment ofthematatu Industry</p><p>InnaIrobI</p><p>To understand the birth of the Matatu Industry, it helps to consider the history</p><p>of Nairobi as an urban center. Historically, Nairobi has been positioned as a</p><p>transportation center because of its location between Mombasa and Kisumu</p><p>cities and available resources like water. In 1899, the railway was established. It</p><p>was a transportation system that, over time, also turned Mombasa into Kenya’s</p><p>administrative center. In 1907 Nairobi became the capital of Kenya; the city</p><p>continued to grow although racially segregated. In the 1920s, automobiles</p><p>filled the town even more; parking and speeding were the major challenges. In</p><p>1929, the roads in the city were planned to get tarmac (Aduwo, 1990: 9).</p><p>These combined developments would open Nairobi up the roads and networks</p><p>for increased mobility. Matatus in Nairobi surfaced in the 1950s. It was afford-</p><p>able transportation with the name meaning 30</p><p>cents (30 KES), which was the</p><p>transport charge (Aduwo, 1990: 14–15). As a system, it was also designed to</p><p>move Africans efficiently from their residential zones to destinations, often in</p><p>the city or rural areas. The African population in the city grew even more at</p><p>Independence, which lifted African movement constraints. As a result, more</p><p>and more estates would surface, expanding the residential areas and expanding</p><p>Nairobi.</p><p>Significant challenges that have been presented in the operations of this</p><p>industry are the same problems faced in other sectors, as well as those that are</p><p>uniquely specific to the sector. Corruption, insecurity, poor regulation and</p><p>management, carelessness, and the aspect of informality have undermined the</p><p>proper management of the sector. And with these challenges, some of which</p><p>have posed extensive barriers toward formalization, the government has and</p><p>will always struggle with the industry unless drastic measures are taken. In</p><p>2018, The Standard Digital published an article trying to assess the possible</p><p>solutions to Nairobi’s transport challenges. The anomalies presented that</p><p>required solutions to transport problems included cost factors, availability,</p><p>including timing and frequencies, cleanliness and comfort, and security and</p><p>safety of passengers (Aduwo, 1990). The article further proposed the</p><p>M. MWANZIAKOSTER</p><p>89</p><p>construction of non-motorized transport pathways, for instance, for bikes, to</p><p>eliminate too much reliance on the matatu. While this provides a somewhat</p><p>considerable opinion that can be explored, it only applies to a minute popula-</p><p>tion of the public.</p><p>Perhaps, the shortcomings of the matatu industry can, however, be man-</p><p>aged by imposing and making follow-ups to stricter regulatory rules or allow-</p><p>ing the government to take over the sector entirely. The problem with the</p><p>latter, nevertheless, is that employment opportunities would decrease further,</p><p>and certain entities will be eliminated completely, for example, the ‘graffiti’ and</p><p>the customization industry, which have provided unrestricted employment</p><p>opportunities to the youth (Aduwo, 1992). As such, it would be important to</p><p>investigate the benefits of streamlining the sector through complete formaliza-</p><p>tion, which would allow more government involvement or complete takeover,</p><p>or whether to allow for continuous privatization with stricter regulations</p><p>(Aduwo, 1992).</p><p>The matatu industry can be seen to have similar operating techniques as</p><p>other micro and medium enterprises, which means there are challenges of</p><p>decent job opportunities and ineffective management approaches. As such, the</p><p>commonalities within the sector include job insecurities, poor wages, and the</p><p>lack of proper institutionalized social protection mechanisms (Ogonda, 1992).</p><p>For the most part, the matatu industry has been chaotic and most of the opera-</p><p>tors have employed unorthodox means to deliver services to the public regard-</p><p>less of the law in place. According to the Republic of Kenya, transport in Kenya,</p><p>documented in the research by The Public of Kenya in 2012, accounted for</p><p>20.6% of the total GDP over a 5-year period between 2007 and 2011. Similarly,</p><p>in 2012, the transport and communication sector accounted for 12.7% of the</p><p>country’s total GDP (Republic of Kenya, 2012). Still, despite the many forms</p><p>of transport in Kenya, road transport has always been the main mode that con-</p><p>tributes perhaps the most to the total percentage of the general industry. This</p><p>is a clear indication that the matatu operation, the primary means of transport-</p><p>ing small goods and people, is technically too important to sideline by any</p><p>means (Mutongi, 2017). Significantly, in some aspects, the matatu network has</p><p>posed an unavoidable challenge but, at the same time, has provided tremen-</p><p>dous opportunities.</p><p>Traditionally, the sector can thus far be considered an informal entity.</p><p>Therefore, as is the case, this inception has limited the attempts to streamline</p><p>the operation of the network and further provide more advanced options to</p><p>improve what has been a disaster in some ways. In December 2018, the Citizen</p><p>Digital reported uproar among matatu operators concerning the plan to phase</p><p>out the 14-seater vehicles (Citizen Digital, 2019). The logic behind this move</p><p>was to transform to the use of large-capacity vehicles, which would carry more</p><p>people and help reduce traffic congestion within the city and even upcountry.</p><p>This move would render nearly 14,000 vehicles useless and a number of youths</p><p>jobless. A strategy to compensate these owners would settle their grievances</p><p>7 THE MATATU INDUSTRY IN NAIROBI</p><p>90</p><p>while the transition progressively absorbs the unemployed youths</p><p>(Muchilwa, 2004).</p><p>Kenya, particularly Nairobi, has been recognized for its famous public trans-</p><p>port system, predominantly the matatus. Even though other African countries</p><p>have similar transport vehicles (not necessarily called matatus), the uniqueness</p><p>and sophistication that these vehicles detail is nothing short of remarkable</p><p>(Mutongi, 2017). Back in the 1960s and especially periods before Kenya</p><p>attained independence from its colonial master, the British, Mutongi (2017)</p><p>asserts that the main transport system was either on foot or cycle to work for</p><p>those who were fortunate enough. These of course were Africans moving to</p><p>and from town while residing in the eastern regions of Nairobi. Their masters</p><p>alternately took refuge in upscale areas and often drove comfortable vehicles</p><p>from one point to another. Considering the African population was signifi-</p><p>cantly larger than that of the whites (nearly three times bigger), formulating a</p><p>proper transportation system was imminent.</p><p>present challenges Inthematatu Industry</p><p>The development of a proper transportation structure has always presented an</p><p>enormous challenge to developing and even developed countries (Jarabe,</p><p>1982). These challenges arise from structural factors, management design, and</p><p>operational costs, among other lesser problems. In Kenya, the transport indus-</p><p>try majorly comprises road, with little reliance on air, sea, and rail networks.</p><p>During the Kenyatta regime, the government allowed the indulgence of the</p><p>private sector into the road transport industry, giving rise to the famously</p><p>known matatu taxis (Kenyan Bus Services Ltd, 1980). Since then, the govern-</p><p>ment assumed the role of regulation and enforcement of road transport Acts,</p><p>which were to be adhered to for the safety and regulation of this massive indus-</p><p>try. However, a considerable number of challenges have been encountered</p><p>henceforth and which have affected, to a greater extent, the efficiency of the</p><p>industry and its usual operations. This shows the extent to which Kenya’s pub-</p><p>lic transport sector has been dominated by the private sector, causing the rise</p><p>of the infamous matatu as the main mode of transportation.</p><p>It is also fair to mention other players who benefit directly or indirectly from</p><p>the somewhat informal industry. Kioy (2011) highlights that among these</p><p>institutions and bodies are the insurance companies, motor vehicle body build-</p><p>ers, repair garages, assembly plants, and local vehicle importers, among others.</p><p>The government has also failed to establish some form of a parastatal to take up</p><p>the industry as an alternative to privatization, which it can use to effect its man-</p><p>agement directly, and therefore, they have been left relying on the private sec-</p><p>tor to operate this mega-industry. The problem here is that quite a number of</p><p>parties have stakes within the industry, leading to seasonal conflicts over time.</p><p>Furthermore, in relation to these conflicting economic, social, and political</p><p>factors, the matatu owners and operators also pursue specific agendas mostly</p><p>related to the profitability of their investments (Kioy, 2011). This also means</p><p>M. MWANZIAKOSTER</p><p>91</p><p>that the matatu is a huge source of employment, from the drivers to conduc-</p><p>tors who look to put up with the little income made at the end</p><p>of the day.</p><p>One of the more consistent challenges raised over time by the public is the</p><p>government’s inability to impose and push for fares regulation within the trans-</p><p>port sector. For instance, according to Mbugua (2009), during peak hours or</p><p>rainy seasons and especially in Nairobi, fares are hiked to unreasonable and</p><p>unsustainable amounts, which is uneconomical and hurts the public.</p><p>Furthermore, matatu transport is almost the sole means of commuting for the</p><p>majority of the public, considering most people are either lower-income earn-</p><p>ers or are unable to afford these fares entirely. On the other hand, these private</p><p>operators and owners blame the government for an unconducive business envi-</p><p>ronment, such as high costs of fuel and increased operational costs (Muchilwa,</p><p>2004). Similarly, they complain of harassment by the law enforcers who push</p><p>them for large sums of bribery. The matatus operating in the upcountry routes</p><p>have also adopted a tendency of hiking fares during holiday and festive seasons.</p><p>The environment under which the matatus are operated has also been ques-</p><p>tioned, especially since it has posed as a hog for unemployed youth. Due to its</p><p>open nature, it has provided a host for anti-social acts such as abuse of drugs,</p><p>violence and thuggery, and prostitution to a lesser degree (Rasmussen, 2012).</p><p>Additionally, informality in this entity has allowed for the encroachment of</p><p>cartel groups who seek to control certain routes and bus stops unofficially.</p><p>These cartel groups, which are also among the reasons the government has</p><p>continually failed to impose stricter rules and regulations, are particularly found</p><p>along the routes of Nairobi. As a countermove, some matatu owners have</p><p>formed their own groups to manage the routes and stages and work the same</p><p>way as the more rudimentary groups of cartels (Rasmussen, 2012). Still,</p><p>Nairobi is and has been notorious for unruly traffic behavior for quite some</p><p>time. Infrastructure has presented a huge limitation in the flow and manage-</p><p>ment of road transport facilities. Poor road conditions, including an underde-</p><p>veloped road network, have caused piles of traffic during peak hours in the city,</p><p>making movement quite tedious (House-Soremekun & Falola, 2016). As a</p><p>result, matatu drivers have coined unruly habits of overlapping traffic jams</p><p>while driving carelessly on road shoulders and consequently presenting risks of</p><p>accidents and piling more congestion to the traffic jam. There is barely any</p><p>traffic rule that matatu drivers obey in the absence of a traffic officer. They do</p><p>this while endangering the lives of both passengers and roadside users. Some of</p><p>the publics have lamented and expressed their displeasure arguing that these</p><p>careless drivers cause most road damage, including knocking down barriers and</p><p>signposts. They race for customers and stop to pick up or drop off anywhere</p><p>along the road. Road signs and vehicle signals are mostly ignored, including</p><p>turn signals, round-about entries, and approaches to T-junctions. These cases</p><p>of incompetence explain the many accidents caused by these drivers even with</p><p>the imposition of stricter rules (Agoki, 1988).</p><p>Security is also a big part of transport operations. Passengers and the general</p><p>public would love to trust that the services they enroll in are safe and secure.</p><p>7 THE MATATU INDUSTRY IN NAIROBI</p><p>92</p><p>The industry has failed to provide a suitably safe and secure means of move-</p><p>ment throughout the country. Nairobi, and especially routes plying the</p><p>Eastlands and other lower-income estates, experience cases of serious cartel</p><p>control, including the infamous Mungiki sect (Khayesi, 2002). Constant</p><p>clashes for route and terminal control threaten innocent members of the public</p><p>who only need to board these vehicles from one point to the other. It is believed</p><p>that Mungiki and certain politicians collaborate to safeguard their interests in</p><p>the industry at the expense of commuters and, as such, continue to undermine</p><p>any attempt by the government to streamline the entity in any way whatsoever</p><p>(Khayesi, 2002). The government’s attempt to phase out the 14-seater vehi-</p><p>cles, for example, faced strong opposition from owners, some politicians, and</p><p>the same cartels that control routes within the city. And while this is the case,</p><p>corruption has been and is still a challenge in many sectors in Kenya, and so is</p><p>the case in transport. So much money has been lost in bribery to the police,</p><p>often avoiding inspections and police stops that could unravel any case of non-</p><p>compliance and codes of conduct.</p><p>It becomes almost impossible to streamline the industry without effecting</p><p>the same effort on related institutions such as the traffic police. Interestingly,</p><p>however, the same authorities also stop vehicles that are in full compliance and</p><p>harass drivers for kitu kidogo or face tighter action in case of a future offense.</p><p>Mungai (2003) indicates that the same authorities have been accused of col-</p><p>laborating with the Mungiki on certain routes where they receive bribes and</p><p>ignore the sect’s actions. The absence of a systematic structure and consistent</p><p>data collection has limited the government’s attempt toward improving the</p><p>transport network, especially within Nairobi. Chitere etal. (2012) determined</p><p>that the best way to obtain any data on matatu operations was through saccos;</p><p>however, not all the saccos are registered, and some vehicles operate without a</p><p>specific designated Sacco. These are mostly operated during peak hours when</p><p>law authorities are either sluggish or there are too many vehicles on commute.</p><p>The Michuki rules, as they are famously known, in 2004, was an attempt</p><p>toward restoring sanity on Kenyan roads, and while it was a welcome imple-</p><p>mentation among commuters, it faced a major push back from matatu opera-</p><p>tors and other stakeholders, leading to a nationwide strike. They complained</p><p>that the Michuki laws demanded too much and it was quite costly to meet such</p><p>demands within a short while (Daily Nation, 2019). However, these measures</p><p>ensured safety and proper conduct among drivers and attendees. Even so,</p><p>other operators in the same space have expressed their displeasure with matatu</p><p>drivers and operators, including taxi drivers, bus drivers and commuters. While</p><p>openly embraced among the youth, loud music is not a necessary accommoda-</p><p>tion among the older population. Erotic films and uncensored music are not a</p><p>welcome source of entertainment to all. Therefore, it is not a surprise to hear</p><p>from some commuters pushing for the ban of matatus from the city. The relax-</p><p>ation of the Michuki rules has brought back the smeared mess of early 2000.</p><p>The government has not made an adequate effort toward curbing these</p><p>issues, and in cases where attempts are made, the enforcement efforts collapse</p><p>M. MWANZIAKOSTER</p><p>93</p><p>after a few days or weeks. This is usually the case since the enforcers themselves</p><p>are believed to be indulged in the same industry they are trying to impose</p><p>reforms on. Road transport in Kenya and particularly commuter systems need</p><p>thorough reformations from within and outside the whole system. All stake-</p><p>holders should be governed by a strict set of rules that can regulate unofficial</p><p>indulgence of small bodies such as cartels while also putting the commuter’s</p><p>interest into great consideration. If it fails to establish a proper regulatory sys-</p><p>tem, the government could as well take over and ensure direct control of the</p><p>commuter transport system.</p><p>conclusIon: aWay forWard forthematatu Industry</p><p>In conclusion, the Matatu system can be improved and positioned to offer</p><p>Nairobi what it needs to move the people safely, efficiently, and in a cost-</p><p>effective manner. The matatu has been now and for the near future will be the</p><p>backbone of transportation in Kenya because the government has not been</p><p>able to offer a more robust and sustainable transport system. Kenda Mutongi</p><p>(2017) claims boldly that without the matatu, transportation throughout</p><p>tivist, Prof. Nasong’o’s research interest lies in the areas of democratization,</p><p>identity politics, social conflict, governance, and development. He is author,</p><p>editor, and co-editor of ten books, and dozens of peer-reviewed book chapters</p><p>and articles in refereed journals. His latest publication is a co-edited volume,</p><p>Beyond Disciplines: African Perspectives on Theory and Method (2022). For his</p><p>prolific scholarly work, Prof. Nasong’o has been honored with the Rhodes</p><p>College’s Clarence Day Award for outstanding Research and Creative Activity,</p><p>and the Ali Mazrui Award for Research and Scholarly Excellence from the</p><p>University of Texas at Austin.</p><p>UrbanusMwinziNdolo has over twenty-six years of experience in teaching</p><p>Social Work and Project Planning in different universities in Kenya. He teaches</p><p>community development at Tharaka University College. Previously, he taught</p><p>at Moi University, Tangaza University, and Marist International University col-</p><p>lege. He served as a Deputy Dean of Students for six years at the Catholic</p><p>University of Eastern Africa. Previously he worked with several development</p><p>agencies in Kenya and beyond as a Development Programme Coordinator. He</p><p>has had hands-on experience in socioeconomic and applied research on albi-</p><p>nism and superstition in Tanzania, violence against girls in schools, and others</p><p>xvi NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>social issues. He is the deputy Chairman, the Kenya National Association of</p><p>Social Workers, Nairobi Branch. He is a member of the International Federation</p><p>of Social Workers and organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and</p><p>Sothern Africa, among many other scientific bodies. His research interests are</p><p>in poverty and social inequality, sustainable community development and par-</p><p>ticipatory methods, good governance and resource mobilization, family and</p><p>child rights, gender equity, and healthcare improvement, among other social</p><p>concerns. He has had his work published widely in these areas.</p><p>W.W.S.Njororai is Professor of Kinesiology at the University of Texas at</p><p>Tyler (UT Tyler), Texas. He has a PhD in Physical Education and Sport from</p><p>Kenyatta University, Kenya and has a research focus on race and sport, associa-</p><p>tion football or soccer, track and field, sport labour migration, physical activity</p><p>and health, performance sport, sociology of sport, pedagogy, recreation, and</p><p>leadership in sport. He has taught at universities in Kenya (Egerton and</p><p>Kenyatta University), Uganda (Kyambogo), and the United States (Wiley and</p><p>UT Tyler). He has thirty-seven years of teaching experience, thirty-one of</p><p>which are at a university. He has previously served as President of the US-based</p><p>Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (2017—2020) and as President of the</p><p>Faculty Senate at the University of Texas at Tyler. He has had over 145 peer-</p><p>reviewed articles, book chapters, and conference proceedings published. He</p><p>frequently writes opinion pieces for The Conversation on various aspects of</p><p>sport in Africa.</p><p>DorothyA.Nyakwaka is a senior lecturer, History Department, and the</p><p>Chairperson of the National Cohesion and Values Committee, Egerton</p><p>University, Kenya. She has presented many papers at local and international</p><p>conferences, and won various awards and fellowships, including the Fulbright</p><p>American Studies Institute and CoDESRIA Governance and Gender</p><p>Institutes. She has published on a wide range of topics, which include,</p><p>among others, regionalism, gender and governance, piracy and insecurity in</p><p>the Horn of Africa, and corruption. She has had articles published in inter-</p><p>nationally recognized and peer-reviewed journals as well as book chapters.</p><p>Her publications include “New Regionalism and Foreign Policy-Making</p><p>Process: The Case of the East Africa Community” in Korwa, G.A and P.J</p><p>Schraeder (eds.) Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign</p><p>Policy (2007); “The Challenges of Piracy in Africa’s Maritime Zones” in</p><p>Africa Insight (2009); “The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty</p><p>and the Piracy Question: The Case of the East African Coast” in Africa</p><p>Insight (2010); and “Women in Post Independent Kenya 1963 to the</p><p>Present” in ochieng, W.R. (ed.) A History of Independent Kenya: A</p><p>Celebration of Kenya’s Fiftieth Anniversary (2013).</p><p>Mumo Nzau holds an MA and a PhD in Political Science from the State</p><p>University of NewYork at Buffalo. He is a consultant researcher, policy advisor,</p><p>and strategist on national security, defense and foreign relations, conflict analy-</p><p>xvii NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>sis, and governance. Dr. Nzau has served in various national, regional, and</p><p>international think tanks. He is a senior lecturer at the University of Nairobi</p><p>and adjunct faculty at the United States International University, University of</p><p>Rwanda, Catholic University of Eastern Africa, National Defence College</p><p>(Kenya), Defence Staff College (Kenya), Police Staff College, International</p><p>Peace Support Training Centre (ISPTC), and Foreign Service Academy</p><p>(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), among others. Dr. Nzau is the author of</p><p>Transitional Justice and After: Kenya’s Experience with IDP Resettlement and</p><p>Peacebuilding Since the 2007/2008 PEV (2016), co-editor of The Changing</p><p>Dynamics of Terrorism and Violent Extremism (2018), and editor of Taking</p><p>Stock of Devolution in Kenya: From the 2010 Constitution, Through Two Election</p><p>Cycles, to the BBI Process (2021).</p><p>DanielOigoOgachi is Lecturer in Economics and Finance and a research</p><p>scholar at the Multimedia University of Kenya. In addition, Dr. ogachi works</p><p>as a financial and research consultant. Dr. ogachi has consulted for the National</p><p>Construction Authority of Kenya, Teachers Service Commission, and Kenya</p><p>National Union of Teachers, among others. Dr. ogachi holds a PhD in</p><p>Financial Economics from the Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life</p><p>Sciences, Szent István University, Godollo Campus in Hungary. He has an</p><p>MBA in Finance from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa and a Bachelor</p><p>of Commerce in Banking and Finance. Dr. ogachi has had his work published</p><p>in highly ranked journals indexed by the Scopus.</p><p>Caroline Ayuma Okello is a senior lecturer at the University of Eldoret,</p><p>Kenya. She received her PhD in Finance from Jomo Kenyatta University of</p><p>Agriculture and Technology. An experienced lecturer with a demonstrated his-</p><p>tory of working in the higher education industry, Dr. okello is skilled in</p><p>e-learning, analytical skills, data analysis, lecturing, econometrics, and research.</p><p>Peter Omondi-Ochieng is Associate Professor of Sports Law and</p><p>Management at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, where he teaches and</p><p>researches in the disciplines of sports finance, law, strategic management, and</p><p>organizational behavior. He also serves in the editorial boards of over six peer-</p><p>reviewed academic journals, including the Journal of Risk & Financial</p><p>Management; Team Performance: An International Journal; International</p><p>Journal of Organizational Theory & Behavior; and Journal of Economic &</p><p>Administrative Sciences, amongst others.</p><p>EricE.Otenyo is Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Northern</p><p>Arizona University, Flagstaff. He obtained his MPA and PhD degrees from</p><p>Syracuse University in New York and Miami University in oxford, ohio,</p><p>respectively. A specialist in public administration, public policy, and develop-</p><p>ment studies, Prof. otenyo’s peer-reviewed articles appear in numerous jour-</p><p>nals and professional outlets, including the International Journal of Services,</p><p>Economics and Management; Public Resistance; International Journal of Public</p><p>Administration; Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; African Security Review;</p><p>xviii NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>Journal of Asian and African Studies; Journal of Public Administration and</p><p>Management; Public Organization Review; Cornell University's IAD Occasional</p><p>Papers Series, International Journal of the Academy of Organizational Behavior</p><p>Management; and International Journal of Research in Organizational</p><p>the</p><p>country would generally crumble, and the economy would take a serious hit.</p><p>In other words, Nairobi is dependent on the existing matatu system to move</p><p>and transport Nairobians. It would be interesting to see the plans that would</p><p>be initiated to try and improve the transport sector within and outside the city</p><p>by the government in the near future. The challenge has always been to imple-</p><p>ment the plans proposed by the relevant bodies strictly and precisely.</p><p>Additionally, the informal nature of the matatu transport system nationwide</p><p>has presented a tremendous blockade toward the incorporation of any poten-</p><p>tially viable means and system. The level of infiltration of the sector by tycoons</p><p>within the government, ‘individuals of class’ and uncontrolled and unruly sects</p><p>have and will continue undermining any efforts toward formalization.</p><p>Therefore, strict measures have to be considered if any attempt to improve and</p><p>offer better quality service within the sector is to be realized. The government</p><p>of Kenya also needs to take more interest and engage in infrastructural improve-</p><p>ments and sustainable regulations within and outside Nairobi. There are many</p><p>challenges that should not be overlooked. The major challenges are:</p><p>1. Poor driving habits. The matatu sector has been hit by numerous cases of</p><p>careless driving within the city. Residents of the city have expressed con-</p><p>cerns about mishandling of both public facilities and individual or Sacco</p><p>vehicles. Furthermore, pedestrians and passengers are constantly in grave</p><p>danger by these offhand operators.</p><p>2. Insecurity. Security is key in the matatu sector, considering they operate</p><p>late and early hours of the day. The presence of cartels, particularly the</p><p>Mungiki, and generally thieves and gangs that target passengers in these</p><p>vehicles have made it difficult for operators to build a trusted brand that</p><p>can assure passengers of safe travel. Security concerns have also become</p><p>7 THE MATATU INDUSTRY IN NAIROBI</p><p>94</p><p>problematic in matatu terminals where unemployed youth loiter with the</p><p>hope of getting something little while others take advantage of the situ-</p><p>ation to participate in criminal activities.</p><p>3. Operating costs. Purchasing and recovering the initial costs of a matatu</p><p>presents enormous challenge for owners in the matatu industry.</p><p>Operational costs, including paying drivers and sometimes the conduc-</p><p>tors, have become difficult considering the constant hustle from police</p><p>and tycoons controlling various routes, the contributions made to saccos</p><p>and dishonest operators who always try to gall as much as they can from</p><p>the profits. Additionally, the 14-seater matatu still holds a reasonable</p><p>chunk of these vehicles but does not make as much profit compared to</p><p>the larger 33-seater vehicles. It becomes almost unprofitable when they</p><p>are hustled.</p><p>4. Poor planning and implementation of existing plans. A number of stud-</p><p>ies and plans have been developed for the city of Nairobi by leading non-</p><p>governmental organizations and government entities dating several years</p><p>back. However, a huge chunk of these plans has vaporized or lie idle in</p><p>some government offices due to vague implementation plans or institu-</p><p>tional constraints resulting from the shortsightedness of the ministry. A</p><p>good example is the Nairobi Metro 2030 plan, which promises to expand</p><p>facilities and develop the city into a world-class metropolis but has since</p><p>met great resistance from the surrounding municipalities.</p><p>5. Police bribes. Constant complaints have been raised by matatu owners</p><p>and drivers regarding harassment by the police. For instance, they are</p><p>continually being pulled over by the police under the pretense of inspec-</p><p>tion and supervision of road users, while ideally, they target these indi-</p><p>viduals and harass them for bribes. In Nairobi, the police are believed to</p><p>be working with the Mungiki, an illegal gang, to eke out bribes from</p><p>matatu operators in designated areas.</p><p>Despite many challenges, the opportunities that the matatu system offers</p><p>the country are widespread and can offer a way for the Matatu industry to</p><p>progress. Three main items can advance the industry. The matatu system can</p><p>be improved by formalizing its procedures, especially regarding safety and</p><p>security, a process that the government can directly spearhead with the matatu</p><p>industry leaders. Stricter rules can be designed to ensure compliance within the</p><p>industry and to eliminate un-roadworthy vehicles and non-compliant opera-</p><p>tors. This should also include finding bad driver behaviors on the road that can</p><p>lead to accidents. This will improve the service quality offered by these opera-</p><p>tors and ensure more safety. And finally, to reduce congestion within Nairobi</p><p>and the surrounding towns, matatus with larger carrying capacities should be</p><p>adopted. For instance, 33-seater buses should offer the base capacity instead of</p><p>the traditional 14-seater vehicles. The suggestions are areas that can assist with</p><p>making the matatu system better. But, along with these ideas comes the need</p><p>for all involved parties to understand and respect the role and placement of the</p><p>matatu transportation in Nairobi.</p><p>M. MWANZIAKOSTER</p><p>95</p><p>references</p><p>Aduwo, G. O. (1992). Urban Transport System: A Case of the Matatu Mode of</p><p>Transport in the City of Nairobi, Kenya. African Urban Quarterly, 7(1–2), 120–129.</p><p>Aduwo, G.O. (1990). The Role, Efficiency, and Quality of Service of the Matatu Mode of</p><p>Public Transportation in Nairobi, Kenya. A Geographical Analysis (pp. 1–8).</p><p>Department of Geography, University of Nairobi.</p><p>Agoki, G.S. (1988). Characteristics of Traffic Accidents in Kenya. University of Nairobi.</p><p>Chitere, P., McCormic, D., Orero, R., Mitula, W.V., & Ommeh, M.S. (2012). Public</p><p>Road Transport Services in the City of Nairobi Kenya. University of Nairobi.</p><p>Citizen Digital. (2019). Uproar Over Plan to Phase Out 14-Seater Matatus in Nairobi.</p><p>December 6, 2018. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://citizentv.co.ke/news/</p><p>uproar- over- plan- to- phase- out- 14- seater- matatus- in- nairobi- 222134/.</p><p>Daily Nation. (2019). Matatu Crews React to Impending Enforcement of Michuki Rules.</p><p>November 11, 2018. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://www.nation.co.ke/</p><p>news/Paralysis- looms- in- matatu- rules- standoff/1056- 4846106- jp2rmxz/</p><p>index.html.</p><p>Daily Nation. (2018). Matatus Withdrawn from Roads as Major Crackdown Starts.</p><p>November 12. Retrieved July 3, 2019, from https://www.nation.co.ke/news/</p><p>Matatus- withdrawn- from- roads- as- major- crackdown-starts/1056-4847152-</p><p>14aur5sz/index.html.</p><p>House-Soremekun, B., & Falola, T. (2016). Globalization and Sustainable Development</p><p>in Africa. University of Rochester Press.</p><p>Jarabe, B.O. (1982). Intra-Urban Mobility and Urban Transportation: A Case Study of</p><p>Nairobi City, Kenya. MA Thesis, Institute of Population Studies, University</p><p>of Nairobi.</p><p>Kenyan Bus Services Ltd. (1980). Public Passenger Transport Services in Nairobi.</p><p>Position Paper Presented to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Kenya</p><p>Bus Service Ltd., Nairobi.</p><p>Khayesi, M. (2002). Struggle for Socio-economic Niche and Control in the Matatu</p><p>Industry in Kenya. DPMN Bulletin, 9(2), 1–6.</p><p>Kioy, D. (2011). Matatu Entrepreneurs: A Study on Investors in Kenya’s Informal</p><p>Transport Business. Lambert Academic Publishing.</p><p>Mbugua, C. W. (2009). A Sociological Study on Commuters’ Compliance to the New</p><p>Traffic Regulations. Master’s Diss., University of Nairobi.</p><p>Muchilwa, Z. A. (2004). Matatu Operators’ Responses to Changing Government</p><p>Regulations. MBA Thesis, University of Nairobi.</p><p>Mutongi, K. (2017). Matatu: A History of Popular Transportation in Nairobi. University</p><p>of Chicago Press.</p><p>Mungai, M. W. (2003). Identity Politics in Matatu Folklore. PhD Diss., Hebrew</p><p>University of Jerusalem.</p><p>Ogonda, R. (1992). Post-independence Trends in Development of Transport and</p><p>Communications. In W.R. Ochieng & R.M. Maxon (Eds.), An Economic History of</p><p>Kenya. East African Educational Publishers.</p><p>Rasmussen, J. (2012). Inside the System, Outside the Law: Operating the Matatu</p><p>Sector in Nairobi. Urban Forum, 23, 415–432.</p><p>Republic of Kenya. (2012). Spatial Planning Concept. Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan</p><p>Development.</p><p>7 THE MATATU INDUSTRY IN NAIROBI</p><p>https://citizentv.co.ke/news/uproar-over-plan-to-phase-out-14-seater-matatus-in-nairobi-222134/</p><p>https://citizentv.co.ke/news/uproar-over-plan-to-phase-out-14-seater-matatus-in-nairobi-222134/</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Paralysis-looms-in-matatu-rules-standoff/1056-4846106-jp2rmxz/index.html</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Paralysis-looms-in-matatu-rules-standoff/1056-4846106-jp2rmxz/index.html</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Paralysis-looms-in-matatu-rules-standoff/1056-4846106-jp2rmxz/index.html</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Matatus-withdrawn-from-roads-as-major-crackdown-starts/1056-4847152-14aur5sz/index.html</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Matatus-withdrawn-from-roads-as-major-crackdown-starts/1056-4847152-14aur5sz/index.html</p><p>https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Matatus-withdrawn-from-roads-as-major-crackdown-starts/1056-4847152-14aur5sz/index.html</p><p>97</p><p>CHAPTER 8</p><p>Pastoralism andtheNorthern Kenya Economy</p><p>MauriceN.Amutabi andLinnetHamasi</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>Northern Kenya has had a complicated history different from the rest of Kenya.</p><p>Despite its geographical span of 14 counties and occupying 75% of Kenya’s</p><p>geographic space, the area remains marginalized politically, economically, and</p><p>socially in Kenya (Fratkin, 1994). The counties include Wajir, Garissa, Mandera</p><p>Samburu, Marsabit, Isiolo, West Pokot, Tharaka Nithi, Turkana, Elgeyo</p><p>Marakwet, Laikipia, Kitui, Tana River, and Baringo. In the political realm,</p><p>northern Kenya has not had the opportunity to dominate the political sphere</p><p>because many political activities are concentrated in the South (Fratkin, 1994).</p><p>Economically the region’s dependency on livestock makes it peripheral in</p><p>Kenya, where agriculture and crop farming remain the mainstay of Kenya’s</p><p>foreign exchange and economic activities. In the social arena, northern Kenya</p><p>has not had leading social institutions (Galaty, 1994). It has no single univer-</p><p>sity, and it is only recently that it has had national schools. The region suffers</p><p>from many disadvantages, such as harsh and unforgiving terrain, which suffers</p><p>scarcities such as water and adequate pasture.</p><p>Northern Kenya has the worst infrastructure in terms of the road network</p><p>and is the only region in Kenya without a railway network or major interna-</p><p>tional airport (Amutabi, 2009b). The area relies mainly on livestock produc-</p><p>tion, which is undermined by many challenges such as banditry and cattle</p><p>rustling as well as cattle diseases such as bovine pleuro-pneumonia, foot and</p><p>mouth diseases, rinderpest, yellow fever, anthrax, and Nagana, among others.</p><p>M. N. Amutabi (*) • L. Hamasi</p><p>Technical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_8</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_8&domain=pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_8</p><p>98</p><p>Security threats are experienced on major highways through banditry and</p><p>cattle rustling, and many human lives are lost and vast numbers of cattle.</p><p>Despite having rich tourist potential, tourists seldom visit the area because of</p><p>insecurity (Blench, 2001). The region has often been regarded as Kenya’s wild-</p><p>life reservoir, holding some rare animal species such as the white rhino, reticu-</p><p>lated giraffe, and bongo antelope. Despite these advantages, the area still lags</p><p>in development. The region has one of the longest international borders tra-</p><p>versing Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, compared to southern</p><p>Kenya, which borders only two countries—Uganda and Tanzania.</p><p>Due to these complex international borderlands, the area experiences influx</p><p>of goods and people. Some of the goods that come through include contra</p><p>bands such as small arms and light weapons that threaten the region’s stability.</p><p>Migration often brings in criminal elements that create instability in the region</p><p>(Simala & Amutabi, 2005). Due to the practice of transhumance, some pasto-</p><p>ralists move their livestock back and forth from Kenya and other countries,</p><p>thereby increasing diseases and exacerbating cattle theft. The borders also pose</p><p>other challenges such as human trafficking and terrorism because of neighbor-</p><p>ing strong Muslim states such as Somalia.</p><p>The region hosts Kenya’s two refugee camps in Kakuma and Dadaab (the</p><p>largest refugee camp in Africa), hosting about one million Somali and Sudanese</p><p>refugees, which creates a complicated social-economic dynamic that has often</p><p>overstretched the infrastructure (Amutabi, 2005). Dadaab and Kakuma have</p><p>created a security nightmare for Kenya because they are centers of proliferation</p><p>of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The refugee camps are the centers of Islamic</p><p>radicalization in the country (Dahl, 1975). Development observers believe</p><p>that there is a need for the integration of northern Kenya into the rest of Kenya</p><p>through the improvement of livestock production as well as economic and</p><p>social infrastructure that will make the region more accessible (Amutabi, 1999).</p><p>This article will address the dynamics of northern Kenya and how they have</p><p>affected the country’s overall development equation, focusing on the social,</p><p>economic, and other dynamics.</p><p>northern Kenya durIng thecolonIal PerIod</p><p>During the colonial period, the region was called the Northern Frontier</p><p>District (NFD), a backwater of Kenya’s colonial economy segregated in devel-</p><p>opment programs. The colonial policy did not regard livestock development as</p><p>important because the system favored exotic livestock and not indigenous live-</p><p>stock in northern Kenya (Amutabi, 2009b). The colonial government saw</p><p>northern Kenya as a source of cattle diseases that threatened the colonial dairy</p><p>economy, and they did everything they could to control the movement of live-</p><p>stock of pastoralists from northern Kenya (International Livestock Research</p><p>Institute (ILRI), 2008). Largely because of this fear of cattle disease from</p><p>northern Kenya, the colonial government created the quarantine system in</p><p>which all cattle from northern Kenya were quarantined in Isiolo, Makutano in</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>99</p><p>west Pokot and Garissa towns and screened for diseases (Amutabi, 1999). Only</p><p>those cattle which passed screening and were safe from cattle diseases were</p><p>transported to Nairobi and other markets in southern Kenya and abroad.</p><p>One of the biggest problems created by quarantine was colossal losses expe-</p><p>rienced by farmers who were forced to pay for the expenses of quarantine and</p><p>screening. Livestock that failed the test were often transported back at the</p><p>expense of the livestock producers. The net result was frustration among herd-</p><p>ers in northern Kenya (Fratkin, 1994). Colonial policies undermined indige-</p><p>nous cattle production because of low milk and meat production yields and</p><p>recommended improvement in production in northern Kenya. This led to the</p><p>improvement of Borana cattle through cross-breeding with meat breeds from</p><p>the west, such as Sahiwal and Ayshire (ILRI, 2008). One resident of northern</p><p>Kenya said:</p><p>The colonial government undermined our region, and this was continued under</p><p>Kenyatta and Moi regimes. We were regarded as northern Frontier District and</p><p>barred from the rest of Kenya. The colonial government did not value pastoralism</p><p>and this did not change even after independence. It is only devolution which has</p><p>changed the face of development in northern Kenya.</p><p>The colonial government segregated northern Kenya through the sessional</p><p>paper no. 10 of 1965. Due to social-cultural factors in northern Kenya, it was</p><p>believed that penetration of Christianity in Muslim areas was not easy</p><p>(Nyanthum, 2014). Therefore, Christian</p><p>missionaries focused their interests in</p><p>southern Kenya where they built churches, schools, and hospitals, creating a</p><p>nucleus for stable urbanization in the south. Over 80% of towns in southern</p><p>Kenya were started as mission stations, railway, and road infrastructure. Many</p><p>mission stations were established around water sources that were lacking in</p><p>northern Kenya.</p><p>Northern Kenya towns and urban areas started as colonial administrative</p><p>centers and were often occupied by colonial forts with soldiers and therefore</p><p>unfriendly to civilian activities, which made their growth slower, and all of</p><p>them did not receive tarred roads until the 1990s (Schlee & Shongolo, 2012).</p><p>Towns such as Kapenguria, Lodwar, Marsabit, Isiolo, Maralal, Rumuruti,</p><p>Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Hola, and Moyale did not receive significant colonial</p><p>investment by way of infrastructure, making them backwaters of development</p><p>and peripheral in the strategic needs of the country (Norwegian Refugee</p><p>Council (NRC), 2014). The danger of the colonial approach to northern</p><p>Kenya’s development was the lack of a purposive and targeted development</p><p>agenda for the region. Livestock improvement development centers were put</p><p>in the south, mainly at Kabete near Nairobi.</p><p>8 PASTORALISM AND THE NORTHERN KENYA ECONOMY</p><p>100</p><p>the ShIfta Menace Innorthern Kenya</p><p>after IndePendence</p><p>The Shifta menace was caused by Somalia national interests where there was a</p><p>call for the Somali people in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia to unite and form</p><p>one nation called the Greater Somalia. The Ogaden war in Ethiopia and the</p><p>Shifta menace in Kenya were related because they were both secessionists in</p><p>nature (Hogg, 1986). The two movements disrupted normal lives and devel-</p><p>opment activities in both Ethiopia and Kenya by killing innocent civilians and</p><p>destroying property worth millions of shillings. The Shifta menace made the</p><p>Kenyan government spend a lot of resources to put it down. The government</p><p>sent large contingents of troops to quell the uprising. The operation against</p><p>Shifta reduced the time and other resources spent on development in the</p><p>region by the government and non-state actors. The net result was that inves-</p><p>tors pulled out, and indigenous people were uncomfortable working in the</p><p>region, leading to development apathy where NGOs and other stakeholders</p><p>pulled out (Amutabi, 2005). The Shifta menace also introduced Small Arms</p><p>and Light Weapons in the region because every family sought to protect itself</p><p>from the Shifta bandits. A former administrator in northern Kenya noted:</p><p>The Shifta menace affected development in northern Kenya. Nobody in the civil</p><p>service wanted to serve in the region. The region was regarded as a place for</p><p>indisciplined cases, inexperienced officers and for military training. Shift war</p><p>made things worse because government convoys and offices were attacked lead-</p><p>ing to many deaths and injuries.</p><p>The accumulation of arms made northern Kenya even more insecure and cre-</p><p>ated a sense of instability in the region. Armed groups such as the Oromo</p><p>Liberation Front (OLF) from Ethiopia took advantage of this lack of security</p><p>in the region to set up camps of operation to mount raids against the Ethiopian</p><p>state (Hesse & MacGregor, 2006). The government responded to the rise in</p><p>insecurity in the region by creating special forces and military formations that</p><p>took root in the region. Formations such as the Anti-stock Theft Unit were</p><p>created to confront the volatile situation in the region. It was not until 1979</p><p>when the first Somali was appointed to the cabinet by President Daniel Arap</p><p>Moi that the Shifta menace seemed to end.</p><p>Malim Mohammed became a minister in the Moi regime at a time when the</p><p>Somalia community in Kenya felt excluded from mainstream politics, and his</p><p>inclusion in the cabinet seemed to change affairs for the better (Galvin, 2009).</p><p>When his brother, Major General Mohammed, was made second-in-command</p><p>in the military, the Shifta menace seemed to disappear so that by the 1980s, it</p><p>seemed to be virtually over as President Moi appointed a few Somalis as District</p><p>Commissioners, Ambassadors, and other senior ranks in government. The</p><p>effect of the menace remains in the region up to this day because the level of</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>101</p><p>fear created in northern Kenya never abated, and the belief among southern</p><p>Kenyans was that northern Kenya was dangerous.</p><p>Northern Kenya did not take long to get itself into more problems due to</p><p>insecurity when the president of Somalia, Said Barre, was overthrown in a mili-</p><p>tary coup in 1979. The coup in Somalia raptured northern Kenya, which burst</p><p>into insecurity in which many attacks started to take place on Kenyan soil</p><p>against various warlords in Somalia (Galaty, 1994). General Aideed’s and</p><p>General Morgan’s forces almost confronted one another even on Kenyan soil.</p><p>The biggest problem was the influx of Somali refugees who entered Kenya</p><p>from all directions, including Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu. Border</p><p>points such as Liboi and Elwalk became so busy that the immigration officers</p><p>posted to these areas were overwhelmed, which made the government imme-</p><p>diately create the Liboi and Dadaab refugee camps (Fratkin, 1994). Although</p><p>Liboi refugee camp was eventually closed, Dadaab refugee camp continues to</p><p>pose serious threats to Kenya’s security arrangements. Kenya did not have</p><p>enough police to deal with the threat and often used the military to assist.</p><p>The security threat in northern Kenya acquired a new level when the Al</p><p>Shabaab threat emerged and has made the area remain largely insecure up to</p><p>this day. Today, the Kenyan government is dealing with the war on terror</p><p>because of Al Shabaab; and in 2013, it created a police unit called the anti-</p><p>terror unit. In 2017, the government created the counterterrorism center to</p><p>deal with the Al Shabaab menace and other terror threats in the country</p><p>and abroad.</p><p>lIveStocK coMPlex Innorthern Kenya andchallengeS</p><p>totheeconoMy</p><p>Livestock is the mainstay of economic activities in northern Kenya, and yet it</p><p>also constitutes the main threat to stability in the region. Raids and counter</p><p>raids for livestock make northern Kenya unstable because the problem has been</p><p>that each group builds up arms to counter anticipated attacks from their neigh-</p><p>bors (Amutabi, 2009a). Due to this, all the way from West Pokot through</p><p>Marsabit and Mandera, many gun runners are selling Small Arms and Light</p><p>Weapons to pastoralists.</p><p>The raiding menace has disrupted livestock production in the region, and</p><p>livestock officers estimate that over half of the domestic animals in northern</p><p>Kenya are exchanged illegally through raiding. There have been proposals to</p><p>minimize this raiding by creating electronic tagging of livestock as is done in</p><p>Brazil, the Netherlands, and Botswana, but policymakers have rejected this</p><p>proposal. Some studies have suggested that some of the elites in Kenya are</p><p>beneficiaries of cattle rustling and banditry, which have kept prices low (ILRI,</p><p>2008). Other studies have suggested that local politicians and brokers in the</p><p>livestock business sponsor some of the raids in order to acquire livestock easily.</p><p>One researcher in northern Kenya has pointed out that:</p><p>8 PASTORALISM AND THE NORTHERN KENYA ECONOMY</p><p>102</p><p>There are too many arms in civilian hands in northern Kenya. This has affected</p><p>the peace and stability of the region where AK47 has become like a walking stick</p><p>for shepherded boys and girls. The exchange of arms with livestock is rampant in</p><p>the region that ammunition and guns are a form of currency in the region.</p><p>Government disarmament programme may not succeed until there is a total life-</p><p>style change and proper sensitization to local communities which is a result of</p><p>raiding and counter raiding.</p><p>The threat to northern Kenya should not have come from within as is the case</p><p>where Pokot raid the Turkana, the Turkana raid the Rendile, the Rendile raid</p><p>the Borana, the Borana raid the Samburu,</p><p>and the Samburu raid the Somali</p><p>and the cycle continues. This cyclic raiding continuum traverses the entire</p><p>northern Kenya livestock complex and has not allowed the government to cre-</p><p>ate the necessary structure to stabilize the area (Amutabi, 1999). The sporadic</p><p>raids lead to loss of lives, the spread of disease and buildup of SALWs, as well</p><p>as an increased number of destitute who now occupy many of the towns in</p><p>northern Kenyan, and some of them become street people and bandits.</p><p>The northern Kenya complex needs more concerted efforts to bring the</p><p>region under total control. Efforts of disarmament and disbanding of ethnic</p><p>militias have always been met with strong resistance from pastoralist leaders in</p><p>Kenya who argue that disarming Kenyans makes them vulnerable to attacks</p><p>from neighbors who are constantly armed, such as the Nyangatom, Merille,</p><p>and Oromo from Ethiopia; Somali from Somalia; Jie and Toposa from South</p><p>Sudan and Uganda; and the Karamojong from Uganda (Fratkin, 1994). The</p><p>government has been reluctant to disarm, which has escalated raids and coun-</p><p>ter raids among pastoralists in northern Kenya.</p><p>The ranchers in northern Kenya control vast areas. Their attempts to intro-</p><p>duce modern livestock farming have failed because the nomadic pastoralist</p><p>groups don’t have a sense of fencing and respect for fenced areas. As a result,</p><p>there are serious conflicts between the ranchers and the pastoralist groups</p><p>(Elmi, 2013). The livestock from nomadic groups often introduces diseases</p><p>and ticks to the ranches, leading to serious conflicts between the groups.</p><p>Government efforts have been futile in dealing with ranchers and pastoralists.</p><p>Some of the ranchers are engaged in the creation of wildlife sanctuaries, some</p><p>of which focus on the preservation of endangered species such as the white</p><p>rhino but they come into confrontation with pastoralists, some of whom abet</p><p>poaching as an alternative means of income.</p><p>The end result is a threat to wildlife conservation and management of breed-</p><p>ing of exotic cattle for beef and milk in northern Kenya. Attacks on ranchers</p><p>and wildlife sanctuaries have also meant undermining tourism and its potential</p><p>in the region (Kenya Land Conservation Trust, 2011). Kenya has 52 national</p><p>parks and national reserves, 25 of which are found in northern Kenya. Despite</p><p>this large number of national parks, the largest proportion of foreign income</p><p>comes from tourism activities in southern Kenya in Tsavo, Maasai Mara and</p><p>other parks. On the other hand, parks in northern Kenya—such as Sibiloi,</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>103</p><p>Samburu, Marsabit, and Shaba—do not attract large tourist numbers because</p><p>of insecurity (Fratkin, 1994). Northern Kenya therefore is unable to take</p><p>advantage of the large potential of tourism to improve its economy.</p><p>Besides livestock production and tourism potential, northern Kenya has</p><p>other strategic resources such as minerals and oil, which started being exported</p><p>in 2018. In 2019 it reached the 200 million barrel mark, making Kenya an oil-</p><p>exporting country. However, there have been challenges exploiting this strate-</p><p>gic resource (Greiner, 2012). First, Turkana County has resisted the ration</p><p>prescribed for sharing revenue and constantly expresses its displeasure with the</p><p>arrangement. Second, the infrastructure that was supposed to be built in 2014</p><p>to facilitate the export of oil has been marred with a lot of controversies. Lamu</p><p>port has not taken off in terms of construction as well as the pipeline and the</p><p>railway connection under Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport</p><p>(LAPSSET) Corridor project from Lamu to Turkana have not taken off. Third,</p><p>the agreement between the Kenya government and Tullow oil remains unclear,</p><p>and the profits that may accrue from carrying crude oil by road are feared to be</p><p>minimal (Angelei, 2013). Observers feel that if care is not taken, Kenya may fall</p><p>into the trap of the oil curse experienced in Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and other</p><p>African countries. Observers also feel that northern Kenya needs to benefit</p><p>from the oil exploration through building of better transport infrastructure,</p><p>provision of water, and other social services.</p><p>Water conflIctS Innorthern Kenya andIMPlIcatIonS</p><p>ontheeconoMy</p><p>Northern Kenya has no permanent water sources apart from river Dauain in</p><p>Mandera between Kenya and Ethiopia border, the Omo River and Lake</p><p>Turkana. The other water sources, such as Uwaso Nyiro and Turkwel River, are</p><p>seasonal, making many counties in northern Kenya rely on borehole water for</p><p>their provisions. Due to water scarcity, boreholes, water wells, and water pans</p><p>have become contested spaces between minority and majority, adults and chil-</p><p>dren, men and women (Amutabi, 2009a). Water scarcity has culminated in</p><p>many conflicts, resulting in open warfare. Many communities in northern</p><p>Kenya are nomadic and often traverse into other communities’ territories,</p><p>bringing about conflicts. Nomadic groups often disrupt sharing programs and</p><p>schedules of these water sources by disregarding local arrangements and plan-</p><p>ning, leading to chaos and tensions (Hamasi, 2014). The result is that lives are</p><p>often lost, and property destroyed as well as displacement of groups. A resident</p><p>of northern Kenya stated:</p><p>The major problem in northern Kenya is shortage of water. Government and</p><p>other development groups in the region have helped in constructing bore holes</p><p>but lack the input of local people. Many of the bore holes are put in areas that are</p><p>not strategic. Borehole management has also been put in the hands of men many</p><p>of whom are migratory and also mismanage the boreholes.</p><p>8 PASTORALISM AND THE NORTHERN KENYA ECONOMY</p><p>104</p><p>The government and other stakeholders have put in place mechanisms for pro-</p><p>viding adequate water for northern Kenya without much success. The main</p><p>problem is a lack of finances as well as inadequate water in the local water aqui-</p><p>fers. This has created tensions over sharing of water resources in many parts of</p><p>northern Kenya (Lesorogol, 2003). Observers have pointed out that some of</p><p>the conflicts in northern Kenya will end when the government provides ade-</p><p>quate water for nomadic pastoralists. There is hope that the recent discovery of</p><p>a major water acquirer in the Turkana and Samburu aquifer said to hold bil-</p><p>lions of cubic liters will abet this problem.</p><p>The water wars have also escalated because the fencing by ranchers makes</p><p>the nomads unable to access some water wells and boreholes as before by</p><p>pumping water from rivers and boreholes for irrigation (Greiner, 2012).</p><p>According to the pastoralists, water is a shared resource, and the capitalist own-</p><p>ership of water by the ranchers worries them a lot. The pastoralists believe</p><p>water is from God, so it should not be hoarded. As a result of this mindset, the</p><p>interests of the locals and the investors collide on water distribution, sharing,</p><p>and management. This conflict is further complicated by the Kenyan constitu-</p><p>tion (promulgated in 2010), which states that in all cases, the interests of the</p><p>locals must remain supreme.</p><p>the MInIStry ofdeveloPMent ofnorthern Kenya</p><p>andother arId landS</p><p>In 2008, President Mwai Kibaki created the ministry of development of north-</p><p>ern Kenya and other arid lands and placed it under a northerner with the hope</p><p>that it would take care of pastoralist interests and development needs. Such a</p><p>model had worked well and successfully in Uganda, where President Yoweri</p><p>Museveni had appointed a minister of Karamoja affairs based in Soroti in</p><p>northern Uganda (Kenya Land Conservation Trust, 2011). The Ugandan</p><p>example reduced cattle rustling, increased seed and quality of livestock produc-</p><p>tion in the region. Livestock officers worked closely with Ugandan Defense</p><p>forces to combat rustling and improve the quality of livestock.</p><p>The creation of the short-lived Ministry of Northern Kenya led by</p><p>Mohammed Abdi Kuti and the emergence of devolution and recovery of</p><p>northern Kenya Counties under the new</p><p>political dispensation met some suc-</p><p>cess and faced several challenges. The success was based on the wide accept-</p><p>ability among herders (Schlee & Shongolo, 2012). Many of the ideas it used</p><p>came from the grassroot rather than the previous top-down ones. The peace</p><p>meetings on stock theft and education on livestock improvement programs</p><p>picked up. The ministry also embarked on a systematic program of sinking</p><p>boreholes to increase the opportunities for access to water in the region.</p><p>Despite some success, there were major challenges predicated on the low allo-</p><p>cation of funds and lack of political goodwill in the south to boost livestock</p><p>production and other pastoralist livelihoods. Major decisions still came from</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>105</p><p>Nairobi and the ministry was treated just like a department in the ministry of</p><p>agriculture (Elmi, 2013). The other challenge was that there was no commen-</p><p>surate hiring of staff to the ministry, and it relied on staff members who had</p><p>been there before and had the mindset of the central government approach.</p><p>There were challenges on duplication of roles between the national and</p><p>county government and accusations of interference in the running of county</p><p>government matters. The minister was accused of favoring Isiolo in sinking</p><p>boreholes and revenue sharing among the 14 counties of northern Kenya. It</p><p>was not surprising that before the end of his term, he declared interest in the</p><p>Isiolo gubernatorial post, which he won (Cummings, 2013). After the 2013</p><p>elections, the ministry was abolished, and its activities were put under the</p><p>directorate of arid and semi-lands under the ministry of devolution.</p><p>Northern Kenya does not have social protection and safety nets for vulner-</p><p>able groups such as the elderly, the young, women, the disabled and other</p><p>minorities (Hogg, 1992). The colonial government and successive regimes</p><p>have not been able to create social protection infrastructure leaving the people</p><p>in northern Kenya vulnerable to the ravages of nature and undermining their</p><p>livelihoods. High levels of insecurity make vulnerable groups become victims</p><p>of banditry and cattle rustlers. The challenge faced by the nomadic lifestyle</p><p>affects vulnerable groups more than other groups.</p><p>concluSIon</p><p>From the foregoing, northern Kenya has had challenges dealing with develop-</p><p>ment issues and many of them have emerged from the colonial legacy. The</p><p>underdevelopment of the region has remained largely due to insecurity and</p><p>external dynamics that have made the region suffer from the infiltration of</p><p>armed groups into northern Kenya. The government of Kenya has made con-</p><p>certed attempts to develop the region through strategic plans of various minis-</p><p>tries, the Kenya national strategic plans, as well as efforts of other stakeholders</p><p>such as NGOs, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), and Faith-Based</p><p>Organizations (FBOs). Northern Kenya needs a robust intervention on man-</p><p>agement and improvement of livestock as well as security which affects tourism</p><p>and the general livelihood.</p><p>There is a need for political goodwill for northern Kenya, where successive</p><p>governments have often put the region’s needs and interests on the back</p><p>burner. Kenyan government needs to rethink its development approach to the</p><p>development of northern Kenya by expanding opportunities for investment in</p><p>the region. The people are willing to be helped in improving their lot and cre-</p><p>ating a fresh start for the region. The region requires effective social protection</p><p>programs and safety nets to cushion inhabitants from the realities of a harsh</p><p>and unforgiving terrain by giving opportunities for investment and improve-</p><p>ment in the quality of life.</p><p>There is a need for improving livestock breeding, branding, electronic tag-</p><p>ging, and effective livestock marketing. This is to improve production and</p><p>8 PASTORALISM AND THE NORTHERN KENYA ECONOMY</p><p>106</p><p>quality of breeds, minimize theft, and improve the marketing of livestock and</p><p>livestock products. If this is done, it is likely to improve the lives and livelihoods</p><p>of people in northern Kenya. The security of northern Kenya is often compro-</p><p>mised by the large prevalence of SALW and banditry activities on the major</p><p>highways and cattle rustling. To combat this proliferation, the region requires</p><p>more policing and effective management of the porous borders. The govern-</p><p>ment of Kenya can make do with the use of formal and informal early warning</p><p>systems to detect security threats before they occur. The government needs to</p><p>embrace both contemporary and indigenous drought management systems</p><p>and knowledge to combat drought effects such as famine.</p><p>Northern Kenya has rich tourist sanctuaries that are useful for tourism but</p><p>the region faces many threats. One of which is trust and confidence in the</p><p>region’s tourist circuits. The government needs to promote the tourism circuit</p><p>in northern Kenya through marketing, effective policing, and improvement of</p><p>transport infrastructure. It is hoped that once the Isiolo international is com-</p><p>plete may open the area for tourism like Malindi, Mombasa, and Kisumu air-</p><p>ports have done.</p><p>There is a need for the national and county governments to spend more</p><p>funds in sinking and maintaining boreholes to ameliorate water shortages in</p><p>the regions. Water is a multiplier factor to development and often acts as a push</p><p>and pull factor in investment. Industrial complexes often require water in rea-</p><p>sonable amounts for related industrial activities. Security activities such as</p><p>threats from fire require water, and wildlife and domestic animals also require</p><p>water for sustainability (Amutabi, 2009c). Large human populations in north-</p><p>ern Kenya require substantial and sustainable water sources to spur develop-</p><p>ment and stability.</p><p>There is a need to increase bitumen roads in northern Kenya and the cre-</p><p>ation of airports, airstrips, and railways lines to facilitate easy movement of</p><p>people. There is a need to create social amenities such as schools, colleges, and</p><p>hospitals to take care of the social needs of the people in northern Kenya. It will</p><p>also be good to create incubation centers of investment in various counties to</p><p>stop the rural-urban migration, mainly to Nairobi.</p><p>The government needs to tame the refugee menace in northern Kenya,</p><p>which has brought about insecurity and environmental degradation. The gov-</p><p>ernment needs to engage stakeholders, mainly non-state actors, in rehabilita-</p><p>tion and reconstruction programs for refugees when they return to their home</p><p>countries. There is a need to increase policing in the refugee camps to curb</p><p>illicit activities such as drug peddling, human trafficking, and proliferation</p><p>of SALW.</p><p>There is a need to promote gender equity and egalitarianism in all develop-</p><p>ment areas of northern Kenya to create a more coherent and integrated coun-</p><p>try, given the understanding that holistic development requires participation</p><p>by all. In this light, the Kenyan government is called upon to effectively imple-</p><p>ment the UNSCR 1325 to promote the participation of more women in peace</p><p>and security issues from the grassroots to the national level. Countries that</p><p>have embraced and implemented the KNAPS perform better on the security</p><p>index compared with those that have not.</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>107</p><p>referenceS</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (1999). The Role of Politicians in Livestock Marketing Policy in Kenya.</p><p>Paper presented at a conference on the theme, ‘Rethinking Livestock Marketing in</p><p>Kenya’ organised by Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy</p><p>and Development and Action Aid Kenya, held in Isiolo, Kenya.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (2005). Captured and Steeped in Colonial Dynamics and Legacy: The</p><p>Case of Isiolo Town in Kenya. In S.Salm & T.Falola (Eds.), African Urban Spaces</p><p>in Historical Perspectives. University of Rochester Press.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (2009a). The Livestock Sector in Kenya. In M.N. Amutabi (Ed.),</p><p>Studies in the Economic History of Kenya: Land, Water, Railways,</p><p>Education, and</p><p>Entrepreneurship. Edwin Mellen Press.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (2009b). Colonial Legacy and Underdevelopment in Northern Kenya.</p><p>In M.N. Amutabi (Ed.), Studies in the Economic History of Kenya: Land, Water,</p><p>Railways, Education, and Entrepreneurship. Edwin Mellen Press.</p><p>Amutabi, M.N. (2009c). Water and Development in Kenya: Problems and Potential.</p><p>In M.N. Amutabi (Ed.), Studies in the Economic History of Kenya: Land, Water,</p><p>Railways, Education, and Entrepreneurship. Edwin Mellen Press.</p><p>Angelei, I. (2013). Oil Governance: FoLT’s Perspective on Oil in Turkana. Retrieved</p><p>December 20, 2013, from http://www.friendsoflaketurkana.org/get- involved/oil-</p><p>governance- folts- perspective- on- oil- in%20Re- marginalising%20Kenyan%20</p><p>Pastoralists%20Turkana/212- oil- governance- folts- perspective- on- oil- in- turkana</p><p>Blench, R. (2001). ‘You Can’t Go Home Again’: Pastoralism in the New Millennium.</p><p>Overseas Development Institute.</p><p>Cummings, R. (2013). Predicting Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of</p><p>Kenya’s Turkana County. Think Africa Press. Retrieved December 30, 2013, from</p><p>http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting- next- oil- insurgency-precarious-</p><p>case- turkana- county</p><p>Dahl, G.S. (1975). Suffering Grass: Subsistence and Society of Waso Borana. Stockholm</p><p>University Press.</p><p>Elmi, M. (2013). The Politics of Policy Making for Pastoralism: Reflections on the Work of</p><p>the Ministry of State for Development of northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands. Paper</p><p>presented at the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) Nairobi Forum, Nairobi, Kenya.</p><p>Fratkin, E. (1994). Pastoral Land Tenure in Kenya: Maasai, Samburu, Boran, and</p><p>Rendille Experiences, 1950–1990. Nomadic Peoples, 34/35, 55–68.</p><p>Galaty, J. G. (1994). Rangeland Tenure and Pastoralism in Africa. In E. Fratkin,</p><p>K. Galvin, & E. A. Roth (Eds.), African Pastoralist Systems. Lynne Rienner</p><p>Publishers.</p><p>Galvin, K.A. (2009). Transitions: Pastoralists Living with Change. Annual Review of</p><p>Anthropology, 38, 185–198.</p><p>Greiner, C. (2012). Unexpected Consequences: Wildlife Conservation and Territorial</p><p>Conflict in Northern Kenya. Human Ecology, 40, 415–425.</p><p>Hamasi, L. (2014). Market Women and Peace Building among the Pastoral Communities</p><p>of Kenya: Special Reference to Elgeyo Marakwet County. In M. Amutabi (Ed.),</p><p>Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: Opportunities and Prospects (pp.53–70).</p><p>Research, the Catholic University of Eastern Africa.</p><p>Hesse, C., & MacGregor, J. (2006). Pastoralism: Dry-lands’ Invisible Asset? Developing</p><p>a Framework for Assessing the Value of Pastoralism in East Africa (Issue Paper 142).</p><p>International Institute for Environment and Development.</p><p>8 PASTORALISM AND THE NORTHERN KENYA ECONOMY</p><p>http://www.friendsoflaketurkana.org/get-involved/oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in Re-marginalising Kenyan Pastoralists Turkana/212-oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in-turkana</p><p>http://www.friendsoflaketurkana.org/get-involved/oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in Re-marginalising Kenyan Pastoralists Turkana/212-oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in-turkana</p><p>http://www.friendsoflaketurkana.org/get-involved/oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in Re-marginalising Kenyan Pastoralists Turkana/212-oil-governance-folts-perspective-on-oil-in-turkana</p><p>http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precarious-case-turkana-county</p><p>http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precarious-case-turkana-county</p><p>108</p><p>Hogg, R. (1986). The New Pastoralism: Poverty and Dependency in Northern Kenya.</p><p>Africa, 65(3), 319–333.</p><p>Hogg, R. (1992). NGOs, Pastoralists and Myth of Community: Three Case Studies of</p><p>Pastoral Development. Nomadic Peoples, 30, 122–146.</p><p>International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). (2008). Livestock Market Access and</p><p>Opportunities in Turkana Kenya (Research Report 3). ILRI.</p><p>Kenya Land Conservation Trust. (2011). Tourism, Vision 2030 and Pro-Pastoralist</p><p>Livelihoods in North-Eastern Kenya: Ecotourism in Northern Kenya Policy Brief—</p><p>Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle (ELMT). Kenya Land</p><p>Conservation Trust.</p><p>Lesorogol, C.K. (2003). Transforming Institutions Among Pastoralists: Inequality and</p><p>Land Privatization. American Anthropologist, 105(3), 531–541.</p><p>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). (2014). On the Margin: Kenya’s Pastoralists: From</p><p>Displacement to Solutions: A Conceptual Study on the Internal Displacement of</p><p>Pastoralists. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.</p><p>Nyanthum, O. (2014). Re-marginalising Kenyan Pastoralists: The Hidden Curse of</p><p>National Growth and Development. In African Study Monographs (Suppl. 50,</p><p>pp.43–72). Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis.</p><p>Schlee, G., & Shongolo, A.A. (2012). Pastoralism and Politics in Northern Kenya and</p><p>Southern Ethiopia. James Currey.</p><p>Simala, I.K., & Amutabi, M.N. (2005). Small Arms, Cattle Raiding and Borderlands:</p><p>The Ilemi Triangle. In W. van Schendel & I.W. Itty (Eds.), Illicit Flows and Criminal</p><p>Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization. Indiana University Press.</p><p>M. N. AMUTABI AND L. HAMASI</p><p>109</p><p>CHAPTER 9</p><p>Venture Capital andSilicon Savannah Valley</p><p>inKenya</p><p>DanielOigoOgachi andZemanZoltan</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>Africa houses over 1billion people and is labeled as one of the fastest-growing</p><p>continents in the world; however, the majority earn less than $8 a day.</p><p>Innovations in mobile technology and access to the internet are fundamental</p><p>driving forces for economic development in the continent. With the advent of</p><p>globalization and the digital economy, Kenya has experienced a high adoption</p><p>of technology in managing emerging businesses referred to as tech start-ups,</p><p>which made Kenya recognized as an Internet Technology (IT) hub for busi-</p><p>nesses. Discussions revolving around the origins of technology movements in</p><p>Africa, precisely in Kenya, saw the country lay down four pillars supporting the</p><p>technology hub of the Silicon Savannah Valley, namely, the mobile money</p><p>transfer, tech incubator model, a global crowdsourcing app and government</p><p>commitment to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy.</p><p>Venture capital (VC) involves financing by investors to business start-ups</p><p>through the advancement of loans or finances by investors, investment banks,</p><p>microfinance and any other financial institutions interested in supporting small</p><p>businesses. The support ranges from monetary to technical or managerial</p><p>expertise. Investment in start-ups can be riskier for the investors. Still, some-</p><p>times it can offer an attractive payoff to the providers of capital even though</p><p>financing such businesses does not guarantee business success. Small and</p><p>medium enterprises in Kenya in the recent past have faced challenges with</p><p>D. O. Ogachi (*) • Z. Zoltan</p><p>Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Gödöllő, Hungary</p><p>e-mail: ogachdniel@gmail.com; zeman.zoltan@uni-mate.hu</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_9</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_9&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:ogachdniel@gmail.com</p><p>mailto:zeman.zoltan@uni-mate.hu</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_9</p><p>110</p><p>capital financing. Investors have diverted their investments from Kenya to</p><p>other countries because of cheap labor.</p><p>Global andlocal analysIs</p><p>According to the research conducted by Groh etal. (2018) on venture capital</p><p>(VC) and private equity (PE), the United States was ranked as the best in the</p><p>whole world in attracting VC and PE at 100%, the United Kingdom at 94.4%,</p><p>Canada 92.6% and Hong Kong 91.2% which ties up with Japan at the same</p><p>percentage. In Africa, South Africa ranked as the number one country in</p><p>attracting VC and PE at 64.8%. Kenya is ranked number two in Africa and</p><p>number one in the Eastern Africa block with 57.6%. Generally, Africa is ranked</p><p>the least continent</p><p>to attract venture capital for start-ups. Developed regions of</p><p>North America (96.8%), Australasia (89.2%) and West Europe (78.7%) are the</p><p>critical attractors of VC and PE based on the index (Fig.9.1).</p><p>Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore have overtaken the United</p><p>Kingdom, which has taken position five in the attraction of VE and PE associ-</p><p>ated with the effect of Brexit, which has seen many investors in limbo due to</p><p>the fluctuations in the pound. Regulations for accessing the single European</p><p>market have also contributed to that. There are more severe consequences</p><p>expected as a result of Brexit (Groh etal., 2018) (Fig.9.2).</p><p>The rise in VC and PE in Africa has been because of a successful implemen-</p><p>tation of mobile money and transfer services in African countries, with success</p><p>stories in Kenya, which ranked as number one in the whole world, Africa’s tech</p><p>incubator model, and commitment by the government to a sound ICT policy</p><p>0%</p><p>20%</p><p>40%</p><p>60%</p><p>80%</p><p>100%</p><p>United States</p><p>United Kingdom</p><p>Canada</p><p>Hong Kong</p><p>Japan</p><p>Australia</p><p>Gemany</p><p>New Zealand</p><p>South Africa</p><p>Kenya</p><p>Fig. 9.1 Venture capital and private equity country attractiveness ranking 2018 coun-</p><p>try. (Source: Groh etal. (2018))</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>111</p><p>Year</p><p>U</p><p>SD</p><p>M</p><p>ill</p><p>io</p><p>n</p><p>2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018</p><p>$ 40655000</p><p>$127838410</p><p>$ 414018422</p><p>$608192366</p><p>Fig. 9.2 Total venture capital attraction to Africa, 2012–2018. (Source Data:</p><p>Crunchbase/TNA Analysis 2018)</p><p>adopted widely. There has been an increasing trend for venture capital attracted</p><p>to business techs and start-ups—the projections for 2018 estimated at between</p><p>$608million to $1billion by the year ending 2019. Investors consider several</p><p>variables before entrusting their finances to any country for investment. They</p><p>gather potential information and analyze important investment determinants</p><p>to ensure that they cushion their money against loss. A similar case is Brexit,</p><p>where investors cannot predict the future of the United Kingdom. In Africa,</p><p>investor decisions on venture capital are influenced by the Research and</p><p>Development allocations expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product</p><p>and better simulation of information between the investors and potential inves-</p><p>tors (Adongo, 2011). Venture capital and private equity have attracted several</p><p>active participants both in Kenya and in East Africa at large, being driven by</p><p>positive sentiments on the viability of Africa as a bedrock for investment</p><p>(KPMG & EAVCA, 2017). According to Bramann (2017), several forces are</p><p>disappointing investors in Kenya to look for investment opportunities</p><p>elsewhere.</p><p>the rIse ofsIlIcon savannah</p><p>Nearly all companies in Silicon Valley focus on taking over the world because</p><p>Silicon Valley firms are the key providers of internet services, which support the</p><p>globalization of business ventures. Success stories behind the success of Silicon</p><p>Valley include Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley,</p><p>and the intellectual hub of San Francisco. However, some other parts of the</p><p>United States failed to embrace the concept of Silicon Valley not because they</p><p>did not take advantage of the geographical relevance of access to the internet</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>112</p><p>but primarily because they were unable to accept the crucial economies of</p><p>agglomeration. In the case of California, it is argued that the success was as a</p><p>result of the labor law embraced (Chander, 2014).</p><p>In East Africa, Kenya is the most diversified and largest economy, with a</p><p>GDP of about $55billion. Ranked as number eight in Africa, Kenya has a GDP</p><p>per capita of approximately $1200 and a population of 44million people. The</p><p>country is aspiring to be an upper-middle-income economy; it shapes its digital</p><p>payments systems and access to real-time market prices for goods and services.</p><p>The country’s mobile revolution and digital payments have stimulated tremen-</p><p>dous revolutions and spawned growth, making Kenya the hotbed of silicon</p><p>savanna in Africa (Akamanzi etal., 2016).</p><p>Kenya is still at the initial stages of adopting information technology in dif-</p><p>ferent spheres of the economy, done through various projects. One such pro-</p><p>gram is the Digital Literacy Programme (DLP). It was a program initiated by</p><p>the government to train over 75,000 teachers in public primary schools in</p><p>readiness for implementing the project. The notion behind this was the gov-</p><p>ernment’s focus on the revolution of the digital economy by improving the</p><p>digital literacy levels in the country. The government believes that technology</p><p>has the power to bring about systematic change in higher education by trans-</p><p>forming learning and teaching in schools by using the latest technology in the</p><p>teaching and learning environment. The other focus of the government is the</p><p>Constituency Digital Innovations Hubs. The project’s focus is to support small</p><p>and medium enterprises in business by ensuring that they have free aces to</p><p>WI-FI in all the 47 counties of Kenya. It will also help create online platforms</p><p>for promoting employment and business opportunities for individuals. The</p><p>other area of interest by the government is Konza City which saw the govern-</p><p>ment purchase close to 5000 acres of land in the peripheries of Konza in</p><p>Makueni County. The main aim is to build a world-class Smart City with an</p><p>amalgam of different businesses, workers, populaces and urban niceties. It is</p><p>deemed by the government to be a prime economic driver for economic devel-</p><p>opment. Konza City will be the city for innovative elucidations for ICTs, busi-</p><p>ness, health and edification branded as the Silicon Savannah (Marchant, 2015).</p><p>According to an article titled “Kenya Breaks Ground on its ‘Silicon Savannah’</p><p>City Project” (WIRED UK, n.d.), the transformation of the currently empty</p><p>city into a mixed functional city will generate 200,000 jobs by 2030, when it is</p><p>likely to be completed. Companies also willing to invest are being offered tax</p><p>breaks to move to the new city to make investments. Silicon Savannah is esti-</p><p>mated to house 35,000 homes, schools, colleges and universities.</p><p>Konza formulae is a crucial part of the plan dubbed Vision 2030. Previous</p><p>government regimes suppressed public resources by using them in their ethnic</p><p>blocks. The silicon savanna valley in Kenya is hoped to be a role model for</p><p>other countries. People around the country will feel improvement in infra-</p><p>structure through high-speed trains and a good road network connecting dif-</p><p>ferent regions. However, previous government regimes and officials took</p><p>advantage to steal public resources for their interests, a situation that led to the</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>113</p><p>2007 political crisis. Kenya has done well in terms of technology adoption,</p><p>which has seen it emerge as a regional leader in the African continent, making</p><p>IBM choose Nairobi as their first site for their African lab for research in 2012.</p><p>Subsequently, other big companies like Intel, Microsoft and Google have also</p><p>opened their head offices in the country.</p><p>Digital innovations have spread rapidly throughout the entire country. For</p><p>digital technologies to benefit everyone and everywhere requires an improve-</p><p>ment of all activities from “analogue” complement to digital investments</p><p>through strengthening regulations that ensure competition among businesses.</p><p>These will be achieved by adapting worker skills to the demands of the new</p><p>economy and by ensuring that institutions are accountable. Inclusion, effi-</p><p>ciency and innovation are the primary mechanisms for the internet to promote</p><p>development (WDR16-BP-How-Tech-Hubs-are-helping-to-Drive-Economic-</p><p>Growth- in-Africa-Kelly-Firestone.pdf, n.d.).</p><p>M-farm is another successful start-up through which farmers get up-to-date</p><p>information concerning the latest agricultural prices. Tech incubators like the</p><p>iHub are sprouting throughout Nairobi to help entrepreneurs unlock their</p><p>business potential. Generally, the average speed of</p><p>internet speed in east Africa</p><p>is higher than in South Africa, which is Kenya’s main rival in the tech sector.</p><p>Mobile phones have also brought about revolutions that have also contributed</p><p>a lot to the entire continent in promoting development and the business</p><p>environment.</p><p>Fiber connectivity in the conurbation is also projected to engender employ-</p><p>ment, yielding close to 16,000 direct jobs to people. Optic fiber cable are being</p><p>done by the government to augment universal access to inexpensive ICTs</p><p>countrywide. The government is unswerving in its commitment to amass</p><p>internet astuteness in the country to stimulate innovation among youths and</p><p>improve public service conveyance.</p><p>The development and acceleration of technology hubs in Africa are a result</p><p>of the revolution of start-ups (De Beer etal., 2017). By 2016, there were 314,</p><p>with half of them located in five countries, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt</p><p>and Morocco. Almost all African countries have at least one or two hubs. The</p><p>rapid acceleration and expansion of these technological changes are very sig-</p><p>nificant in unlocking growth prospects in development financing, including</p><p>physical infrastructure and individuals’ economic lives.</p><p>In their article, De Beer etal. (2017) said that technology hubs are essential</p><p>drivers of innovation, social change and economic opportunity within and</p><p>beyond the African continent. The ascent of Africa’s innovation center points</p><p>is of vital significance as the pattern speaks to an open door for home- developed</p><p>business enterprises coming up with nearby answers for financial issues and</p><p>actuating Africa’s innovation revolution.</p><p>A change in outlook is continuous in Kenya, where emerging innovations</p><p>are gradually supplanting the old method of doing business. Smart and youth-</p><p>ful business visionaries are at the front line to create ICT through innovation</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>114</p><p>hubs, incubators and accelerators to ensure that there is successful unlocking of</p><p>business openings in Kenya (Ndemo, 2017).</p><p>Among the key improvements to advance entrepreneurship was the laying</p><p>of the principal fiber optic cable on the Eastern Seaboard of Africa that saw</p><p>colleges and start-up centers have access to faster internet. In 2007, Safaricom</p><p>propelled versatile mobile money transfer service to a market deficient in infra-</p><p>structure to help retail banking with plentiful cell phone clients. They profited</p><p>from the 5% of the Kenyan populace who had access to bank accounts and cre-</p><p>ated a solution that revolutionized citizens’ financial freedom. The item</p><p>changed clients’ cell phones into roaming bank accounts and cash movement</p><p>gadgets. Within two years, M-Pesa was winning overall tech grants after pick-</p><p>ing up almost 6 million clients and transferring billions every year. The versatile</p><p>cash administration formed the mainland’s most perceived case of technologi-</p><p>cal leapfrogging, propelling ordinary Africans without bank accounts directly</p><p>over conventional physical money into the digital economy.</p><p>Next, there was the Ushahidi application formed in late 2007. The software</p><p>was used to trail violent eruptions in Kenya after the post-election violence.</p><p>The software became a highly valuable instrument for digitally forecasting</p><p>demographic events. As Kenya shifted back to stability, requests came in from</p><p>around the globe to adapt Ushahidi for other purposes.</p><p>By the end of 2008, the application transformed into Ushahidi, the interna-</p><p>tional tech company, which presently has numerous applications in more than</p><p>twenty countries. It crosshatched the iHub Innovation Centre in Nairobi’s</p><p>now known as the African IT. Since 2010, 152 companies have molded out of</p><p>iHub. It has 15,000 members, and on any day, numerous young Kenyans work</p><p>in its labs and interact with global technologists such as Yahoo. iHub gave rise</p><p>to Africa’s innovation Centre movement, inspiring the upsurge in tech hubs</p><p>across the continent. Silicon Savannah stamps M-PESA, iHub and Ushahidi</p><p>saw undersea fiber optic cable installed in Mombasa in 2010, which has signifi-</p><p>cantly increased broadband in East Africa. The project has seen many benefits</p><p>in developing Kenya’s ICT infrastructure toward the country becoming a</p><p>regional ICT hub (Ndemo, 2017).</p><p>There is an ongoing debate about the adoption of disruptive ICTs in Kenya</p><p>and throughout the world, considering that own innovations mentioned above</p><p>(M-PESA, Ushahidi, BRCK and BitPesa) are causing disruptions in other parts</p><p>of the world. There is a need to open up the conversation about venture capi-</p><p>tal, entrepreneurialism, and risk and support disruptions coming from else-</p><p>where that may affect business ventures. It will help ensure that Kenya and</p><p>Africa continue to contribute to this substantial growth as the revolution in</p><p>ICT is a global phenomenon. The ICT revolution is a global and competitive</p><p>phenomenon signaling a paradigm of innovativeness and creativeness through-</p><p>out the world. The rapid expansion in innovation and creativity has attracted</p><p>international avenues for investment to those interested in ‘save Africa’ and</p><p>those interested in investing in it (Marchant, 2015).</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>115</p><p>Kenya offers vibrant advantages to venture capitalists seeking to invest in</p><p>East Africa, with Nairobi regarded as the supreme attractive location in East</p><p>Africa from which they can position themselves to bait the market (Divakaran</p><p>etal., 2018). Nairobi has attractive investment features, which places it as the</p><p>best investment hub in East Africa, alongside Johannesburg and West Africa as</p><p>the investment capitals of South Africa.</p><p>Descriptions for the success of Silicon Valley are a component of the conver-</p><p>gence between venture capital and education. The change in the common law</p><p>supports the rise of Silicon Valley as a global trader, especially in America, to</p><p>offer a pleasant working environment for businesses to achieve industrial devel-</p><p>opment. The development of internet enterprises has necessitated this. Asia</p><p>and Europe imposed strict rules, stringent and robust privacy constraints that</p><p>safeguard intellectual property and privacy issues, protecting local internet</p><p>entrepreneurs. The two continents attended more to the risks that entrepre-</p><p>neurs face concerning property rights holders rather than ordinary individuals,</p><p>whereas America favored both commerce and speech-enabledby the medium..</p><p>Therefore, it is crucial for countries seeking to incubate their own Silicon Valley</p><p>Hub to focus on freeing speech if they would like to break through the new</p><p>industry and take over the world, as that is the focus of nearly all companies</p><p>and countries. The business hubs have become leading suppliers and providers</p><p>of internet services for entrepreneurs. In the United States, the success of</p><p>Silicon Valley straddles the large academic centers of Stanford University and</p><p>the University of California, Berkeley. Both the industries benefit from a sym-</p><p>biotic relationship that exists between them, which allows them to share</p><p>resources and knowledge to support the technology hubs (Chander, 2014).</p><p>Venture capital relies on a stable and sound institutional regime with a pre-</p><p>dictable rule of law and enforcement regime, which safeguards the interests of</p><p>investors (Cardis etal., 2001). Besides, venture capitalists look for a pleasant</p><p>environment with an efficient market free from corruption, which readily</p><p>allows exit from ventures and systems (Wright Robbie, 1998). Having a stable</p><p>and predictable working environment for hubs reduces risks and uncertainties,</p><p>which hinder the success and health of new business ventures. Unstable and</p><p>unpredictable economies like China and Russia have uncodified business envi-</p><p>ronments, making investment unattractive (Meyer& Peng, 2016). Start-up</p><p>ventures in evolving economies face similar levels of uncertainty and the liabil-</p><p>ity associated with the newness of such firms. The resulting danger is that the</p><p>investments</p><p>are domiciled in business environments that are volatile and unpre-</p><p>dictable. VC and enterprises play an essential role in helping venture capitalists</p><p>find their way out of the ever-changing and challenging environment in emerg-</p><p>ing economies.</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>116</p><p>venture capItal InthesIlIcon savannah valley</p><p>The venture capital industry under the Silicon Savannah Valley is made up of</p><p>four leading players, namely, the entrepreneurs who need funding; the venture</p><p>capitalists who want high returns by making money available for SMEs; invest-</p><p>ment bankers who need companies to sell. Venture capital firms cushion them-</p><p>selves against any market risks through co-investment with other firms to</p><p>reduce risk exposure. There are the leading investors and several other co-</p><p>investors who help the principal investor with portfolio diversification, which</p><p>reduces the risk of financial loss. In some cases, the venture capital required</p><p>may be much, which will require two to three companies to pool funds</p><p>together, thus reducing the workload on venture capital partners by getting</p><p>others involved in evaluating the risks during the due diligence period and</p><p>managing the deal(Bunyasi, Bwisa & Namusonge, 2014).</p><p>Venture capital funds purchase minority stakes in future businesses as well as</p><p>fast-growing companies and afford these businesses with funds to fuel contin-</p><p>ued expansion. The amount of investment always ranges from US $250,000 to</p><p>US $2.5million, done mostly over a long period. VC in Kenya is more special-</p><p>ized than private equity due to the high execution risks associated with funding</p><p>start-ups because of risks associated with doing business in Africa. Kenya is the</p><p>hub for venture capital because M-Pesa and Safaricom are the major technol-</p><p>ogy companies in Kenya (Divakaran etal., 2018).</p><p>In a study by Ahlstrom etal. (2007), as economies begin to mature, they</p><p>tend to experience fundamental and institutional transformations, especially in</p><p>how venture capital works in new and innovative markets. During economic</p><p>transformations in institutions, there is a change in the environment in which</p><p>companies operate. As a result, there are changing demands in venture capital</p><p>activities, especially in financing emerging economies.</p><p>Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Africa suffer due to</p><p>insufficient financial resources for sustainability, especially debt financing from</p><p>GOVERNMENT</p><p>ENTREPRENEUR</p><p>VENTURE</p><p>CAPITALIST</p><p>INVESTMENT</p><p>BANK</p><p>Venture Capital in the Silicon Savannah Valley</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>117</p><p>institutions, which is very expensive to access. VC in the form of equity financ-</p><p>ing is preferable as an alternative source of funding for start-ups yearning to</p><p>grow. As the best alternative to the funding of MSMEs globally, VC flaunted</p><p>has received less attention in Africa, with Kenya not an exception. Start-ups</p><p>pose a higher risk to VCs at the initial development stages, with reasonable</p><p>returns expected in subsequent phases of growth and development(Lavender,</p><p>Hughes & Speier, 2018).</p><p>Empirical studies show that VCs are riskier in financing MSMEs in the initial</p><p>development stages; however, they expect reasonable returns from early stage</p><p>financing into their mezzanine, growth and early maturity stages. Explorations</p><p>have established that venture capitalists are cautious about investing in Kenyan</p><p>start-ups due to the unpredictable nature of their operations and the failure to</p><p>meet minimum requirements, and lastly, their greenness in financial manage-</p><p>ment (Ambrose, 2012).</p><p>Avnimelech and Teubal (2008) developed a three-phase innovation and</p><p>technology policy (ITP) model purported to lead to the triumphant rise of VC</p><p>for innovative SMEs both in high- and non-high-tech sectors. Such systems</p><p>have received increasing recognition that could facilitate ICT revolution and</p><p>innovation as well as transition to the knowledge economy.</p><p>MeasurInG acountry’s vc andpc assets attractIveness</p><p>toInvestors</p><p>Investors, in most instances, are not conversant with the socio-economic envi-</p><p>ronment in countries they may want to invest in. They have to make rational</p><p>decisions regarding VC and private equity (PE). They, therefore, gather infor-</p><p>mation and analyze various variables or determinants before allocating funds to</p><p>different countries. Doing due diligence is time- and resource-consuming, but</p><p>it is imperative. Selecting countries for investment becomes hard due to the</p><p>pace of economic development, especially in emerging economies or coun-</p><p>tries(Njue & Mbogo, 2017a, 2017b).</p><p>Groh etal. (2018) developed an index that is used by investors in solving</p><p>problems on where to allocate the funds. The index does not act as a substitute</p><p>for the efforts by the investor to build their knowledge and experience but only</p><p>facilitates the process of initial due diligence. Emerging economies attract</p><p>investors through attractive economic growth opportunities. However, growth</p><p>opportunities should not be solely the determinant that attracts VC and PE</p><p>investments.</p><p>The presence of a burgeoning VC and PE market infrastructure and invest-</p><p>ment atmosphere requires many socio-economic and institutional requisites.</p><p>Most countries are not yet mature enough in terms of socio-economic devel-</p><p>opment to support the business models of VC and PE. Company size and</p><p>employment levels are key hindrances to VC/PE attractiveness and prosperity.</p><p>Economic growth expectations provide a rationale for investors to penetrate</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>118</p><p>many emerging countries. Attractive VC and PE investment opportunities exist</p><p>if an economy is flourishing (Gompers and Lerner, 1998).</p><p>Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) found that VC/PE</p><p>activity is cyclical and significantly associated with GDP growth. Financial for-</p><p>tune and advancement encourage business enterprise by giving an impressive</p><p>collection of capital for risky ventures. The quantity of new pursuits that meet</p><p>all requirements for VC support is identified with societal riches, not exclu-</p><p>sively given better access to financing, yet additionally as a result of higher pay</p><p>among potential clients in the local market. Financial size and development</p><p>are, without a doubt, essential criteria to survey expected arrangement open-</p><p>ings and VC/PE nation-engaging quality. In any case, financial development</p><p>itself is likewise an after-effect of various other approaches, which we talk about</p><p>inside the consequent crucial drivers (Groh & Wich, 2012).</p><p>Cumming and Schwienbacher (2018) documented notable findings of a</p><p>study conducted after the global financial crisis. The study argued that VC in</p><p>certain different countries is due to discipline, the rule of law and enforcement</p><p>of rules and regulations governing start-ups as well as other financial institu-</p><p>tions, especially after the financial crisis. Most pronounced ventures are in</p><p>countries without major financial centers.</p><p>VC and PE in Kenya had attracted a sizeable number of active participants</p><p>and increased investments activities, which is a result of positive annotations</p><p>about the viability of Africa as a home for investment. Sustained positive eco-</p><p>nomic growth and development of the African continent over the past decade</p><p>has spawned some new-found investment interests other than the destination</p><p>for financial aid. Recently studies have established that Foreign Direct</p><p>Investment (FDI) presently exceeds the official development assistance. Early</p><p>stage venture funding through VC and PE financing has been coming up as</p><p>viable funding options for businesses alongside the traditional financing ave-</p><p>nues through commercial lenders (Gugu & Mworia, 2016). Lack of talent</p><p>among entrepreneurs, scarcity of capital and lack of potential market are the</p><p>key factors driving away investors in Kenya. Low-income consumers character-</p><p>ize the market, which has led to disappointment among investors, thereby</p><p>making them</p><p>look for investment elsewhere (Bramann, 2017).</p><p>In another study by DeBeer etal. (2006), the insurgency of Africa’s start-</p><p>ups has instigated a proliferation of hubs, accelerators, incubators and co-</p><p>creation spaces across the continent. The membership of AfriLabs included five</p><p>incubators in four counties when founded in 2011. It is the leading network of</p><p>African hubs. The number of active centers had grown to 314 by 2016, with</p><p>half of the centers located in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco.</p><p>Ideally, nearly every African country is home to at least one or two hubs.</p><p>Africa’s technology hubs’ remarkable progress and perceived potential have</p><p>reaped global attention from newscast outlets like economists and international</p><p>agencies, for example, the World Bank. African hubs have received increased</p><p>attention as a result of events like the visit by Facebook founder and CEO Mark</p><p>Zuckerberg’s to Nigeria and Kenya. Emerging technology hubs in Africa are</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>119</p><p>crucial to homegrown entrepreneurs as they help propel innovation for start-</p><p>ups. Technology hubs are also vital in establishing partnership opportunities</p><p>for ventures in Africa. Projections on the future, the centers are among the key</p><p>drivers of successful global engagements with entrepreneurs in Africa.</p><p>Most banks are expanding the SME portfolio slowly, with the segment</p><p>receiving growing interest from various actors, including policymakers and</p><p>donors who recognize the pivotal role that SMEs play in economic develop-</p><p>ment, employment and investment. However, significant SMEs lack financial</p><p>services, which make them rely heavily on costly lending technologies, and at</p><p>times, they do not suit their needs. There is still much room for product inno-</p><p>vation in the SME finance space, even though there have been positive devel-</p><p>opments over the last few years. Many SMEs finance their working capital</p><p>needs through overdrafts, which is not a pleasant way to raise venture capital</p><p>for businesses. The development of other valuable SME finance products, such</p><p>as factoring and financial leasing, has made some progress over the last few</p><p>years but is still very limited (World Bank, 2015).</p><p>Digitization has transformed venture capital activities for both the entrepre-</p><p>neurs and the practice of pursuing venture activities. It is vital for policymakers</p><p>to monitor digital entrepreneurship for ventures to benefit from economic</p><p>growth and societal welfare. The measurement challenge of digital entrepre-</p><p>neurship rests in the prevalent nature of the spectacle itself that cannot be</p><p>apprehended by count-based measures of individual-level entrepreneurial</p><p>accomplishment (Autio etal., 2019).</p><p>conclusIon andrecoMMendatIons</p><p>The development of the Kenyan Silicon Savannah valley has helped Kenya gain</p><p>prominence and global reputation as the pioneer to capitalize on mobile tech-</p><p>nology. Kenya has successfully implemented ICT services, which have made it</p><p>a home to many technology hubs. Kenya’s situation as the center point for East</p><p>African ventures has likewise enabled it to catch the mind-boggling bit of the</p><p>sub-districts’ ongoing arrangement movement. Nonetheless, Kenya has a cou-</p><p>ple of auxiliary blemishes in the legal, administrative and tax collection struc-</p><p>ture influencing VC and PE.Despite the endeavors of Kenyan experts to make</p><p>impetuses for financial specialists to enroll their assets locally, private equity</p><p>funds still prefer to register offshore rather than establish operations in Kenya.</p><p>Domiciling a reserve in Kenya makes inconveniences concerning charges and</p><p>organizing wasteful aspects. In order to achieve vision 2030, there is a need to</p><p>increase ICT hub services by introducing various competitive products with</p><p>the full spectrum to meet the demands of investors to make the country attrac-</p><p>tive to investors. ICT regulation policy requires concerted efforts by both the</p><p>government and the private sector. Skill development is also a critical challenge</p><p>that is affecting the industry. There is a need to promote skills, talents and ICT</p><p>innovations among various actors and stakeholders to support innovations.</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>120</p><p>references</p><p>Adongo, J. (2011, August). Determinants of Venture Capital in Africa: Cross Section</p><p>Evidence (AERC Research Paper 237). African Economic Research Consortium.</p><p>Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D., & Yeh, K.S. (2007). Venture Capital in China: Past,</p><p>Present, and Future. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 24(3), 247–268.</p><p>Akamanzi, C., Deutscher, P., Guerich, B., Lobelle, A., & Ooko-Ombaka, O. (2016,</p><p>Spring). Silicon Savannah: The Kenya ICT Services Cluster. Microeconomics of</p><p>Competitiveness, 1–37. Retrieved February 28, 2017, from www.isc.hbs.edu/</p><p>resources/courses/moc- course- at- harvard/Documents/pdf/student- projects/</p><p>Kenya%20ITC%20Services%202016.pdf</p><p>Ambrose, J. (2012). Venture Capital (VC): The All-Important MSMEs Financing</p><p>Strategy Under Neglect in Kenya. International Journal of Business and Social</p><p>Science, 3(21), 234–241.</p><p>Autio, E., Szerb, L., Komlosi, E., & Tiszberger, M. (2019, September). The European</p><p>Index of Digital Entrepreneurship Systems 2018 (Vol. JRC117495). Publications</p><p>Office of the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2760/39256</p><p>Avnimelech, G., & Teubal, M. (2008). From Direct Support of business sector R & D/</p><p>Innovation to Targeting Venture Capital/Private Equity: A Catching-up Innovation</p><p>and Technology Policy Life Cycle Perspective. Economics of Innovation and New</p><p>Technology, 17(1), 153–172.</p><p>Bramann, J.U. (2017). Building ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems in resource-scarce</p><p>contexts: Learnings from Kenya’s “Silicon Savannah”. Digital Kenya, 227.</p><p>Bunyasi, G. N. W., Bwisa, P. H., & Namusonge, P. G. (2014). Effect of Access to</p><p>Business Information on the Growth of Small and Medium enterprises in Kenya.</p><p>International Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 5(10), 121–128.</p><p>Cardis, J., Kirschner, S., Richelson, S., Kirschner, J., & Richelson, H. (2001). Venture</p><p>capital: The definitive guide for entrepreneurs, investors, and practitioners. John</p><p>Wiley & Sons.</p><p>Chander, A. (2014). How Law Made Silicon Valley. Emory Law Journal, 62, 639–694.</p><p>Cumming, D. J., & Schwienbacher, A. (2018). Fintech Venture Capital. Corporate</p><p>Governance: An International Review, 26(5), 374–389.</p><p>De Beer, J., Millar, P., Mwangi, J., Nzomo, V., & Rutenberg, I. (2016). A framework</p><p>for assessing technology hubs in Africa. NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and</p><p>Entertainment Law, 6, 237.</p><p>De Beer, J., Mwangi, J., & Nzomo, V.B. (2006). World Patent Information. Journal of</p><p>Intellectual Property Rights, 28(4), 363–364.</p><p>De Beer, J., etal. (2017). A Framework for Assessing Technology Hubs in Africa. NYU</p><p>Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law, 6(2), 237–277.</p><p>Divakaran, S., McGinnis, P., & Schneider, S. (2018, October). Survey of the Kenyan</p><p>Private Equity and Venture Capital Landscape. https://doi.org/10.159</p><p>6/1813- 9450- 8598</p><p>Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (1998). Venture capital distributions: Short‐run and long‐</p><p>run reactions. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2161–2183.</p><p>Groh, A., Lieser, K., & Biesinger, M. (2018). The Venture Capital and Private Equity</p><p>Country Attractiveness Index 2018 (p.44). IESE Business School. Retrieved from</p><p>https://blog.iese.edu/vcpeindex/</p><p>Groh, A.P., & Wich, M. (2012). Emerging economies’ attraction of foreign direct</p><p>investment. Emerging Markets Review, 13(2), 210–229.</p><p>D. O. OGACHI AND Z. ZOLTAN</p><p>http://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/Kenya ITC Services 2016.pdf</p><p>http://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/Kenya ITC Services 2016.pdf</p><p>http://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/Kenya ITC Services 2016.pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.2760/39256</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8598</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8598</p><p>Behavior and Human Resource Management. His latest publication is a co-</p><p>authored monograph titled The Inequality of the COVID-19 Virus: Immediate</p><p>Health Communication, Governance and Response in Four Indigenous</p><p>Regions (2021).</p><p>Kefa M. Otiso is Professor of Geography, Professor of Service Excellence</p><p>(2017–2020), and Director of the Global Village at Bowling Green State</p><p>University, Bowling Green, ohio. He’s also the founding President of the</p><p>US-based Kenya Scholars and Studies Association. He has a PhD degree in</p><p>Urban and Economic Geography from the University of Minnesota, Twin</p><p>Cities. His research interests are in urbanization, globalization, international</p><p>migration, development, governance, and cultural change in the context of</p><p>Africa and North America. He is the co-author of Population Geography:</p><p>Problems, Concepts, and Prospects, 10th Edition (2013) and author of Culture</p><p>and Customs of Tanzania (2013), Culture and Customs of Uganda (2006), and</p><p>many refereed journal articles, book chapters, and editorials.</p><p>EdmondJohnPamba holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and</p><p>Diplomacy and is a graduate student in International Relations and Diplomacy,</p><p>University of Nairobi, Kenya. He is a researcher at the Horn International</p><p>Institute of Strategic Studies. He has co-authored book chapters in Taking</p><p>Stock of Devolution in Kenya and co-authored peer-reviewed journal articles.</p><p>He has also contributed to seminal research works in the areas of security, con-</p><p>flict, counterterrorism and counter-violent extremism, and geopolitics in the</p><p>Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.</p><p>Damaris Parsitau is a sociologist of religion and gender, with a focus on</p><p>Pentecostal Christianity and gender. She is the Kenya Country Director, British</p><p>Institute in East Africa. Dr. Parsitau was recently appointed as a research associ-</p><p>ate and visiting fellow at the Women Studies in Religion Program (WSRP) at</p><p>Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. She is also a former</p><p>Echidna Global Scholar (2017) at the Brookings Institutions, Centre for</p><p>Universal Education (CUE), Washington, DC.Dr. Parsitau is an associated</p><p>research fellow at the University of South Africa (UNISA) and has previously</p><p>held visiting research fellowships at the University of Cambridge in England</p><p>and the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. She has over twenty years’ experi-</p><p>ence in teaching, research, leadership training, and mentorship. She is also well</p><p>traveled and is highly published in peer-reviewed journals and book chapters.</p><p>Stephen Mwachofi Singo is Lecturer in Political Science and Public</p><p>Administration at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, where he teaches interna-</p><p>tional relations and comparative politics. He is also Deputy Director at Security</p><p>Research and Information Centre (SRIC), a Kenyan civil society organization</p><p>xix NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>that researches on the phenomenon of small arms and light weapons prolifera-</p><p>tion, and advocates for disarmament and arms control. From 2007 to 2014, he</p><p>served as Director for Peace and Security at the International Conference on</p><p>the Great Lakes Region based in Burundi, where he coordinated peace and</p><p>security programs in twelve member states of the International Conference on</p><p>the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). He is a member of the editorial board of the</p><p>Arms Trade Treaty Monitor (ATT) based in London, and an associate research</p><p>fellow at the Horn International Institute for Strategic Studies, where he is co-</p><p>Chair of the Maritime Working Group. Singo is a trainer and facilitator at the</p><p>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) based in Nairobi, Kenya.</p><p>He has researched and has had his work published on small arms and light</p><p>weapons proliferation, the regional dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding,</p><p>disarmament and arms control, security, terrorism, and governance. His latest</p><p>publication is Kenya’s National Security Council: Balancing Democratic Control</p><p>and Executive Power. He holds degrees from various Kenyan universities and</p><p>an Executive Diploma from Uppsala University, Sweden.</p><p>KennedyW.Waliaula was, at the time of writing, a senior lecturer in the</p><p>Department of International Relations and Diplomacy and Director of the</p><p>Center for Language and Global Studies at Riara University, Nairobi, Kenya.</p><p>Unfortunately, Dr. Waliaula passed on shortly after submitting his draft chap-</p><p>ter. A renowned Kiswahili scholar and media personality, Dr. Waliaula left</p><p>behind a rich legacy of his writing and scholarship, with many of his books used</p><p>in the Kenyan education system across the curriculum, from primary to univer-</p><p>sity levels. He has been celebrated as a Kiswahili guru who left an indelible</p><p>mark on Kiswahili Studies through his scholarship, media work, and public</p><p>engagement.</p><p>Mary Nyangweso Wangila is Professor of Religious Studies and the</p><p>J.Woolard and Helen Peel Distinguished Chair in Religious Studies at East</p><p>Carolina University in North Carolina. Her research specialization is religion,</p><p>gender, human rights, African religions, and religion and sexuality. She is a</p><p>graduate of the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta,</p><p>Georgia, and Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, where she trained as a</p><p>sociologist, ethicist, and theologian. She is the author of Female Genital</p><p>Cutting: Mutilation or Cultural Right? (2014) and Female Circumcision: The</p><p>Interplay Between Religion, Gender and Culture in Kenya (2007), co-author of</p><p>Religion, Gender-Based Violence, Immigration, and Human Rights (2019),</p><p>and editor of World Religion in the Global World (2020).</p><p>Peter Wafula Wekesa is a senior lecturer in the Department of History,</p><p>Archeology, and Political Studies at Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. He</p><p>holds a PhD in History from Kenyatta University and has had several articles</p><p>published on the history of border community relations, border resources,</p><p>identity politics, nationhood, and international relations. His articles have</p><p>appeared in Africa Development, the Journal of Third World Studies, East</p><p>xx NoTES oN CoNTRIBUToRS</p><p>African Social Science Review, the Journal of East African Studies, Chemichemi,</p><p>and Jahazi, among other refereed journals. He has also contributed several</p><p>book chapters besides being a co-editor of Kenya’s 2013 General Elections:</p><p>Stakes, Practices and Outcomes (2015).</p><p>EdmondMalobaWere is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at</p><p>Kisii University, Kenya, in the Department of Political Science and Peace</p><p>Studies. He has over twenty years of teaching and research experience at the</p><p>university level in East and Central Africa. Dr. Were has been widely published</p><p>in national and international peer-reviewed journals and contributed chapters</p><p>to university-level books. He has mentored several postgraduate students in</p><p>Political Science, especially in diplomacy and international relations, and peace</p><p>and conflict studies. Prof. Were has led action research projects in Rwanda,</p><p>especially the Edqual Project under the University of Bristol. He has special</p><p>research interest in contemporary power politics underlying transboundary</p><p>natural resource management in Africa and dynamics of resource use conflicts</p><p>in Africa.</p><p>Zeman Zoltan is a professor and Director of the Institute of Finance,</p><p>Accounting, and Controlling at Szent István University, Godollo, Hungary.</p><p>xxi</p><p>List of figures</p><p>Fig. 9.1 Venture capital and private equity country attractiveness ranking</p><p>2018 country. (Source: Groh etal. (2018)) 110</p><p>Fig. 9.2 Total venture capital attraction to Africa, 2012–2018. (Source</p><p>Data: Crunchbase/TNA Analysis 2018) 111</p><p>Fig. 13.1 Kenya Military Capabilities. (Source: ADB, (2016). Jobs for</p><p>Youth in Africa. African Development Bank) 176</p><p>Fig. 13.2 Kenyan youth empowering and mentoring younger girls in the</p><p>informal settlements of Nairobi to engage inlocal development</p><p>processes. (Source: Author) 178</p><p>Fig. 13.3 Peace meeting between the Pokot and Turkana at Kapau (North</p><p>Rift Kenya),</p><p>https://blog.iese.edu/vcpeindex/</p><p>121</p><p>Gugu, S., & Mworia, W. (2016). Digital Kenya. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-</p><p>137- 57878- 5</p><p>Kenya Breaks Ground on its “Silicon Savannah” City Project | WIRED UK. (n.d.).</p><p>Retrieved May 22, 2019, from https://www.wired.co.uk/article/</p><p>kenya- silicon- savvanah</p><p>KPMG, & EAVCA. (2017). Private Equity Sector Survey of East Africa for the Period</p><p>2015 to 2016. Retrieved from https://estateintel.com/app/uploads/2015/</p><p>01/2017_KPMG_and_EAVCA_Private_Equity_in_East_Africa_Survey_Final.pdf</p><p>Lavender, J., Hughes, B., & Speier, A. (2018, January). Venture Pulse Q4 2018.</p><p>Venture Pulse. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301- 472X(11)00337- 7</p><p>Marchant, E. (2015, January 4). Who Is ICT Innovation For? Challenges to Existing</p><p>Theories of Innovation, a Kenyan Case Study. CGCS Occasional Paper Series on</p><p>ICTs, Statebuilding, and Peacebuilding in Africa.</p><p>Meyer, K.E., & Peng, M.W. (2016). Theoretical foundations of emerging economy</p><p>business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(1), 3–22.</p><p>Ndemo, B. (2017). The paradigm shift: Disruption, creativity, and innovation in Kenya.</p><p>Digital Kenya: An entrepreneurial revolution in the making, 9(4), 1–12.</p><p>Njue, M.N., & Mbogo, M. (2017a). Factors Hindering SMEs from Accessing the</p><p>Financial Products Offered by Banks. International Journal of Finance, 2(3), 67–85.</p><p>Njue, M. N., & Mbogo, M. (2017b). Improving Access to Banking Products and</p><p>Services for Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya. International Journal of</p><p>Finance, 2(3), 47–66.</p><p>WDR16-BP-How-Tech-Hubs-are-helping-to-Drive-Economic-Growth-in-Africa-</p><p>Kelly- Firestone.pdf. (n.d.)</p><p>World Bank. (2015, September). Financial Sector Deepening: Supply Bank Financing of</p><p>SMEs in Kenya (pp.1–32).</p><p>Wright Robbie, M.K. (1998). Venture capital and private equity: A review and synthe-</p><p>sis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 25(5–6), 521–570.</p><p>9 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SILICON SAVANNAH VALLEY IN KENYA</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57878-5</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57878-5</p><p>https://www.wired.co.uk/article/kenya-silicon-savvanah</p><p>https://www.wired.co.uk/article/kenya-silicon-savvanah</p><p>https://estateintel.com/app/uploads/2015/01/2017_KPMG_and_EAVCA_Private_Equity_in_East_Africa_Survey_Final.pdf</p><p>https://estateintel.com/app/uploads/2015/01/2017_KPMG_and_EAVCA_Private_Equity_in_East_Africa_Survey_Final.pdf</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-472X(11)00337-7</p><p>PART II</p><p>Environment, Globalization, Gender,</p><p>and Society</p><p>125</p><p>CHAPTER 10</p><p>Environmental Policy andPractice inKenya</p><p>WanjalaS.Nasong’o</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>In their search for livelihoods and socio-economic development, human beings</p><p>have had an adverse effect on the natural environment. This deleterious effect</p><p>is a consequence of a number of factors including burgeoning human popula-</p><p>tions; destructive technologies; environmental illiteracy that leads to unsustain-</p><p>able natural resource use; and the unwillingness of human beings to control</p><p>their use of natural resources in a way that maintains them within the capacity</p><p>of the biosphere to provide sustainable support for life. Despite this reality,</p><p>some development practitioners and policymakers in the global south contend</p><p>that concern for the environment is a luxury that only global north countries</p><p>can afford. This perspective holds that environmental preservation and conser-</p><p>vation can only be afforded from the proceeds of development. Nevertheless,</p><p>by the end of the twentieth century, there emerged increasing recognition that</p><p>the kind of development that pollutes and undermines the ecosystem, the very</p><p>mechanism that supports life, is inimical to development worthy of the name</p><p>(Attfield, 1994: 133). Recognizing that “we have pushed the world to an</p><p>utterly unprecedented condition,” Fredrick Ferre (1994: 238) posits that we</p><p>are living in a “post-natural world” in which we have so tampered with the</p><p>An earlier version of this chapter was published as an article in the International</p><p>Journal of Green Growth and Development, 3(1), 2017, 1–19. It is published here with</p><p>permission from The Energy and Resource Institute.</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o (*)</p><p>Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, USA</p><p>e-mail: nasongos@rhodes.edu</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o etal. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_10</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_10&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:nasongos@rhodes.edu</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_10</p><p>126</p><p>atmosphere that it has had a devastating impact on the weather. Temperatures</p><p>and rainfall are no longer entirely determined by some separate, uncivilized</p><p>force. Instead, they have become partly a product of our habits, economies,</p><p>and ways of life. Against this background, Ferre (1994) declares that we are</p><p>condemned to be morally responsible towards the environment. Ian Johnson</p><p>(1999) adds that the unruly demolition of forests and natural resources, the</p><p>gradual dissipation of variegated biological species, soil degeneration, the</p><p>effects of global warming, pollution, and the destruction of the ozone layer,</p><p>make the preservation of the environment compelling if only for prudential</p><p>reasons. In Johnson’s view, the present generation must protect the natural</p><p>environment for future generations.</p><p>This chapter probes and analyzes the contested nature of the nexus between</p><p>the development process and the evolution of environmental policy in Kenya.</p><p>The chapter proceeds within the framework provided by two competing</p><p>approaches to the environmental problem—Cornucopianism and neo-</p><p>Malthusianism. It is noteworthy that the direct result of the general concern</p><p>for the environment is concerted initiatives, in Kenya and elsewhere globally,</p><p>for the protection and conservation of the natural world, an approach rooted</p><p>in the neo-Malthusian perspective. Yet, proponents of these initiatives for the</p><p>protection and preservation of the environment find themselves confronted by</p><p>contrarian forces that argue, from a Cornucopian perspective, that deliberate</p><p>efforts to preserve the environment are misplaced and a waste of time. To</p><p>them, to argue that human activities have negatively affected the ecological</p><p>rhythm and that these need to be institutionally restrained amounts at best to</p><p>crying wolf and, at worst, to environmental scaremongering. We should, they</p><p>argue, continue to exploit the natural environment with abandon and whatever</p><p>negative consequences, if any, will be taken care of as and when they arise by</p><p>the magic of technology and the ingenuity of free-market forces. In the follow-</p><p>ing sections, I map out the key arguments of the neo-Malthusian and</p><p>Cornucopian schools and then apply these schools of thought to the emer-</p><p>gence and development of environmental policy and practice in Kenya. The</p><p>chapter concludes that given the tension between the neo-Malthusians and the</p><p>Cornucopians in the Kenyan context, there is an imperative need to strike a</p><p>balance between the country’s development needs and the imperatives of eco-</p><p>logical preservation.</p><p>the neo-MalthusIan school</p><p>Neo-Malthusianism advances the argument that overpopulation is likely to</p><p>increase the depletion of the world’s resources and environmental degradation</p><p>to unsustainable levels with the ultimate effect of ecological collapse. Thomas</p><p>Malthus pioneered the fundamental theory of population growth. According</p><p>to the theory, population grows at a geometric rate (by multiplica-</p><p>tion—1–2–4–8–16–32), while food supply grows at an arithmetic rate (by</p><p>addition—1–2–3–4–5–6). Populations thus tend to grow at a much faster rate</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O</p><p>127</p><p>than what the natural resources can provide for. In Malthus’ view, the gap</p><p>between the rates of increase in population and food supply results in what he</p><p>called “positive” conditions such as wars, famines, and epidemics that help</p><p>check overpopulation. Malthus was against birth control methods,</p><p>where the youth helped in translating languages</p><p>and interpreting peace resolutions to the elders. (Source: Author) 181</p><p>Fig. 13.4 Marathon runner Jemima Sumgong won gold at the Rio olympics</p><p>in 2016 when she was 31. (Source: Nzwili F. (2016) ‘olympic</p><p>marathon runner feted in Kenya for her faith and endurance’</p><p>Religion News Service August 15, 2016) 183</p><p>Fig. 22.1 Kenya military capabilities. (Data Source: Global Fire Power, 2020) 299</p><p>Fig. 26.1 Distribution of Kenyan Diaspora/Migrants, 2017. (Source: Author</p><p>based on UN [2017] data) 351</p><p>Fig. 26.2 Number of Countries with 1000 or More Kenyan Migrants,</p><p>1990–2017. (Source: Author based on UN [2017] data) 355</p><p>Fig. 26.3 Annual Diaspora Remittance Flows to Kenya, 2004–2019 (US$</p><p>‘000). (Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 2020) 358</p><p>Fig. 32.1 Consumer price index (2010 = 100). (Source: World Bank data,</p><p>2020) 435</p><p>Fig. 32.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (current US$). (Source: World</p><p>Bank data, 2020) 435</p><p>Fig. 32.3 Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (modelled ILo</p><p>estimate). (Source: World Bank data, 2020) 436</p><p>Fig. 32.4 Exports of goods, services, and primary income (BoP, current</p><p>US$). (Source: World Bank data, 2020) 436</p><p>Fig. 32.5 Imports of goods, services, and primary income (BoP, current</p><p>US$). (Source: World Bank data, 2020) 437</p><p>xxiii</p><p>List of tabLes</p><p>Table 2.1 Annual average economic indicators before and during</p><p>adjustment to 1997 20</p><p>Table 2.2 Annual average macroeconomic and sectoral outcomes 20</p><p>Table 2.3 Socio-economic indicators, 1970–1983 21</p><p>Table 26.1 Continental Distribution of the Kenyan Migrant Stock, 2017 350</p><p>Table 26.2 Global/National Distribution of the Kenyan Migrant Stock, 2017 352</p><p>Table 31.1 Major developments in Kenya’s regional integration 422</p><p>1</p><p>CHAPTER 1</p><p>Contemporary Kenya: Politics, Economics,</p><p>Environment, andSociety</p><p>WanjalaS.Nasong’o, MauriceN.Amutabi, andToyinFalola</p><p>IntroductIon</p><p>The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Kenya is a bold attempt to address a</p><p>wide range of themes and ideas in one volume, covering the country’s contem-</p><p>porary society, culture, economics, politics, and environment from multiple</p><p>disciplinary perspectives that are critical and innovative. This volume is pio-</p><p>neering in many ways. First, it explores the politics of the country from single-</p><p>party authoritarianism shortly after independence to the multi-party era</p><p>beginning in 1992 and beyond. Second, it explores critical themes in contem-</p><p>porary Kenya’s society, including issues of the environment, gender and poli-</p><p>tics, civil society and the politics of democratization, as well as the political</p><p>economy of democratization and political reform. Third, the volume examines</p><p>how the external global context has impacted Kenya and, perhaps most impor-</p><p>tantly, the role of Kenya in the global context within the processes of globaliza-</p><p>tion. Essentially, this volume focuses on many themes, ideas, and discourses on</p><p>contemporary Kenya from the time of independence to the present. The</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o (*)</p><p>Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, USA</p><p>e-mail: nasongos@rhodes.edu</p><p>M. N. Amutabi</p><p>Teachnical University of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya</p><p>e-mail: m.amutabi@lukenyauniversity.ac.ke</p><p>T. Falola</p><p>Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA</p><p>e-mail: toyinfalola@austin.utexas.edu</p><p>© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature</p><p>Switzerland AG 2023</p><p>W. S. Nasong’o et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary</p><p>Kenya, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_1</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_1&domain=pdf</p><p>mailto:nasongos@rhodes.edu</p><p>mailto:m.amutabi@lukenyauniversity.ac.ke</p><p>mailto:toyinfalola@austin.utexas.edu</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15854-4_1</p><p>2</p><p>volume builds on its companion, Palgrave Handbook of Kenya’s History, which</p><p>details the country’s history from precolonial times through independence to</p><p>the first decade of post-independence political consolidation. The volume is</p><p>divided into three parts, covering 34 chapters, that focus on the aforemen-</p><p>tioned themes, as briefly summarized in the following sections.</p><p>Part I: IndePendence andthePolItIcal economy</p><p>ofdeveloPment</p><p>Kenya attained political independence from Britain in 1963in a global context</p><p>of emerging Cold War rivalries. This Cold War context greatly shaped the</p><p>political dynamics in Kenya. Indeed, the factional political rivalries and the</p><p>disintegration of the nationalist coalition shortly after independence are attrib-</p><p>utable to this Cold War global context (see Palgrave Handbook of Kenyan</p><p>History, Chap. 21). This section of the Handbook, containing seven chapters,</p><p>examines contemporary Kenya’s efforts at development within a global context</p><p>of Cold War politics. There are debates on whether Kenya has ever moved on</p><p>from the left and right or progressive and conservative orientation of politics.</p><p>Indeed, one of the major issues, contemporary issues, in Kenya’s political econ-</p><p>omy of development is the role of the state in the country’s economy. Whereas</p><p>the country performed relatively well from the time of independence in 1963</p><p>to the late 1970s, the situation began deteriorating in the early 1908s, neces-</p><p>sitating prescriptions from Kenya’s multilateral lenders in the name of struc-</p><p>tural adjustment programs (SAPs). This is the subject of Chap. 2 of this volume.</p><p>Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were introduced in Kenya at a time</p><p>when the country was suffering serious economic decline. The economy had</p><p>stagnated, and it came as no surprise when SAPs were introduced in Kenya in</p><p>the 1990s. They created a lot of problems for the country due to massive</p><p>retrenchment of workers and cutting down on government expenditure on</p><p>social amenities such as schools and hospitals, leading to the introduction of</p><p>cost-sharing, which increased the economic burden on ordinary Kenyans. This</p><p>chapter shows that SAPs also led to the privatization of state corporations such</p><p>as Telecommunications and Kenya Power Company, among others. The net</p><p>result of all these activities was the massive suffering of Kenyans, with little to</p><p>show for positive effects of these IMF and World Bank-imposed austerity</p><p>reforms. The chapter concludes that SAPs failed in many ways because of the</p><p>lack of involvement of stakeholders. This chapter argues that SAPs were never</p><p>intended to assist African development but were top-down policies that served</p><p>the interests of external neoliberal actors and their agents.</p><p>Education is an important sector in the human resource development of</p><p>Kenya. This is the discussion in Chap. 3. The chapter addresses major reforms</p><p>that have taken place in the education sector in Kenya from independence in</p><p>1963 up to the present. The Ominde Commission of 1964 remains the most</p><p>comprehensive education reform policy document in Kenya. Other Commission</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>3</p><p>Reports and Committees have largely operated under the foundation laid by</p><p>the Ominde Commission. Kenya has experienced four major reforms in educa-</p><p>tion. The first took place after independence when the primary cycle was</p><p>changed from eight to seven years. The second, in 1984, with the Mackay</p><p>Report, which introduced a second university in the country (Moi University).</p><p>The third took place in 1985 with the introduction of the 8-4-4 system of</p><p>education. The fourth took place in 2017 with the introduction of Competency</p><p>Based Curriculum (CBC) with a six-year primary cycle.</p><p>Violence has dominated Kenyan politics since independence. This is the</p><p>subject of Chap. 4. The chapter is predicated on the idea that Kenya’s freedom</p><p>was earned through armed struggle through Mau Mau and other groups which</p><p>were regarded as terrorist organizations by the colonial government. Ironically,</p><p>the birth of gangs, militias, and gangs is associated with the independence</p><p>struggle in Kenya. This is because of the unresolved resettlement of the 4500</p><p>Mau Mau veterans who surrendered to the Kenya government at Ruringu sta-</p><p>dium in Nyeri</p><p>in 1964. Whereas 2500 were resettled in the one-million-acre</p><p>land as promised by President Jomo Kenyatta, 2000 were asked to wait for</p><p>their own land to be found. Many resided with their friends who had been</p><p>allocated land, but the promise was never fulfilled, and many of them became</p><p>vagabonds and goons for hire and called variously as “Ngorokos” and often</p><p>hired by politicians for protection, mainly in the Rift Valley. The children of the</p><p>Ngorokos became the Mungiki, who were basically disgruntled landless peo-</p><p>ple. In urban centers, the Mungiki and other vagabonds muted into urban</p><p>gangs and assumed various names while others were ethnic-based, but all</p><p>engaged in forms of violence. In western Kenya, Angola Musumbiji emerged</p><p>as a leading gang for hire, while in Nyanza, Amachuma, Chingororo, Sungu,</p><p>and Baghdad Boys became gangs for hire. In Nairobi, Jeshi la Mzee, Taliban,</p><p>and other groups emerged to challenge Mungiki’s dominance. In Coast, the</p><p>Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and Kaya Bombo became leading gangs</p><p>for hire. Chapter 23 examines the dynamics of these gangs and their political</p><p>and socio-economic impact on the country.</p><p>University students have played a major role in the leadership and democra-</p><p>tization process in Kenya since independence (Amutabi 1995b). This is the</p><p>focus of Chap. 5, which argues that the political course in Kenya would not be</p><p>the same today without university students. The chapter highlights and dis-</p><p>cusses some of the most prominent student leaders, including Titus Adungosi,</p><p>Mwandawiro Mghanga, Wafula Buke, and James Orengo, among others. Some</p><p>of these student activists were arrested, detained, and some, like Titus Adungosi,</p><p>died in detention. Yet others, like Orengo, survived and succesfully joined poli-</p><p>tics and served as members of parliament, senators, and even as cabinet minis-</p><p>ters. Overall, Chap. 5 examines the ways in which university students and</p><p>former student leaders have participated in shaping national politics in Kenya.</p><p>Kenya has had many public intellectuals, such as Ali Mazrui, William</p><p>Ochieng, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and Makau Mutua. This is the subject of</p><p>Chap. 6. One of the important themes to emerge has been the debate on</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>4</p><p>centralization and devolved development approaches. The chapter also cap-</p><p>tures other debates such as the land question, minority question, questions on</p><p>religion, anxieties of coastal inhabitants, what form of democracy, presidential</p><p>or parliamentary, the debate on farmers and herders and merging of the two</p><p>systems, debate on 30% rule for either gender in leadership, issues of gender</p><p>mainstreaming, protection of people living with disabilities, as well as equitable</p><p>sharing of national resources. The analysis aims to create the opportunity to</p><p>arrive at a national consensus on issues of representation and historical injus-</p><p>tices. The chapter makes an important contribution to the understanding of</p><p>public intellectuals in shaping debates around development.</p><p>Chapter 7 examines the country’s Matatu industry focusing on Nairobi</p><p>City. From the time of independence to the present times, the public has relied</p><p>on the Matatu (minibus) industry for transport and movement within and</p><p>outside the city of Nairobi. The chapter highlights the unique fact that the</p><p>Matatu industry is the only sector that has not been aided by any external or</p><p>local funding. Interestingly, the industry has presented itself as a private entity</p><p>that generally contributes a huge chunk to the Kenyan economy by dominat-</p><p>ing the transportation of passengers and small-sized goods throughout the</p><p>country. Yet, the government has continually struggled to manage the sector</p><p>over time. This lack of effective government management and control of the</p><p>sector impacts all who use and rely on the Matatu system, as systems of control</p><p>often surface without warning, often resulting in retaliation. These challenges</p><p>raise the question, should the government solely assume the role and com-</p><p>pletely eliminate private actors in the transport industry to ensure that trans-</p><p>port is managed properly? Is the government able to take on this task and does</p><p>it have the resources in place to sustain and manage the public transport sector?</p><p>Chapter 7 reflects on the Matatu system in light of Nairobi’s current transpor-</p><p>tation challenges. It argues that despite many challenges, the Matatu system is</p><p>the backbone of transportation in Kenya; from its origin, it has served a key</p><p>function in the transport needs of Nairobi and the country at large based on its</p><p>unique history and development.</p><p>Over 70% of Kenya’s land is arid and semi-arid and occupied by pastoralist</p><p>populations. This is the discussion in Chap. 8. Pastoralism is one of the sectors</p><p>that has not received a lot of attention in Kenya compared to farming. Northern</p><p>Kenya has been neglected from the colonial period to the postcolonial state</p><p>due to many factors. Despite the marginalization of pastoralism in northern</p><p>Kenya, the region has made great strides in development, especially after devo-</p><p>lution in 2013. Northern Kenya has many strategic resources, including live-</p><p>stock development, hosting of over ten national parks with a rare species of</p><p>animals not found anywhere else in the world, as well as great potential in</p><p>irrigation agriculture. There are unique challenges of the region such as lack of</p><p>water, harsh and unforgiving terrain, insecurity, livestock diseases, and expo-</p><p>sure to porous international borders, which have made the people of the region</p><p>engage in creative mechanisms of coping with these challenges. The chapter</p><p>captures new approaches of taming the terrain that will transform it into a</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>5</p><p>productive and dynamic place that can contribute to Kenya’s development. A</p><p>lot of efforts have been put in place to improve infrastructures in the region,</p><p>such as the northern corridor infrastructure under the LAPSSET project, as</p><p>well as roads, electricity, hospitals, water, and security posts. There are also</p><p>efforts to improve the breeding of livestock, production, and marketing, as</p><p>well as programs aimed at empowering people in northern Kenya.</p><p>Kenya has been fascinated by the role of venture capital in creating wealth.</p><p>This is the subject of Chap. 9. The role of “Silicon Valley” has been seen as a</p><p>solution to some of the development challenges in Kenya. Many economists</p><p>believe that if used properly, venture capital can trigger development in other</p><p>sectors, especially addressing the problem of vulnerable sectors that require</p><p>direct investment injection. The argument is that there should be mechanisms</p><p>of directing investors in proper areas where they can act as incubators of great</p><p>ideas along the lines of California’s Silicon Valley. Kenya has created business</p><p>parks whose aim is to tap into venture capital in places such as Konza City in</p><p>Machakos and Makueni Counties. Although it has taken a long time to estab-</p><p>lish Silicon Valley, there are indications that the future is bright because of the</p><p>emerging strength in Kenya being preferred as a global investment hub in</p><p>East Africa.</p><p>Part II: envIronment, GlobalIzatIon, Gender,</p><p>andSocIety</p><p>Kenya is an important partner in the global realm of environmental protection</p><p>and preservation, having successfully lobbied to host the United Nations</p><p>Environmental Program (UNEP) after its creation following the 1972 UN</p><p>Conference on the Human Environment. Indeed, Kenya is the only country</p><p>outside of the Global North to host the headquarters of a United Nations</p><p>agency. One of the leading advocates of environmental protection in the coun-</p><p>try, Wangari Maathai, went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004 for her</p><p>efforts. Similarly, the country enjoys a vibrant civil society, and, in terms of</p><p>sports, Kenya has remained dominant in international athletic events, especially</p><p>in long-distance running, rivaled only by Ethiopia. Accordingly, Part II</p><p>of the</p><p>Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Kenya, composed of Chaps. 10–24,</p><p>focuses on these important issues that intersect the domains of the environ-</p><p>ment, globalization, gender, and society.</p><p>Kenya has been active in environmental issues on the global stage. This is</p><p>the subject of Chap. 10. Environmental policy and practice in Kenya have been</p><p>in adherence to global protocols, accords, agreements, and treaties. As the</p><p>home of UNEP, Kenya has made great strides in ensuring that environmental</p><p>policies are sound and in agreement with global practices. Since independence,</p><p>the country has had a ministry in charge of the environment, dealing with</p><p>issues of conservation and preservation of the environment. Kenya is a signa-</p><p>tory to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal Protocol, and other global protocols</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>6</p><p>working towards conservation of environments. It has worked closely through</p><p>intergovernmental agencies to ensure that the national water towers of Mt.</p><p>Kenya, Mt. Elgon, Aberdares, the Mau, and the Cherangany are preserved.</p><p>Great efforts have been made to ensure that existing carbon sinks are sustained.</p><p>Kenya is among few African countries that have worked closely to maintain at</p><p>least 10% of its landmass under forest cover. The country has embarked on</p><p>development that will ensure minimum utilization of fossil energy, focusing on</p><p>promoting green energy such as wind, solar, biogas, and geothermal sources,</p><p>which are huge issues in debates on climate change. Chapter 10 examines these</p><p>issues and identifies a dichotomy between environmental conservationists</p><p>(Neo-Malthusians) and environmental exploiters (Cornucopians) on the</p><p>Kenyan policy and political terrain.</p><p>Wangari Maathai is an icon in environmental conservation and is regarded</p><p>very highly in the global conservation movement through her activities in her</p><p>NGO, the Green Belt Movement. This is the subject of Chap. 11. The chapter</p><p>highlights the role Wangari Maathai played in preserving Karura Forest from</p><p>annexation by greedy land grabbers, as well as protecting Uhuru Park from</p><p>land grabbers who wanted to construct a tower in the park. She suffered a lot</p><p>of violence from security agencies acting on behalf of people in government</p><p>with eyes on forest land and public parks. She single-handedly took on the elite</p><p>in society who were bent on destroying Kenya’s environment. Her role earned</p><p>her the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in 2004, becoming the first black African</p><p>to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Her message remains important in spearheading</p><p>the fight against environmental degradation and working towards sustainable</p><p>development, democracy, and peace.</p><p>The greatest effort made by the government of Kenya in addressing issues</p><p>of gender inequality, affirmative action and gender mainstreaming was in the</p><p>enactment and promulgation of the 2010 constitution, which incorporated the</p><p>30% rule of either gender taking positions in leadership. This is what is covered</p><p>in Chap. 12. Since independence, the government of Kenya has been working</p><p>on issues of affirmative action, especially on the empowerment of women and</p><p>girls. The intention has been to narrow the gap between men and women in</p><p>access to education, health, and economic sustainability. The chapter points</p><p>out the obstacles created in the quest for gender equality in Kenya, such as</p><p>related cultural obstacles, problems of patriarchy and skewed power and influ-</p><p>ence, scarcity of resources, religious beliefs, and gender stereotypes. To address</p><p>some of these issues, the 2010 constitution resulted in the creation of the</p><p>Gender Commission of Kenya and seats in County Assemblies and 47 parlia-</p><p>mentary seats reserved for women. Various ministries have made efforts such as</p><p>the Ministry of Education in admitting girls to the university under affirmative</p><p>action with lower points compared to those of boys. There are ongoing efforts</p><p>in which the government implements global demands for gender equity</p><p>through national, regional, and global bodies.</p><p>The Kenyan youth are an important segment of the country’s development,</p><p>as addressed in Chap. 13. The youth constitute over 60% of Kenya’s population</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>7</p><p>and have continued to play an important role in development through youth</p><p>groups, roles in formal and informal employment, as well as being active par-</p><p>ticipants in other sectors. This is the subject of Chap. 33. A ministry has been</p><p>created for youth that caters to youth interests and development. The govern-</p><p>ment of Kenya has worked through agencies such as the National Youth Service</p><p>(NYS) and the National Youth Fund (NYF) towards the empowerment of</p><p>youths. The 2030 Vision has placed a lot of emphasis on developing youth tal-</p><p>ent and their incorporation into mainstream development. The government</p><p>has constructed technical training institutes in each constituency to take care of</p><p>the increasing needs of youths. The country has created ten National</p><p>Polytechnics as well as many centers of youth talent improvement. The govern-</p><p>ment places a high premium on the training of youth through granting of</p><p>bursaries and scholarships, being aware of the role of youth in national</p><p>development.</p><p>There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that civil society has played an</p><p>important role in Kenya’s democratization process. This is the discussion of</p><p>Chap. 14, which addresses the role of civil society and democratization in</p><p>Kenya. It was through the teaming of civil society with political party activists</p><p>that Kenya’s second liberation was assured. Civil Society organizations were at</p><p>the forefront of ensuring that Kenya succeeded in becoming a multiparty</p><p>democracy again. Many of them included the Green Belt Movement, National</p><p>Convention Executive Council, Kituo cha Sheria, and Bunge la Wananchi,</p><p>among others which have ensured that the democratic project in Kenya suc-</p><p>ceeds. The chapter addresses the battles of civil society with the state as well as</p><p>the role they have played in creating democratic awareness and expanding</p><p>democratic space. The Coalition for a National Convention under Kivutha</p><p>Kibwana and Willy Mutunga made sure that Moi and KANU were put on</p><p>notice for the repeal of section 2(A) of the constitution. Other groups joined</p><p>in the struggle to agitate for change. The chapter explores the role of civil soci-</p><p>ety organizations in Kenya’s democratization while noting that this realm is</p><p>replete with many contradictory possibilities, some benign and progressive,</p><p>while others are odious and self-serving.</p><p>Kenya transitioned into its second republic in 2010 with the promulgation</p><p>of a new constitution. This new constitutional dispensation and the devolved</p><p>governance structure that became a reality in 2013 is the subject of Chap. 15.</p><p>Devolution was spelled out in the 2010 constitution, creating Kenya’s second</p><p>tier of governance at the county level. There was a lot of resistance to devolu-</p><p>tion by the national government, which saw its position threatened by the</p><p>demand in the constitution to share 15% of revenue with devolved units.</p><p>Although the national government gave in to sharing resources with counties,</p><p>it resisted the move of withdrawing government workers from counties. For</p><p>example, the former provincial administration was retained and renamed inte-</p><p>rior and coordination, among others. There was a lack of good planning and</p><p>implementation of devolved services such as health and early childhood educa-</p><p>tion, among others. This resulted in health workers going unpaid for months</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>8</p><p>due to delayed disbursement of funds by the national treasury to the County</p><p>governments. Delay in payment of salaries led to many strikes by health work-</p><p>ers, which affected service provision in many parts of Kenya. Some believe that</p><p>the future of devolution is assured due to its incorporation into the constitu-</p><p>tion and the many advocates</p><p>of the devolved units.</p><p>Chapter 16 addresses the theme of ethnicity around which Kenya’s politics</p><p>is organized and the violence spawned by the politicization of ethnicity and</p><p>ethnicization of politics. The chapter addresses problems of ethnicity in Kenya</p><p>by contending that ethnicity rises during sharing of resources or during elec-</p><p>tions. Kenya has experienced periodic ethnic violence during elections, leading</p><p>to deaths and destruction of property. This chapter looks at the dynamic of</p><p>political violence and how violence has been fanned by ethnicity, paying atten-</p><p>tion to the role of political leaders in contemporary Kenya. The chapter points</p><p>out that it is until Kenyans outgrow ethnic considerations in the election of</p><p>leaders that ethnic violence might be minimized. It also points out that ethnic</p><p>factors in Kenya have influenced elections and undermined democratic prac-</p><p>tices. There are those who argue that with increasing urbanization, ethnic ten-</p><p>sions may dissipate.</p><p>Since independence in 1963–2022, the regimes of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel</p><p>Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta have given us the opportunity to assess</p><p>presidential leadership styles in Kenya. This is the subject of Chap. 17. Different</p><p>presidents in Kenya have had different styles of leadership based on the realities</p><p>of their times and idiosyncrasies. Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency was based on the</p><p>consolidation of political power. His presidency was dominated by the creation</p><p>of institutions and structures of control. The ascendance of Moi to power in</p><p>1978 continued the legacy of a single party, and elements of dictatorial tenden-</p><p>cies came into light on many occasions. There was political intolerance such as</p><p>detention without trial as well as roadside appointments and declarations not</p><p>backed by constitutional authority. This culminated in the serious erosion and</p><p>decline of democracy until 1992, when multiparty was restored. Moi’s two</p><p>terms from 1992 to 2002 did not differ much from the previous reign. Mwai</p><p>Kibaki’s reign from 2002 to 2013 ushered in new democratic efforts and ele-</p><p>ments of democracy. There was evidence of consultation and consensus in</p><p>decision-making, culminating in the promulgation of the new constitution in</p><p>2010. Uhuru’s presidency from 2013 to 2022 initiated a new dialogue on</p><p>governance through partnerships with other political actors. The annulment of</p><p>Uhuru Kenyatta’s election in 2017 became one of the political highlights of his</p><p>presidency in the way he handled the Supreme Court verdict. His partnership</p><p>with opposition leader Raila Odinga through the celebrated handshake showed</p><p>a new trend in the democratic dispensation in Kenya.</p><p>Sports and leisure have been ignored in write-ups on Kenya’s historical past.</p><p>This theme is discussed in Chap. 18. The chapter shows how Kenya’s sports</p><p>and leisure have ignited interest, especially in athletics, from external actors.</p><p>Kenyan athletes have dominated the global scene, thereby attracting attention</p><p>to their training. The influx of visitors to high-altitude training centers in Iten,</p><p>W. S. NASONG’O ET AL.</p><p>9</p><p>Eldoret, Kapsabet, Nyahururu, and Ngong has increased Kenya’s revenue col-</p><p>lection. The success in athletics has not been matched in other sporting areas</p><p>such as football, rugby, volleyball, basketball, netball, tennis, hockey, swim-</p><p>ming, badminton, cricket, handball, and boxing. Equally, the leisure sector</p><p>suffers from inadequate infrastructure and insecurity in some of the prime</p><p>tourist attractions in the country. Kenya’s earnings in tourism and hospitality</p><p>could do better if the government could better manage the sector.</p><p>Religion has been a mixed bag for Kenya. This is the subject of Chap. 19.</p><p>The chapter covers the religious dynamic of Kenya based on the vast benefits</p><p>Kenya has derived from faith-based development in the country. Religious</p><p>organizations from the Catholic church to Protestant churches, such as the</p><p>Anglican Church of Kenya, Pentecostal churches, the Salvation Army, the</p><p>Seventh Day Adventists, have ushered institutional development in learning</p><p>institutions and hospitals. Religions have also played an important role in</p><p>development, such as Muslim, Hindu, and other religious investments in social</p><p>infrastructure. Religious leaders have also played an important role in the</p><p>democratization process through the Catholic Bishops, the NCCK, the</p><p>Supreme Council of Muslims, and The Hindu Council of Kenya, among oth-</p><p>ers. The preservation of Kenyan cultures is assured through the department of</p><p>heritage supporting museums and a wide range of cultural centers. The reli-</p><p>gious institutions and cultural centers promote dialogue that is useful for sus-</p><p>tainable peace in Kenya. The 2010 constitution recognizes alternative dispute</p><p>resolution mechanisms under which religious and cultural groups are destined</p><p>to play a major role. On the flip side, as the chapter notes, the rise of radical</p><p>Islam has been blamed for increased terror activities in the country that have</p><p>had major negative consequences socially, politically, and economically.</p><p>The Kenyan constitution of 2010 unequivocally stipulates that Kiswahili is</p><p>the sole national language. This means Kiswahili is the major trans-ethnic lan-</p><p>guage of communication for the more than 50 million Kenyans at home and</p><p>abroad. It is the language of social interaction at weddings, funerals, get-</p><p>togethers, dating, and, in general, public and private functions. Furthermore,</p><p>Kiswahili enjoys pride of place with English as one of the two official languages.</p><p>Kenya, in this regard, has distinguished itself as the first country ever in the</p><p>world to constitutionalize the dual role of Kiswahili as both the national and</p><p>official language. And yet paradoxically, Chap. 20 contends that the state of</p><p>Kiswahili in Kenya is a case of broken language and broken promises. The</p><p>chapter explores the origins and development of Kiswahili and underscores its</p><p>importance as the lingua franca of the Eastern African region.</p><p>Kenya is starting to recognize the importance of indigenous knowledge sys-</p><p>tems, especially in creating opportunities for alternative medicine. This is the</p><p>subject of Chap. 21. The chapter covers indigenous knowledge and alternative</p><p>medicine, which are neglected fields in the study of development in Kenya</p><p>because of their historical isolation by the colonial state in Kenya. The chapter</p><p>highlights four reasons indigenous medicine is important in Kenya’s develop-</p><p>ment dispensation. First, over 90% of Kenyans have used indigenous medicine</p><p>1 CONTEMPORARY KENYA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY</p><p>10</p><p>at one time or another. Second, indigenous medicine is accessible as the first</p><p>step of treatment for many Kenyans. Third, the prohibitive cost of biomedicine</p><p>makes it inaccessible to most Kenyans and opens up opportunities for indige-</p><p>nous medicine. Fourth, the widespread knowledge on indigenous medicine</p><p>removes the age, economic, gender, and formal education gap in accessing this</p><p>indigenous medicine. The chapter points out why the sector remains popular</p><p>and the need for the Kenyan government to cultivate ways to harness the</p><p>potential in this area for the benefit of the majority. There is a need to explore</p><p>through research the efficacious and therapeutic values of indigenous medicine</p><p>in order to establish patterns and trademarks that protect indigenous medicine.</p><p>The importance of national security in national development cannot be</p><p>gainsaid because national peace and stability are predicated on the stability of</p><p>this sector. This is the discussion of Chap. 22. The chapter addresses the mili-</p><p>tary, police, correctional service, and other security agencies in charge of the</p><p>protection of forests, wildlife, national parks, marine resources, and county</p><p>government enforcement agencies. The chapter highlights the harmonious</p><p>existence of all the agencies in this sector. However, there is a need to incorpo-</p><p>rate informal and nonformal entities such as village security</p>